FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JULY 1963

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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HOLD FAST

By Paul-Henri Spaak

IT becomes clearer and clearer that January 14, 1963, is fated to go down in history as the "black Monday" of both European policy and Atlantic policy. What occurred that day was something much more significant than the mere dooming of negotiations between Great Britain and the European Community. It was, in plain fact, an attack on the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community—an attack, that is, on the two most significant achievements of the free world since the end of the Second World War.

Those who have been active in international politics since 1945 must sometimes wonder whether they have done better or worse than those who were in power after 1919. It can be said quite objectively, I believe, that they have done better. They adapted themselves—though not without some difficulty—to the formidable process of decolonization; they created NATO, the greatest defensive alliance the world has ever known; and by setting up the Common Market they halted the process of deterioration which was beginning in Europe. If it be added that the likelihood of a European war which might grow into a world war now seems very remote, one might conclude that there was no reason to be too dissatisfied.

But the decision taken by General de Gaulle on January 14 puts all this either directly or indirectly in jeopardy.

We must begin by analyzing the method which he used to break up the negotiations with the British, the pretexts given and why the true reasons were concealed. When we have ascertained what the real reasons were, we shall be ready to draw conclusions regarding such a dangerous diplomatic action.

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II

The background of the problem can be sketched rapidly. For a long time—for too long a time—Britain refused to accept the idea of a united Europe. Its hesitations and procrastinations are regrettable, but the reasons are understandable: a great country which has just won a great war is naturally reluctant to acknowledge that it must radically alter its age-old traditions. The mere fact of victory works against the effort of readjustment.

Great Britain accepted the Council of Europe with reluctance. It deliberately refused to take part in the Coal and Steel Community. It stayed out of the discussions on the European Defense Community. It chose not to participate in the negotiations which were to culminate in the Common Market. For a long time it did not believe that the European idea would work, and it would not abandon its traditional views and policies in order to embark on what it deemed to be a hazardous adventure. But the European Coal and Steel Community was formed, the Treaty of Rome was concluded and ratified, and the European Commission was set up. The achievements of the new organization were as swift as they were sensational.

During this time, the British Empire was falling apart and both economic and political relations among the Commonwealth countries were becoming less important. The hour of agonizing reappraisal was drawing near. It struck in 1961.

Mr. Macmillan's Government understood that it had to choose, and it made its choice with courage. In October 1961, Mr. Heath declared in Paris that his country was ready to accept the principles of the Treaty of Rome, with the attendant political consequences. He added that the three main problems involved in Britain's entry into the Common Market were: the existing ties between Britain and the Commonwealth countries; British agriculture; and the interests of the European Free Trade Area. The six members of the European Economic Community, France included, declared that they accepted this statement of the problem and agreed to open negotiations on the basis of it.

Was France ready at that time, or was she not ready, to admit Britain into the Community? No categorical reply can be given. What is certain is that France executed a triple play designed to make it more difficult for Britain to enter the Common Market. France invented a procedure for the discussions which contained

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dangers that I, for one, perceived at once. Britain should have been regarded as a possible future partner and treated as we had treated each other when discussing the Treaty of Rome. Instead, it was decided that the Six as a group would negotiate with Britain standing by itself. Throughout the negotiations, therefore, there were double parleyings, first among the partners of the E.E.C., and then between them and Britain. In preparing for the Treaty of Rome we had set up a Committee of the Whole on which all the partners were represented and which sought mutually acceptable solutions; this time we were adversaries confronting each other without having suggested possible solutions.

During the talks among the Six, France cleverly insisted on a strict interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. This naturally hindered the granting of exceptions and accommodations which Britain asked for, and such as we had generously accorded to ourselves. France also demanded that real negotiations with Great Britain should not begin until after agricultural policy had been settled within the E.E.C. and until after relations between the E.E.C. and the African countries had been regulated. France knew that by hardening the position of the E.E.C. on these two points it would be erecting obstacles which Britain would find it hard to surmount.

Without giving the matter enough thought, even those who were most in favor of Britain's entry into the Common Market accepted these tactics. In such circumstances the negotiations were bound to take a long time, and did. But long and difficult as they were, progress was made. The relations between the E.E.C. and the Commonwealth countries were practically settled. With only a few exceptions, Britain adopted the E.E.C.'s external tariffs. Finally, Britain agreed to align its agricultural policy with that of the E.E.C. by December 31, 1969, at the latest.

Two full weeks of further discussion were planned to begin January 14, 1963. Optimists among the negotiators hoped during this period to reach the final stage which would open the way for the British entry. A few days before the beginning of the session, Mr. Fayat, Belgium's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Paris to settle the details of the proceedings. Everything went smoothly. He returned to Brussels very pleased with the talks he had had. The negotiators met as scheduled on January 14. Nothing gave them the slightest hint of the bombshell that was about to explode.

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On the afternoon of January 14, General de Gaulle held a press conference at which, to everyone's stupefaction, he propounded two ideas: (1) Great Britain was not ripe for admission to the Common Market; (2) the Brussels negotiations, having reached a deadlock, should be terminated. The effect in the conference was dismay, confusion and also anger.

There can be no doubt that the method employed was totally inexcusable. I have never heard anyone—anyone at all, not even the most loyal Gaullist—attempt to justify it. Not only was the method inexcusable as regards Britain; it was equally inexcusable vis-à-vis France's five partners. One simply cannot comprehend how negotiations begun by general agreement among a group of six nations could be broken off at the wish of one member of the group without any previous discussion, or why a press conference should be chosen to make this wish known abruptly to its partners.

Let it not be said that this procedural aspect is secondary. I regard it, on the contrary, as very important. It reveals General de Gaulle's open contempt for the views of his partners and at the same time a will to make his own views prevail at the expense not merely of the rules of common civility but of the rules by which a community must be governed. When one partner in an organization like the European Community thinks it natural to impose its will on all the rest, nobody can be surprised if the spirit of collaboration languishes.

Certainly the concept of the European Community which lies behind this "diplomatic method" is a highly individual one. In General de Gaulle's mind, the partners in the Community are not really equal, as the founders had planned. What we are witnessing is an attempt by one partner, who regards himself as the strongest, to impose his own will on the others. In the coming year, however, the partners have no intention of accepting such treatment.

III

It will long be argued whether the negotiations with Britain might have reached a successful outcome or whether they were in any case doomed to failure. No definite answer can ever be given. The only way of discovering whether negotiations will be successful is to pursue them to the end. That is what General de Gaulle would not permit.

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Of all those concerned, only the French believed that the negotiations would fail. France's five partners in the Common Market, Great Britain and the European Commission were unanimous in taking the opposite view. Though the negotiators realized that difficulties existed and that there were still important problems to be solved—even tackled for the first time—all who took part, except the French, laid greater emphasis on the ground already successfully covered. All except the French foresaw the possibility of a satisfactory final settlement.

But further controversy on this point is futile, not only because it can never be decided, but chiefly because it soon became apparent that the two grounds cited by the President of the French Republic for terminating the negotiations were only pretexts; the real reasons lay elsewhere.

When we search for these real reasons I do not think that anyone can deny today that the Nassau agreement between Great Britain and the United States was the underlying cause of General de Gaulle's decision. Doubtless he had never been enthusiastically in favor of Great Britain's entry into the Common Market; but judging from his attitude between October 1961 and January 1963, he was reluctant to show his hostility openly or to take direct responsibility for the failure of the Brussels negotiations. He would certainly have preferred them to fail for technical reasons. The Nassau agreement seems to have been a new element in the situation which caused him to explode his bombshell on January 14.

I believe that, as he saw it, the British at Nassau had the choice between a nuclear policy pursued in close collaboration with the United States and a European policy carried out in collaboration with France. By choosing the first, Britain definitively cut itself off from Europe.

From this we may deduce that the key element of General de Gaulle's doctrine, the one which has the highest priority, the one which shapes his international policy, is his determination that France shall have her own nuclear *force de frappe*. All those who do not help him to carry out his "grand design" must therefore be against him. For myself, this is not a new view of General de Gaulle's policy; I already held it when I was Secretary-General of NATO.

General de Gaulle's thinking might be summed up in simplified form as follows: "Every great country must have its own nuclear

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deterrent. France is a great country. Therefore France must have her own nuclear deterrent." I am convinced that nothing will persuade him to advance beyond the stark simplicity of this syllogism. Because the United States did not accept it, Franco-American relations within NATO deteriorated. Because Britain would not adhere to it at Nassau, the doors of Europe were shut in its face.

I do not share either General de Gaulle's ideas on the French *force de frappe* or his concept of the defense of the free world. Before I explain my reasons, however, let me note two arguments in support of his thesis which I think carry some weight:

1. It is difficult to suppose that great European countries such as Great Britain and France can be completely excluded from the formulation of nuclear strategy and from the execution of it in time of war. Their standing in the world, their history, their great military traditions all speak against their being reduced to such a secondary role. It would be all but impossible to get them to agree that in a war in which their existence was at stake they were to have no say on its most important aspect.

2. To abandon the idea of building up a national *force de frappe* would very probably mean the closing of important avenues of progress in certain scientific and industrial fields which are today of paramount significance. The fact is (and it does not do us honor) that most of the vast sums needed for scientific research and development can be obtained only through military budgets. National defense is often the only reason that seems adequate to justify many kinds of expenditure. Considerations of national defense are what have enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to take the lead in the conquest of space. One must either imitate them or renounce the pursuit of that tremendous adventure.

Both arguments, I repeat, are sound. True, the United States has made an effort to meet the first, at least indirectly. Its proposals for an inter-allied nuclear force or a multilateral nuclear force within the framework of NATO would certainly furnish a basis for collaboration in which the largest allies would participate in making nuclear strategy. And in fact it is inconceivable that there should not be close coöperation between the NATO and the American forces. Nevertheless, the American proposals as they stand have not solved the crucial question as to which authority is entitled to make use of the nuclear weapons. Thus

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far, the famous question, "Who will push the button?" remains unanswered. It seems to me, however, that an answer can be found.

On the other hand, the problem created by the scientific and industrial knowledge that may be acquired through military research in atomic and electronic fields remains wide open. I have thought for a long time that this is the weakest point of the Atlantic Alliance. When I was Secretary-General of NATO, I used to say: "Is it really essential to European pride that Europe discover again what was long ago discovered in the United States? And on the other hand, would the security of the United States be jeopardized if it told its friends secrets which are already known to its enemies?" This great gap in the field of collaboration, this refusal to share knowledge which extends beyond the scope of military needs, is the chief reason for the difficulties we have mentioned, and to some extent it justifies the French attitude.

In the interests of objectivity, I hasten to add that General de Gaulle's frequent allusions to the temporary nature of the Atlantic Alliance and his repeated references to a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals are not of the kind to inspire great confidence on the part of the United States Government. Secrets can be shared only with an unconditional ally.

IV

General de Gaulle's television speech of April 19 sheds further light on his concepts. Twice at least, in seeking to justify the crushing financial burden which he asks the French people to assume in order that he can build up his nuclear *force de frappe,* he stated that the effort was necessary in order to defend France if it were attacked. This brings us to the crux of the problem.

The planning of a military organization, and the tactics and strategy for its use, must be based on a set of political assumptions.

It seems to me that from the political standpoint General de Gaulle visualizes a future war as a virtually unaltered repetition of what happened in the wars of 1914 and 1939: France is attacked—and I presume that in his mind the Communists this time take the place of the Germans. Such a conception strikes me as entirely outdated.

In my view, if a third world war occurred, it would have noth-

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ing in common with the wars we have known. It would not be fought for the purpose of restoring frontiers, or of territorial conquest, or of economic expansion. A third world war could have no other objective than to fulfill the Communist desire for world domination, and in such a conflict Europe would play only a secondary part. If, contrary to the ideas expounded and defended by Mr. Khrushchev—for which we should be grateful to him—Communism should one day decide to resort to war in order to achieve world supremacy, the country it would have to attack would be the United States. The Communists know that the outcome of the conflict could not be decided in Paris, Bonn or London, but only in Washington; consequently, France would be attacked only to the extent that all of Europe was attacked, and the United States at the same time as Europe.

The Atlantic Alliance was founded on the principle that the defense of the free world, on both sides of the Atlantic, is one and indivisible. This principle remains valid today, and it is my profound conviction that this political reality should determine the form of our military organization. This means, I believe, that the military organization should become steadily more closely integrated.

To these various considerations should be added General de Gaulle's expressed belief that sooner or later the United States will withdraw its armed forces from Europe and that as it becomes increasingly concerned with its own security in a narrow sense it will refuse to employ its nuclear weapons in the defense of its allies. This is contrary to the constantly repeated declaration of the American leaders. Apart from the fact that it may be somewhat dangerous to keep on questioning their words, it seems to me inconceivable that the United States would allow Communist forces to overrun all of Europe when obviously this would be only a first step toward the next goal—that of knocking out the United States itself.

I might add that it is rather difficult to imagine the Soviet Union starting a war with Europe, in which it would risk sustaining serious damage, while leaving the United States out of the conflict with all its forces intact and capable of intervening when and as it chose.

All these various theories and assumptions seem to me mistaken. They fail so plainly to take into account the real situation that exists in the world today, the forces in being and the goals

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that might be sought, that I wonder whether they do not conceal a line of rather complicated political thinking. I wonder whether in reality General de Gaulle is not seeking to speed the departure of the American forces from Europe, since he regards it as in any case inevitable. The void thus created might lead the other European countries to take refuge under the sheltering wing of France, which then alone could afford them some protection. This would be tantamount to a French hegemony in Europe, the achievement of the Gaullist grand design.

If such is the notion, then it is indeed composed of dreams and idle fancies. It is a completely outdated notion, an anachronism. It looks back to the policies of centuries past and rejects the two major ideas which have dominated international life since the end of the Second World War: the building of a united Europe and the global defense of the free world.

V

What conclusions are we to draw from all this? Without dramatizing the situation, we must recognize that the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community are going through the most serious crisis they have so far experienced.

One of their largest members, France—or at any rate, official France—no longer believes in the two basic principles which led to the formation of NATO and of the Common Market. It no longer believes that the defense of the free world is indivisible, and it is looking for a substitute formula. It also does not believe in the community spirit which animated the authors of the Treaty of Rome. The French concept of the Europe which must now be created is a sort of alliance, with the bonds between the partners no closer than those which held the Triple Alliance together before 1914. Paris may attach a little more importance now to cultural and economic matters, but if so it is only a little seasoning added to very ancient recipes. We are thousands of miles away from the concept of a federated Europe, where each country would retain its basic national characteristics while pooling what the modern world requires must be handled in common —international policy, defense and economic policy.

There is much more here than a difference in tactics. The differences are of fundamental principle. In such circumstances there is but one thing for NATO and the European Community to do: hold fast. We must be faithful to the rules laid down for

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NATO in 1948 and for the Common Market in 1957. We must persevere and not give way.

Within NATO, this means basically that in the political field we must consult together more and more closely on a widening range of problems, with a view to evolving a joint Atlantic policy. It means that from the military standpoint, after establishing a set of principles and determining the eventuality for which we must prepare, we must integrate conventional and nuclear means of defense to the highest possible degree. That will be the best reply to those who doubt the indivisibility of defense.

Within the European Community, we must continue the work auspiciously begun. If possible, we must skip some stages of tariff abolition, advance rapidly toward a common policy in trade, transport and social affairs, tackle the great monetary problem, work out an agricultural policy, and, by avoiding autarchy and protectionism, demonstrate that the European Community is an open organization.

These ideas are still held today by the overwhelming majority of European statesmen. They are shared by the overwhelming majority of European peoples. Let us not, then, be dismayed.

If we review in our minds the policy of the Western world during the years following the Second World War, we still, in spite of everything, arrive at the cheering conclusion that there is no need to change its main lines. Some details of application must be altered. But it is not an agonizing reappraisal that is called for, only an intelligent evolution based on experience. The dissident element constituted by current French policy may be a cause of delay, but it cannot prevent the ultimate success of the great undertakings to which Europe and the United States have set their hands.

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PARTNERS AND ALLIES

By Alastair Buchan

AFTER the events of the past six months, few people on either side of the Atlantic would dispute the view that the concept of Atlantic partnership and the imagery of "twin pillars" and "dumbbells" need reconsidering. As applied, the imagery has obscured the disparity in European economic and strategic strength; it has overlooked the contrast between America's genuine desire to see European economic strength increase and cohere, and its equally genuine reluctance to encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it has assumed an identity of political interest between the United States and Western Europe which can, one hopes, be evolved but may not exist *prima facie*; and it has rested on an important confusion between the six West European countries of the Community and the 12 European countries in NATO, whose interests also are not identical with one another.

For nearly 20 years American policy has cherished the vision of a united Europe whose leaders could talk the same language of power and responsibility as its own. During the early years of that policy there was little conflict between its economic and political aspects, for almost all the strategic power of the West was effectively in the hands of the United States. Moreover, if military technology had pursued a less breakneck course, it is possible that the United States would have viewed the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a united Europe—or its individual countries —with a reasonable equanimity. The United States might have calculated that to enhance European pride, lessen European fears and promote Western security as a whole would hasten the day when the two systems could look each other in the eye with confidence. Indeed in the mid-1950s, when the British V-Bomber force with nuclear bombs was becoming an actuality, it was accepted in Washington as fulfilling a useful complementary role to that of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), in that, with its speed and proximity to Russia, it could be in action faster than American bombers.

It can be argued, of course, that for a complex of political reasons, the United States has viewed the British and the French programs in a different light, and that it was bound, in terms of its relations with the Soviet Union, to become restive as soon as

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other European nuclear projects began to raise tensions in Germany. But even so, forms of nuclear coöperation conceivable five years ago are not conceivable today, for it was primarily the introduction of the missile into the strategic balance, rather than the political overtones of European projects, that made American strategic experts insistent upon the centralized command and control of nuclear weapons. Doubt was thereby cast upon the feasibility of a true Atlantic partnership long before phrases like "twin pillars" or the "dumbbell" had even been coined. The speed of the missile compressed the time margins available for political decisions from hours to minutes; whereas in the days of manned aircraft some "hot-line" communication might just have sufficed for a great power to dissociate itself from the action of a smaller ally, no such option is available when weapons fly at 16,000 miles an hour. The anonymity of the missile immediately inculpates the largest power in any alliance, no matter whose national emblem may originally have decorated the one fired against the adversary. The unchallenged penetration of the missile makes it necessary to deter its use by the adversary, through the development of a second-strike capability which sets a premium on complex and expensive systems for achieving invulnerability, on numbers of units of strategic delivery, on areas of low population density, on warning time—in short, on exploiting the assets which the United States happens to possess and Europe does not.

Thus, those who concentrated primarily on the economic aspects of the Atlantic relationship, whether in Europe or the United States, saw by the early 1960s the prospects of an early fruition of that equal and interdependent European-American relationship, to which so much good will and patient toil had been contributed from both sides of the Atlantic; but those responsible for strategic planning and its attendant diplomatic problems—including arms control—saw the balance of responsibilities becoming increasingly uneven. There are some bitter Europeans who now argue that the American insistence on central strategic control—explicit, for instance, in Mr. McNamara's public statements and implicit in the Nassau proposals—is evidence that the United States has never intended to relinquish its political hegemony within the Alliance, and that repeated statements of the American desire for a strong and independent Europe, such as President Kennedy made last July 4, were mere phrase-making. On the contrary, I would argue that much of the muddle in Atlan-

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tic relationships arose from an overeagerness in every Western capital, including Washington, to believe that a strong Western European pillar could somehow be created without confronting the fact that economic and strategic trends were going in opposite directions, and without evolving any but the haziest notion as to what kind of political portico would connect these "two pillars" which were to replace the existing multilateral relationship in NATO. Such loose thinking has now been usefully exposed by President de Gaulle. But it is unlikely to shake the conviction of those who will make American strategic policy in the coming years that centralized command and control is the only safe course for the Alliance; some other part of the "grand design" is more likely to be jettisoned than that conviction.

II

To many people in Europe and to some in the United States the setbacks of recent months—the exclusion of Britain from the Community, the tensions within the Community, the deterioration in Franco-American relations—all point in one direction: toward eliciting a higher degree of European common interest and a stronger basis for partnership through the creation of a collective European nuclear force. Thus, from Paris, M. Jean Monnet has declared, "Equal partnership must also apply to the responsibilities of common defense. It requires, amongst other things, the organization of a European atomic force including Britain and in partnership with the United States."[1] From Harvard, Professor Henry Kissinger has advised his countrymen that "Instead of being hostile to the French nuclear program, and, at best, indifferent to the British effort, we should use our influence to place them in the service of a European conception."[2] And from London, *The Economist* has advocated "a collective European deterrent organized with American backing and woven in with the American defense network."[3]

Such suggestions, authoritative though they may be, are so cloudy that it is essential to give some precision to them. The first question concerns Britain. The present American Administration and its predecessor have been unequivocal—despite political and academic criticism—that they will not assist with the develop-

[1] Interview with *Corriere della Sera*, April 6, 1963.
[2] *The Reporter*, March 28, 1963.
[3] May 4, 1963, p. 410.

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ment of nuclear forces in Europe which are not integrated with those of the United States. Congress would be likely to hold to this view even if some future Administration changed its mind. Therefore, in asking Britain to throw in her lot with Europe at this time one is asking her to renounce her very intimate military relationship with the United States, in return for coöperation with a group of allies who have little to offer her in the way of technological secrets and to whose political aims she does not fully subscribe.

In the second place, even if Britain and France were to strike up a successful nuclear partnership—and this is a questionable proposition for two countries whose military élites have distrusted each other ever since 1914—there is no indication that the other Western European countries, especially Germany, would accept an Anglo-French force as a substitute for the American guarantee, any more than they have been prepared to accept an autonomous British force operating "on behalf of Europe." It would be very difficult in any case to persuade German or Italian opinion that any European effort could be an adequate substitute for the American guarantee. Consequently, the idea makes political sense only if all the countries of the present, or an enlarged, Community have a full share in planning and operational control.

The technical difficulties of creating a European force, financed by the whole Community and posing a strong counter-city threat to the Soviet Union, are formidable, but they can be overestimated. If Britain, with her large aircraft industry and established nuclear weapons program, were to combine with the considerable technical resources of France, Germany and Italy, a new generation of European strategic weapons could probably be developed by the early 1970s—or without Britain by the mid-1970s. With Britain participating, it would involve increasing European defense expenditures by about one-quarter—without Britain, by about one-third. The increase in either case would still represent a lower percentage of European national incomes devoted to defense than in the United States.

The real difficulty about a European deterrent would be the problem of control. A European nuclear force would have to represent a common effort by a group of middle and small powers; it could not, therefore, be controlled unilaterally by any one country. (If President de Gaulle's concept of a *Europe des Patries* should prevail, the idea would, of course, be stillborn.) Hitherto the European Community has owed its success to the fact that it

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has not wasted time in arguing over blueprints for supranational institutions, but has attempted to develop those which reflect the highest community of interest. The planning decisions concerning a separate European nuclear deterrent—types, range, deployment, finance and so on—could perhaps be taken by the Council of Ministers of a Europe which had achieved a confederal structure; but the decision to use, threaten to use or withhold such weapons in a crisis could not. To become an operational nuclear power the Community would (after accepting Britain) first have to become a genuine federation with a powerful central government like that of the United States. More than that, its peoples would have to have acquired that sense of common identity which would make an Englishman or a Frenchman ready to see operational control over nuclear weapons placed in the hands of an Italian or a German, and vice versa. Moreover, as the resort to nuclear weapons is the most awful decision that a political society could be asked to contemplate, it could hardly be taken by any collective body (especially if "Europe" were to embrace the Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries), and might require, if a European deterrent were to be politically credible, the concentration of power in the hands of a President of Europe with authority analogous to that of the President of the United States.

Conceivably Western Europe—with or without Britain—may be able to take the very big step from confederal to federal institutions within the next ten years. But is it possible to create, within the next decade, the highly centralized form of government that would be necessary to make credible the deterrent threat of a nuclear weapons system under the control of the Community itself? It has been suggested that the need to control nuclear weapons may have a decisive effect upon the structure of European institutions. This is possible, but by no means certain, especially as long as the European powers have an alternative—namely, association with the control of American weapons.

Even if there were American support for the idea of a separate European deterrent, there are still three questions to be answered. First, could it be evolved without weakening the American commitment to Europe? Those who advocate the European solution agree that Europe would require only a limited strategic force targeted on Soviet cities. But the difficulty of a coördinated relationship between a smaller and a larger force is that, in an emergency, the former can only force the hand of the latter, not re-

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strain it. Thus, even though Europe behaved with great responsibility, there might be growing pressure in America to make clear to the Soviet Union that the United States was no longer automatically committed to the support of Europe in all eventualities —the very thing that some advocates of a European force most fear. At the least it might lead to pressure to withdraw American forces from Europe, for nearly half a million American lives could be jeopardized by actions over which the United States had no control.

The second question concerns the effect upon the Soviet Union of a decision to create an independent European deterrent. It now regards the European Community, in its purely economic aspects, as a major challenge. If Western Europe decided to develop its own weapons of mass destruction, would the Soviet Union be content to do nothing during the six to ten years while this force was growing from drawing-board to actuality? If not, there are many vulnerable and exposed points in Europe against which it could exert pressure.

The third question concerns the effect upon the European Community itself. So far it has been grounded upon a foundation of common economic interests, but the unresolved disputes within the Community show that the next stages—the evolution of a political framework or of a common foreign policy—are going to be extremely difficult. In view of the different attitudes about nuclear strategy that exist among European governments, within governments, or between governments and their people on this question, might not the attempt to evolve European strategic nuclear programs within the next decade break up the Community itself? M. Monnet, Professor Kissinger and *The Economist* write as if nuclear weapons were a unifying political influence; the evidence of the past decade hardly supports this. And to disrupt one of the most promising experiments in supranationalism that this century has witnessed merely to satisfy an unproven equation between political stature and the possession of nuclear weapons would be a profound tragedy.

Are these risks the United States or Europe can face with equanimity? Even if they did not materialize in this form, would not the attempt to carry the analogy of partnership beyond the economic into the nuclear field lead, not to increased confidence between the two halves of the Alliance, but to distrust, to American isolationism or European neutralism? Leaving aside the question

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of whether such a Europe might become a third force, do we deliberately wish to foster the development of two Western strategies which even if coördinated could have as fatal results for world peace as a similar relationship between Germany and Austro-Hungary had in 1914? Are adult communities like Europe and the United States really prepared to squander resources on this kind of duplication of effort, laying themselves open to most telling accusations of the less privileged and less adult?

III

If one accepts the view that premature attempts to endow Europe with the attributes of a great nuclear power may destroy the very objectives at which the concept of "partnership" is aimed, then we must tackle more directly the basic sources of malaise to which the multilateral Alliance has given rise.

There is little difficulty in tracing this uneasiness to its original source: on the European side it springs from the sense of irritation, impotence and even despair which the individual allied countries feel in doing business with a nation which has many times their own strength and resources, a nation which is self-sufficient to an extent they can no longer hope to be, and whose policy, once painfully evolved by a cumbrous process of internal debate, is extremely hard to alter. On the American side it comes from weariness with the complexities and intrigues of the "entangling alliance," and the discomfort of negotiating individually with a number of countries much weaker than itself. Yet since these tensions will not be alleviated by casting our eyes upon an objective which is at present unattainable and which on deeper consideration may prove undesirable, then what needs discussing is how the multilateral system can be made to work more satisfactorily. Here I would like to confine myself to the politico-military aspect and attempt to sketch how the problem presents itself to many Europeans who, like myself, are convinced that the Atlantic house needs to be built on a firmer foundation than "twin pillars."

It can be argued that the collapse of the "grand design" has created an artificial atmosphere of crisis which need not persist. The proposal for a multilateral force of surface ships is not regarded in Europe as a comprehensive solution to the control of strategy within the Alliance. Since the force itself is marginal to the strategic requirements of the West, it represents no real shift of the American burden to Europe, and obscures the question of

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control. But it may serve as the basis of a more satisfactory German-American military relationship. If this did no more than allay the somewhat unreal American belief that Germany may soon be tempted by the British and French example to become an independent nuclear power—thereby enabling Washington to adopt a rather less fearful attitude to Franco-German friendship—it will have served some useful purpose.

Then, if Washington can cease making offensive statements about the French nuclear effort, misconceived though it may be, it may become rather harder for President de Gaulle to resist the views of his professional advisers that the *force de frappe* must be coördinated, at least as to targets, with SAC. From that beginning much else could flow.

Moreover, it is possible that there will be a marked change in the climate of European politics over the next two years or so, which may make it easier to reconsider the Atlantic relationship. By 1965 there may be a Labor Government in Britain, left-center governments in Italy and Holland as well as Belgium, and a government in Germany with very different perspectives from that of Chancellor Adenauer's, whether it be C.D.U., S.P.D. or a coalition. The left-center in Europe is at present more Atlantic in its outlook than the right, readier to accept American leadership, probably readier to assume greater financial burdens, less concerned with asserting the independence of Europe, more concerned with the dangers of the arms race and therefore more sympathetic to American views on arms control. President de Gaulle may soon find himself in conversation with a different set of European leaders, and the great internal debate within Europe between the original concept of community and his own concept of union, and the relationship of either to the United States, may ultimately be resolved in a different setting from today. But it might be a serious mistake to assume that time and normal political change will come to the rescue of the Atlantic Alliance or obviate the need for more fundamental thought and action on both sides of the ocean.

Mr. Harold Wilson has indicated cautiously that a Labor Government might relinquish the British nuclear weapons program. It is certainly probable that it would abandon the attempt to build new generations of strategic weapons, including Polaris; but even a Labor Government might well have second thoughts about removing Britain from the ranks of the nuclear powers altogether, if it meant exclusion from nuclear arms-control negoti-

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ations and unemployment in the weapons industries, or if France's strategic nuclear program is still going steadily forward. And a change in the political leadership of her neighbors is unlikely to dissuade President de Gaulle, or any successor, from the view that the risk that the United States might not support Western Europe in some unforeseen crisis, however small, justifies an independent French nuclear program.

But apart from the question of the two European nuclear weapons programs, there are three aspects of the strategic relationship, in its broadest sense, where there may be underlying conflicts of interest. The first concerns arms-control discussions and negotiations. There is a strong feeling among European governments, which recent events have accentuated, that there is now a permanent dilemma in American policy. On the one hand, the nature and risks of the arms race are such that if the United States does not seek limited agreements with the Soviet Union, both great powers will become involved in so complex and dangerous a deadlock that they risk losing control of the course of international relations. Yet such limited agreements may jeopardize European interests, especially if they take the form of some bilateral agreement that involves American "nuclear disengagement" from Europe or the withdrawal of American bases and forces in return for some equivalent Soviet concession. American writing on arms control assumes an almost completely bipolar world. The American decision to dismantle the Thor and Jupiter missile bases in Britain, Italy and Turkey has been widely noted in Europe both as a foretaste of things to come and as evidence of a tacit Soviet-American deal, to which Europe is not privy, in the wake of the Cuban crisis. The fact that British opinion, on the whole, favors a bilateral Soviet-American dialogue on arms control tends to divide London from the Continent rather than bridge the gap between American preoccupations and European suspicions.

A second source of tensions, which is related to this, concerns the military posture of NATO forces in Europe. Over the past two years the Kennedy Administration has been increasingly insistent that the conventional forces of the European allies should be enlarged and improved. At the same time semi-official spokesmen of the Administration have aired the idea of a purely conventional defense of Western Europe. The lack of enthusiasm in Europe for strengthening conventional forces and for the doctrine of "flexible response" has disappointed many American officials,

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and has been variously attributed to complacency, naïveté or stinginess. But in fact it may derive from a genuine conflict of interest. Europeans who dispute the wisdom of current American policy do not necessarily take the extreme view that the American commitment to the integrity of Europe has diminished, and those who dispute the wisdom of current American policy do not minimize the financial and moral sacrifice which the United States makes by keeping 400,000 troops in Europe. But it is realized that the way in which the United States can honor this commitment has been profoundly affected by the development of a delicate over-all strategic balance; discounting what Mr. Herter or General Taylor may or may not have said on earlier occasions, the United States clearly cannot stake the survival of North American civilization against a Soviet raid on the Denmark Straits or Thrace. It must seek safer alternatives if it is not to loosen its commitment to Europe.

But to Western Europe, with its small and crowded land area, with the horrors of conventional war upon its own soil still fresh in men's minds, this attempt to stress the "conventional option" seems to offer the Soviet Union the temptation to make some limited *promenade militaire* against an exposed part of Europe, to destroy its conventional defenses, and to open negotiation from well inside the present perimeter of free Europe before the United States could take the agonizing decision to risk a strategic nuclear exchange. This view does not imply any slight on American courage and determination, but is based on a considered judgment that to deter all war in Europe requires leaving the Soviet Union in constant doubt as to whether an aggressive act of any scale would invoke a nuclear response. This in turn means keeping tactical nuclear weapons sited well forward, and perhaps decentralizing the decision to use them. I think that there are ways in which this argument could be resolved to the relative, if not the complete, satisfaction of both sides; but this will not be done by behaving as if the other party did not understand the problem.

A third kind of friction, which changes in European governments will not modify, concerns military research and production. The pride and ambition of European science and industry are rising fast. At the same time the United States maintains not only a complete war potential of its own, but, in order to solve its balance-of-payments problem, is anxious to sell more and more armaments to Europe. Every advanced country in Europe has

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had an unhappy experience in trying to reach interdependent arrangements on research and production with the United States; in addition, except for certain very advanced weapons, there is increasing doubt about the efficiency of manufacturing American-designed aircraft or weapons in Europe. In every major European country there are ambitious firms and designers who are anxious to foster interdependent arrangements within Europe rather than continue to depend on the United States. Here Britain's interests coincide with those of her neighbors. One of the most common arguments in Europe for a major nuclear weapons program is that otherwise European industries will be denied the "spin off" benefits which their American competitors acquire—including important ramifications in employment, civil progress and economic activities.

IV

The most important reason why the Alliance must soon decide whether to pursue the concept of partnership to its logical conclusion, or to work toward a complementary and interdependent relationship, is that in less than six years' time the North Atlantic Treaty will have to be reconfirmed. This means that there is a shorter time ahead of us than the period between Suez and the present day in which to decide what form the political structure of the Alliance will take in the 1970s and 1980s. Just ahead of us the road may fork toward two Atlantic alliances or one. Since the lead time of modern weapons is six to eight years, since official positions on such momentous questions require prolonged thought, and since public opinion in the NATO countries is not yet even aware that this deadline confronts it, there is no time to waste in carrying the debate forward.

The point which I should like to emphasize could easily be misinterpreted as underrating the vast resources of wealth, skill and brains which the United States devotes to the defense of its allies. It is simply that, if the United States decides that it will remain firmly the leader of the Atlantic Alliance rather than accept what in effect would be a separate European alliance, connected merely by some tenuous coördinating machinery, then American methods and perspectives in the years immediately ahead may have to change more drastically than those of any other country. If the logic of centralized control of strategic decisions is to be accepted, then new techniques for mitigating the frustrating

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effects of the independent U. S. deterrent, and for limiting the careless use of America's vast political and physical power, have to be considered. In this sense, the period of preoccupation with partnership rather than leadership has been one of retrogression rather than advance, for it has obscured the means a leader must use to command continuous support and confidence.

A number of examples come to mind. For one thing, in recent years, American strategic policy has been evolved with less consultation with the European allies than at any time in the history of the Alliance. As the vitality of the internal American debate has increased, it has apparently seemed less and less necessary to draw the allies into it. No one in Europe underrates the formidable ability and remarkable achievements of Mr. McNamara; yet, not only was there no consultation with America's allies on the level and kinds of strategic power that should be constructed for the mid-1960s, but the strategic doctrine for the employment of Minuteman and Polaris—that of "controlled nuclear response" in the event of war—emerged out of an entirely American discussion and was presented as established policy a year ago to a bewildered collection of allied governments whose officials had little inkling of the considerations which had shaped it. Hence it is not surprising that it was greeted with considerable suspicion.

The same is true of the argument over conventional forces in Europe on which, in the words of Mr. Paul Nitze, "the United States campaigns within NATO, by example and persuasion."[4] No one can dispute the American example, the magnificent quality of the U. S. Seventh Army in Germany; but it is no substitute for a better attempt to argue out the implications of the "conventional option" with its allies. There is a fog of European suspicion about American ideas and, as M. François de Rose has pointed out, "Misunderstandings have reached the point where motives are being questioned."[5] Here lies one of the real danger points, for in a few years' time the United States will not be the only source of tactical atomic weapons in NATO.

Second, there is a strong feeling in Europe that, despite talk of "shifting the burden" and of greater European participation in the defense of the free world as a whole, the effect of some American suggestions would be to create "spheres of influence" and to confine European energies primarily to Europe itself. Thus the

[4] Speech at Cleveland, March 2, 1963.
[5] *Foreign Affairs*, April 1963, p. 489.

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proposal for a NATO multilateral force, as a solution to the association of Europe with nuclear strategy, would give European countries some control over a small part of the nuclear deterrent forces of the West, but not necessarily association with the world-wide responsibilities of the United States. Apart from its other disadvantages, this proposal might well foster an inward-looking Europe if it were ever fully implemented. Europe is inclined to suspect that the United States—perhaps as a hangover of the earlier colonial crises in NATO—does not really want its coöperation in the problems of Asian, Pacific or Caribbean security. This suspicion may be quite unjustified, but if it is, then it becomes a prime American interest to involve Europe in the problems of global policy.

Here I think one can detect a fallacy arising out of the purely financial approach to the problem. In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee last January, Mr. McNamara said: "We have no desire to dominate NATO. In fact, we would be very happy to share more equitably the heavy burdens we now carry in the collective defense of the Free World. But as long as we do carry so great a share of the total burden, we cannot escape carrying a proportionately large share of the responsibility for leadership and direction." This would be a sound principle for the control of a great industrial corporation; but in terms of the Alliance it may be self-defeating, by promoting European parochialism and separatism. Probably, it is only by asking the European allies to assume a greater responsibility for participation and direction than their present contribution entitles them to that they can be given the impetus to assume a larger proportion of the total burden.

Third, American policy sometimes hampers those kinds of European coöperation which do reflect a genuine community of European interest. Because the United States has played such a vigorous role in European defense, the European members of NATO have tended to feel, if anything, a diminishing sense of responsibility toward each other. Thus the countries of North and West Europe now feel little responsibility for the Mediterranean countries and vice versa. The defense of the central area has become increasingly a German-American affair and there is now talk of Germany's integrating her military logistic system with that of the United States. Without embarking on the very dubious course of encouraging European coöperation in nuclear

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weapons, it would still be possible, by the development of European interdependence in conventional weapons—aircraft, tanks, electronics, short-range missiles and the like—to express a genuine community of interest and give greater outlet to European scientific and technical ambition.

This has an important implication for American policy. It is that the United States should not try to alleviate a balance-of-payments problem, which it has undoubtedly incurred in the defense of Europe and the free world, by the indirect method of pressing American weapons upon Europe (except where they are clearly superior), or by attempting to persuade Europeans to bear the cost of a marginal source of military strength, such as the multilateral seaborne force. It would be far sounder to ask Europe to make a direct contribution to the support of American forces in Europe, or even to help bear part of the costs of an essential weapons system like Minuteman in return for closer association with the planning of its use. When the day comes that a U.S. Secretary of Defense orders a European plane, missile or ship for the American armed forces, Europeans may become less convinced that they are dealing with a monolith and therefore must become one themselves. The development of a complementary rather than a competitive military relationship between Europe and the United States will require deliberate acts of forbearance on both sides, and strong governmental control over commercial instincts. If a European Defense Authority could be created to foster interdependence in military research and production it could acquire a second and equally important role: namely, to translate into terms of the budgets and plans of individual European countries agreements with the United States about the European share of the over-all burden of European and non-European defense. If there is to be a 30-division force in Germany, and if the United States and Canada continue to supply six of these, it should be an intra-European argument, not a debilitating series of American arguments with individual European governments, as to how the other 24 are to be found.

Finally, NATO, the instrument of multilateral consultation and planning, has been allowed by all the major governments to decay. It lacks a powerful Secretariat, and most particularly the kind of American military intellectuals who provide the grist of ideas and calculations on which policy decisions in Washington are based. There is thus virtually no European-American dialogue

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on matters of defense planning and policy below the plane of the ministers and ranking generals—a level at which national positions are not easily adjusted. NATO's structure does not permit using the techniques of civil-military planning which have been increasingly adopted by national governments, but tends instead to keep the military and civilians in separate compartments, to the detriment of both. In consequence, it has failed to become the powerful clearinghouse of national policies which its founders intended and has become one party to a series of loud and prolonged arguments between governments. Britain has, at last, had to revise her view that NATO is basically an Anglo-American arrangement for the defense of Europe, and it is now becoming her principal channel of discourse with her European allies. It would give heart to many in Europe if the United States took a similar decision.

Europeans are apt to feel that American officials lose their authority if they are away from Washington for any length of time. Certainly, by the light of hindsight, many would feel that NATO would be stronger today if the Council and Secretariat had been located in Washington rather than Paris, so that the representatives of the allied countries could be in closer touch with that other multilateral process whereby American policy emerges out of fierce debates between the Executive and Congress, Defense and State, the services and industry. Large organizations cannot readily be moved, but a good case can be made for double-banking the NATO Council, perhaps by a consultative council of the Ambassadors of the NATO countries in Washington, with its own small permanent staff, meeting regularly with the Secretaries of Defense and State. Its central purpose would be to provide a multilateral setting in which American ideas or proposals could be raised before they solidified into official policy. It would also have advantages in a period of high tension such as Cuba, and would be essential if Europe were not to be misled and made suspicious by the fruition of any Soviet-American arms-control discussions.

V

The improvement of the transatlantic institutions we have so laboriously developed over recent years can derive only from a belief that they are worth using and that they fulfill a function which bilateral diplomacy no longer can. Certain modest steps

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toward the strengthening of the NATO system have already been taken or proposed: the establishment of the Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council (though its machinery has hardly been used); the plan to group the inter-allied forces concerned with nuclear interdiction into a single command, which was approved at Ottawa in May; the likely proposal of the Canadian Government to make NORAD into a NATO command; the plan to station European NATO officers at SAC headquarters. The multilateral seaborne force may gain wider acceptance now that the German Government appears seriously interested in it.

But these will remain a patchwork of repair jobs, holding together a fabric whose foundations may be sinking, unless there is a more candid reconsideration of the European-American relationship, free of false analogy and imagery. I would suggest that a useful point of departure would be to examine the truth or falsehood of four propositions.

The first is that the concept of "partnership," in its political and strategic aspects, can be considered a secure basis for planning the future structure of the Alliance only if it is believed that Europe—the Europe of the 12 NATO allies, not just of the six Community countries—can develop over the next few years powerful, central political institutions which command widespread popular support. The second is that if this objective should prove unattainable, and it becomes necessary to concentrate on improving the present multilateral system under American leadership, then important modifications in the way this leadership is exercised will be necessary. The third is that the countries of Europe will not make a move to lighten the American share of the common burden until they are first asked to share a larger part of the responsibility for formulating and directing allied policy. The fourth is that a satisfactory solution to the problem of the command of nuclear weapons and the control of strategic decisions is inseparable from that of long-term political consultation and confidence within the Alliance.

Only the last point needs any elaboration. The literature of contemporary strategic analysis is strewn with the wrecks of schemes for allied control of nuclear weapons, executive bodies and weighted votes, "hot lines" between capitals and rights of withdrawal. What they mostly overlook is that without political intimacy they are certain to break down, while in any atmosphere of real confidence they might prove unnecessary. And this may

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be as true of the multilateral seaborne force as of any paper proposal. Here the contrast between British and French experience is relevant. The debate in Britain as to whether her nuclear program is worth the cost and friction it creates derives not from any "special relationship" to the United States in the sense of guarantees which her allies lack, but from the fact that for many years there has been a continuous Anglo-American dialogue, often very acrimonious, so that there is a wide range of politicians, officials, soldiers and journalists in both countries who know each others' minds. France's determination to build a nuclear force is connected, just as directly, with the fact that the Franco-American dialogue dried up many years ago, and is only now beginning to be reopened.

The beginning, therefore, of a solution to the problems of command and control of nuclear weapons lies in confronting the sources of distrust and the conflicts of interest which they have engendered, rather than in devising ingenious mechanics of command. It lies in making the European allies partners in the Washington debate from which emerge policies on arms control, for the defense of Europe and for meeting the world-wide responsibilities of the United States. If the multilateral process is insufficient for all purposes, there are few people in Europe who would not welcome the deliberate cultivation of a "special relationship" between France and the United States. This is most particularly so in Britain, the country which has most to lose from strained relations between Paris and Washington.

As 1969 approaches, more drastic solutions may appear necessary: the commitment of the whole of the independent American deterrent to NATO, an Atlantic Executive Authority, even an Atlantic Union. But before we know whether such ideas are even worth discussing, we have first to discover whether the oldest political union in the modern world and the component nations of a union that is still unborn can exercise sufficient self-restraint to make the term "Atlantic partnership" more than a mere phrase.

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CRISIS DIPLOMACY

By Harlan Cleveland

TO judge from the daily news, the management of American foreign policy is the art of throwing ourselves into one crisis after another. By shifting the spotlight from one trouble spot to the next, the impression is created that the United States Government deals exclusively in short-range reactions to external emergencies.

Most of the people engaged in the management of American foreign policy, most of the time, are not working on the headline crises, but on other subjects. A round of tariff negotiations, a student exchange program, the use of surplus food for economic growth, the tedious but important process of getting to know hundreds of leading personalities in more than a hundred foreign countries, the analysis of bits and pieces of intelligence from all over the world, the selection and instruction of government delegates to 500 conferences a year—these and many, many other necessary works are also "American foreign policy."

Yet in the upper reaches of our Government, and particularly at the level of the President and his nearest echelon of advisers, the newspaper version of relative priorities is not, after all, so far from the facts. The President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and several dozen other men do spend a very large part of their time working on the crises of the moment. (This does not, paradoxically, mean that long-range policy is neglected; for it is often at moments of crisis that the most basic long-range decisions about foreign policy are made.)

The highest officials of our Government spend their time on crisis management because there is no other way for responsible men to take the responsibility for crucial decisions. For the problem of decision-making in our complicated world is not how to get the problem simple enough so that we can all understand it; the problem is to get our thinking about the problem as complex as humanly possible—and thus approach (we can never match) the complexity of the real world around us. And only the highest officials are in a position thus to maximize the complexities.

Albert Einstein is supposed to have said that every proposition should be as simple as possible—but not one bit simpler. The de-

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cision-maker in any large-scale enterprise—and *a fortiori* the maker of decisions in international affairs—has to immerse himself *personally* in the full complexity of the problem at hand. "Completed staff work" is the last thing he wants, or should want, from his advisers. For if he is to make a responsible decision, he must himself measure the options and filter the imagined consequences of each through his most dependable computer, which is his own brain.

By the same token, "contingency planning" must normally deal with many contingencies which do not, as things work out, come to pass. Last fall, countless man-hours went into contingency planning for the crises elsewhere which were thought to be the Soviets' possible reaction to a quarantine of Cuba. Yet contingency planning is never wasted—for it develops the analytical skills of the contingency planners and thus puts the Government in a more "ready" position.

The most usable end-product of planning is not a paper, but a person thoroughly immersed in the subject—a person whose mind is trained to act, having taken everything into account, on the spur of the moment. And that is why the ultimate decision-maker must himself participate in the planning exercise. A busy boxer, training for the bout of his life, cannot afford to let his sparring-partners do all his daily calisthenics for him.

The management of a foreign-policy crisis, then, is an exciting, demanding form of organized thinking, in which the maximum degree of complexity must be sifted through the minds of those few men in a position to take the ultimate responsibility for action. And as Josiah Royce said: "Thinking is like loving and dying; each of us must do it for himself."

Is there a pattern to so personal a process? At least five lessons about crisis management seem to emerge with some clarity from the talk-filled rooms where the makers of policy foregather and our destiny is shaped.

Lesson No. 1: Keep Your Objectives Limited

Somewhere in his writings Emerson advises young people to be very careful in deciding what they most want out of life—for they are likely to get it. A similar, but qualified, principle applies to American foreign policy: select your objective carefully, for *if it is limited enough* you are quite likely to achieve it. International politics, like local or national politics, is the art of the pos-

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sible, but in international politics the price of overreaching the possible could be nuclear extinction.

In the Cuba missile crisis, the President decided that since an adverse shift in the world power balance was in the making, our basic security interests required the removal of "offensive weapons" from Cuba. That term might be subject to varying interpretations having to do with both weaponry and purpose; but clearly it covered the I.R.B.M.s and M.R.B.M.s, the I.L.-28 medium-range bombers and nuclear warheads for these and any other weapons. For this overriding but still limited goal the President was prepared to commit U.S. power and prestige to the hilt.

Critics now say that the objective should have been broader, that the outright elimination of both the Soviet presence and Castro-Communism from Cuba should have been the objective last October. But the judgment of the moment, confirmed by the eloquent silence of those critics at the time, was that the missiles and bombers were the only threat so great as to require the immediate counter-threat of force to remove them. The Soviet troops are a dangerous nuisance, and we should and will continue our efforts to get them out. But they do not represent—as the missiles did—a fundamental change in the balance of world power. Castro, too, is a serious problem, but relief from the embarrassment of his presence in the Caribbean is not to be measured in megadeaths throughout the Northern Hemisphere. In the Cuba missile crisis, then, a limited objective was attained brilliantly—partly, at least, because it was specific, limited and attainable.

In the Congo, too, the Administration's objective was a limited one. In 1960 President Eisenhower decided to back a United Nations peace force for the Congo, instead of responding to the new Congolese Government's urgent appeal for our direct intervention. Neither then nor since has the United States Government undertaken to prevent internal trouble in the Congo except to the extent that such trouble invited foreign intervention and therefore threatened (in U.N. Charter language) the Congo's "territorial integrity and political independence." Foreign intervention in fact took place—including the returning Belgian paratroops and a large-scale attempt by the Soviet Union to establish its military presence in the Congo; and foreign funds and leadership were plainly evident in both the Communist-backed sedition of the Stanleyville régime and the secession based on copper revenues in South Katanga. But our concern with the Congo's inter-

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nal troubles has been carefully limited to the original objectives by both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations.

A limited objective has likewise been the key to American policy during the recurring crises in Laos. When confronted by the Communist push in Laos in 1961, the new Administration in Washington was faced with three alternatives: to accept the huge costs and risks of holding Laos with U.S. military force, to allow the country to fall to Communist control, or to seek a settlement based on neutrality. It was decided that a neutral Laos just might have a chance, whereas the effort to affiliate Laos with the free world had helped divide the country by civil war. The resulting plan for Lao neutrality reached at Geneva still hangs in the balance as this is written. Communist intransigence still hampers both the internal politics of Laos and the inspection work of the International Control Commission. But, because the objective is limited, it has a chance of succeeding, and at the same time will test the possibility of agreements with the Communists on other matters as well.

In some crises, especially those that involve other nations in the free world and not directly the Soviet Union, the United States objective can be more limited than in Cuba or the Congo. When, for example, the French and Tunisians fell to fighting over the base at Bizerte, our considerable diplomatic efforts were bent toward the limited aim of keeping the peace. We cannot escape either our own power or our obligations under the United Nations Charter; both propel us into the middle of any dispute that threatens to disturb the peace. But in such disputes, our primary interest is in getting the disputants to talk rather than fight; any outcome agreed between the parties most concerned is usually all right with us.

Similarly, during recurrent recent "flaps" on Israel's borders and among the Arab countries, our concern is often with procedure rather than with trying to play God on the substance of local disputes. That Israel is here to stay is a basic tenet of American foreign policy; but when it comes to frontier flare-ups, our effort generally is focussed on setting up a procedure for defusing border incidents, case by case. This interest in procedure has caused the United States to initiate, or support, a whole network of U.N. tripwires and conciliation devices—the Mixed Armistice Commissions, the Truce Supervisory Organization, the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip and along the Israeli-Egyptian frontier, a U.N. presence in Jordan, and recently, an agree-

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ment for a U.N.-inspected evacuation of foreign troops and military aid from Yemen.

In all these examples our objectives are limited, not by some absolute yardstick, but by a relative standard which matches them with our vital interests. Since our "must" list cannot include everything we would like to see happen in a turbulent world, the first task of crisis diplomacy is to decide what immediate aims are really worth the impressive resources we can deploy to achieve them.

Lesson No. 2: Decide How Far You Would Go.

Having limited his aims to match the vital interests of the United States, an American President facing a foreign-policy crisis must make another decision: how far down the road to the use of force he would, realistically, be willing to travel if things go from bad to worse. This is partly a judgment about his allies: who will be with him in the first instance—and in the last? But in the ultimate clutch would he—honestly now—order United States armed forces into action to support the policy, and if so, on what scale?

Some version of these questions must also be asked by decision-makers elsewhere, including those in the Kremlin. But in a democratic society so powerful that it must lead, not follow, the early facing of these questions is of the essence. For on matters of life and death, a democracy cannot bluff. It has to mean business.

A democratic government can—for a little while at least—cloak its tactics in official secrecy. But it does well to assume that its ultimate intentions are bound to show. Many people are looking on; many are asking questions; there is too much tradition and habit and impulse toward openness for a democracy to keep a very big secret for very long. And while this adds to the frustrations of doing business in world affairs, it is, in the end, not a price but a blessing of the system.

In the crisis over Soviet missile bases in Cuba, it was plain as day that the United States would, if need be, eliminate them by force—and alone if necessary. It was this very clarity of resolve which made our quarantine action, that relatively restrained first response, so extraordinarily effective. The Soviets had to crank into their calculations, not just the effect of a naval quarantine, but their own willingness to escalate to hostilities that might lead to nuclear war as the price of keeping their missiles on an island

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off Florida. Looked at this way, it simply did not seem worthwhile, and they took the missiles and bombers out.

In the Congo, it was clear from the outset that if the Soviets threatened to introduce a military presence in central Africa, we would have to reply in kind. Yet this was one of the last things we wanted to have happen—which mainly accounts for our consistent support for the alternative afforded by the United Nations.

Perhaps it will illuminate the central importance of deciding about the ultimate use of force if we note some cases closer to the other end of the crisis spectrum.

When the Indonesians and the Dutch squared off on West New Guinea last year, we looked around to see who was interested in the matter in a practical way. The Dutch were interested, not in retaining control of West New Guinea, which they had tried very hard to give to the United Nations, but in giving it up with dignity under arrangements that guaranteed to the Papuans the right of deciding their own destiny. The Australians were watching matters closely, and with deep concern. The Indonesians were anxious to take over the territory, and seemed for a time to be willing to do so by force. The Soviets clearly had an interest, as the principal supplier of military equipment to Indonesia. And we were interested, because a solution by force would have been in the interests of nobody—except perhaps the Soviets.

The problem, therefore, was to get a peaceful settlement agreed to by both Dutch and Indonesians. The Secretary-General of the United Nations chose an American diplomat to bring the parties together, and it was this mediator who finally proposed the arrangement that neither government could suggest but both could accept. The bedrock fact was this: there was no disposition, in the Netherlands or among her closest allies, to insist upon another result if that meant the use of military force.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, there is the case of Goa. The future of this Portuguese enclave in India should have been negotiated—as had already been done with the similar French and British enclaves. The Goans themselves might well have been asked what they thought about their future, but neither side was prepared to ask them. Our Government and other governments worked hard behind the scenes to get talks started and to prevent the use of force in Goa. But the Indians did not want to wait any longer, and the Portuguese did not want to talk.

When the crunch came, the United States like other govern-

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ments had to face up honestly to whether it was prepared to defend Goa from the Indians, and had to concede that this would not be a prudent and sensible use of its armed forces. As an exercise in random opinion-sampling, I have asked hundreds of Americans since then whether they would have wanted to put the Marines into Goa, or even go there themselves to fight. I have yet to find a volunteer.

Since nobody was prepared to stop the Indians by force, there was no possibility of the United Nations "doing something" about Goa. We and others publicly complained, with irrefutable logic, that India's use of military force to accomplish the takeover was in flat violation of her commitments under the Charter. But we and other military powers are the Charter's teeth; in cases where we are not prepared to bite, the U.N.'s only recourse is moral suasion—and the Indians knew it.

Lesson No. 3: Creep Up Carefully on the Use of Force

The "next step" in a foreign crisis depends, then, on what limits are set to the objectives sought, and how far we are willing to go to achieve them. But even if the responsible executive decides he is willing to risk nuclear war for an objective of vital concern, it behooves him to select first the gentlest form of force that has a good chance of being effective.

The purpose of the use of force is not to kill people we fear, nor is it to provide a release for the frustrations of the user. It is to accomplish the limited objective sought in the particular case, with the least risk of escalation to more damaging forms of force.

Thus in the Cuba crisis, the advantage of a naval quarantine over an air strike was that it put the option of starting violent action up to the Soviets, and gave them 48 hours (the time it would take the nearest Soviet freighter to reach the quarantine line) to think it over. Now, with hindsight wisdom, we know that decision was right. Latent power worked so well that power in being was never engaged at all.

Responsible political leaders will always start the use of force at the cautious end of the spectrum of possibilities, for force is a one-way moving staircase: it is easy to escalate, very hard to de-escalate. Much theoretical argument and many books on thermonuclear war have partly obscured the very wide range of lesser ways to apply force. Yet it is precisely in the controlled, political use of force that we have useful current experience. We know that,

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once the decision is made to go much further if necessary, many moves short of war are both possible and effective. We can move military equipment around to dramatize our resolve—as in positioning tanks in Friedrichstrasse in Berlin or moving the Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait. We can shift ground forces into positions of readiness for quick action—as in the placement of American troops on the Thai border during last year's Laos crisis. We can inject a military force into a trouble spot to keep the lid from blowing off, and then encourage the U.N. to take a hand—as President Eisenhower did in 1958 by landing Marines in Lebanon. We can help finance and provide logistic support to a U.N. peace force, as we have done for six and a half years in the Middle East and for three years in the Congo. In the hands of rational men, the escalator to nuclear war is very long, with many steps and the opportunity for much talk along the way.

The use of force in a dangerous world demands adherence to a doctrine of restraint—the cool, calm and collected manipulation of power for collective security—and the sophisticated mixture of diplomacy with that power. For until the ultimate thermonuclear button is pressed, and mutual destruction evolves from mutual desperation, force is just another manner of speaking —with a rather expensive vocabulary. But if force is to be a persuasive form of discourse, its modulations must carry not only the latent threat of more force but equally the assurance that it is under the personal control of responsible men.

Lesson No. 4: Widen the Community of the Concerned

The unilateral use of power is becoming as old-fashioned as horse cavalry. Even when the decision to employ power is essentially our own, we find it highly desirable to widen the community of the concerned—to obtain sanction for the necessary "next step" from the broadest practicable segment of the international community.

It was President Truman who made the first decision to stand against aggression in Korea, and it was ultimately American power which enabled the South Koreans to throw it back. But on the day of the President's decision the United States Government went into the U.N. Security Council and transformed our own resolve into a system of collective security. Acting under commission as executive agent of the United Nations, we later welcomed the participation of 14 other nations in the defense of Korea.

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Each time action has been required to keep the lid on in the Middle East, we have helped strengthen the U.N. presence there, rather than building up our own. Even in 1958, when action seemed to be needed so quickly in Lebanon that the President sent the Army and Marines sloshing ashore, we offered from the outset to get out as quickly as a U.N. force could be mustered to take our place—and made good on this promise in less than three months. The Congo is another clear case where, presented with the option of going in ourselves or helping organize a more complicated, more widely based U.N. force, the U.S. Government of the day rapidly chose the wider over the narrower base of action.

In the Cuba crisis, the decision to apply American power was enveloped from the very outset in a plan for widening the communities of the concerned. In the hours before President Kennedy unveiled the Cuba scenario in his television speech of October 22, dozens of allies were made privy to our plan of action. While the President was speaking, a formal request for an emergency meeting of the Security Council was delivered to its president. The next morning Secretary Rusk presented to the Organization of American States in emergency meeting a proposal for collective action; and that afternoon the Rio Pact nations decided on a quarantine of Cuba and continued aerial surveillance as minimum first steps. The same afternoon, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson opened in the Security Council the case for the United States. And not until that evening, October 23, did President Kennedy, acting under the Rio Pact, proclaim the quarantine.

In the days that followed, the United Nations went to work in three different ways. It served as the forum in which we could demonstrate the credibility of our evidence about the Soviet missile sites, and explain to the world why we and our Latin American allies had to act on this evidence. Then the U.N., through the Secretary-General, served as a middleman in crucial parts of the dialogue between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which led to a peaceful solution. It was an appeal from U Thant which Chairman Khrushchev was answering when he said that his ships would not challenge the quarantine line. Finally, the U.N. was ready, at our suggestion, to provide inspectors to examine missile sites in Cuba, to make sure the missiles were gone.

Castro, as we know, would not allow U.N. inspectors into his island. But while we would have preferred to have him accept on-site inspection, his refusal to coöperate with the United Nations

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had useful side-effects. For Castro thus branded himself an outlaw, and convinced practically all the vocal bystanders that this was not a case of little Cuba versus the big United States; this was intransigent Cuba thumbing its nose at the world community.

The object of our policy was to get rid of those missiles and bombers, peacefully if possible. There is no doubt that debates and operations in the Organization of American States and the United Nations had much to do with the fact that most of the world came to agree with this aim, and thus helped to achieve it.

To merge our efforts with the efforts of others does not, of course, subtract anything from our "national sovereignty," nor does it inhibit something called our "freedom of action." Notions like these are a hangover from the now-obsolete assumption that, acting alone, we are sovereign and free. In these days of interdependence, a stronger case can be made for the contrary proposition: that in each crisis we are born naked—and free to use our power in concert with whatever group of nations is most relevant to the task at hand. That this is true of little countries hardly needs to be argued; it is, indeed, why most small countries are so partial to the United Nations. That it is becoming true of all countries, even the most powerful, is one of the lessons of each foreign-policy crisis in our time. The matrix of alliances and international organizations, more even than the power of individual nations, is the hallmark of modern international relations.

Lesson No. 5: The Law You Make May Be Your Own

In the ebb and flow of crisis diplomacy, those who watch the "Operational Immediate" cables and write the contingency papers are very much involved with international law, and with its unanswered questions. Laymen as well as lawyers can readily perceive how principles that are valid in one area may be silly in another, how improvised instruments tend to harden into permanent institutions, how scientific invention and technological innovation outrace man's thinking about law, how old doctrine grows obsolete and gets altered in practice. If we are to add one more "lesson from flaps we have known" it would be this: Watch carefully the precedents you set. You will have to live with the institutions you create. The law you make may be your own.

Consider what is happening to the doctrine of non-intervention

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in the internal affairs of other nations. The facts of modern international relations are clear: nations are deeply involved in each other's internal affairs, through aid programs and military training and fellowships for students and leaders; through the beneficent dispatch of culture and the acrimonious exchange of propaganda; through a thousand pluralistic channels ranging from trade unions to the Children's Fund. When the question comes up, we tell ourselves that this is all right as long as the government of the receiving country asks the foreigner to come and allows him to stay. But our generation has also witnessed too many perversions of this practice—who can forget the "request" from the Kadar government for the Russian tanks that crushed the freedom fighters in Hungary?—to be sure that it is the last word in law for an era of deep mutual involvement in each other's internal affairs.

Consider, further, the mutations in air and space law. The law used to be simple: you cannot fly through my air space unless I say you can. But what if I fly over your nation in *outer* space, above the "air"? Judging from Soviet and American practice, and from a U.S. resolution unanimously passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, the doctrine of air space runs out of gas somewhere in the upper stratosphere.

How is civilized man to set standards on intervention or surveillance or on a host of other matters which differentiate the world community from a jungle? In our world, the standards are being set and international law being written more and more by the actions and reactions of international organizations. Every action in every crisis has implications for the United Nations peace system; it can be strengthened—or weakened—by the manner in which it is put to work in each crisis. So this consideration, too, must pass through the mind of the decision-maker.

Most citizens would be surprised how often, when the world thinks we in Washington are working on the next day's tactics, we are instead discussing the long-run growth of law and institutions, the issues suddenly illumined in the dead of night by the blinding light of a Cuba, a Laos or a Congo.

When we put all these lessons together, perhaps we have nothing more than another, more up-to-date, way of thinking about political leadership in its most complex form. We have said that the decision-maker in times of crisis must keep his objectives in line with his nation's vital interests, must decide how

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far he would go in the clutch, must use force gently while widening the community of the concerned, and must set only those precedents he would be willing to live with later.

If the known factors and the rational considerations indicate a clear preference for one policy alternative over any other, then decision-making is easy—and responsible criticism correspondingly more difficult. That is why such decisions seldom reach the Secretary of State or the President. It is when a rational weighing of measurable factors still leaves two or more reasonable options that the man who makes the ultimate decision must somehow stuff the whole problem into his own head, and add those priceless ingredients—personal judgment, sense of direction, feel for the total political environment in which the decision is made.

The fact that the most important decisions are often close decisions, that the personal judgment of political leaders is so deeply involved, makes them peculiarly easy to criticize. But the responsible critic of foreign-policy decisions must also wrap his mind around the full complexity of the problem. He too must think in terms of limited objectives; he too must decide when and where he would use force, how he would deal with allies and neutrals, what laws and institutions he is prepared to make—or break. If the critic is not willing to propose an alternative policy that meets these tests of relevance, then he is not criticizing American foreign policy but merely scratching an itch of his own.

At the moment of action the man who has to take the personal responsibility for the final decision, and face the political crossfire it may produce, is alone with his own understanding, his own moral gyroscope and his own fund of courage. It takes no courage to bluster; it takes some to stand up to a mortal threat that plainly has to be faced. But what takes the most gumption is to persevere in a decision that takes months or years to prove itself. There were moments during the chronic Congo crisis when the brickbats were very thick in Washington; but the President stuck to his position, simply because the alternative of great-power confrontation in the middle of Africa seemed even more unattractive than the swelling noise-level on his Congo policy.

The capacity to go on working with brickbats whizzing past the ears is, of course, the first qualification for public leadership in an open society. But the saving grace in the management of foreign-policy crises is this: dyspeptic criticism of a policy that turns out to be successful has a remarkably short half-life.

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THE PARTY SYSTEM AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

By Tom J. Mboya

> Practically nobody in these islands understands the Party System. Britons do not know its history. They believe that it is founded in human nature and therefore indestructible and eternal . . . by the immutable law of political human nature.
>
> —BERNARD SHAW, in "Everybody's Political What's What?"

> . . . if you were to ask . . . an American concerning the two great parties of his own country . . . , a bewildered look would probably cross his face; he would scratch his head and murmur something about tariffs. You would be puzzled. If you asked five Americans you would be five times as puzzled.
>
> —VIRGINIA COWLES, in "How America Is Governed"

MANY people believe there is some special connection between the democratic form of government and the party system, so that one cannot exist without the other. This belief is strengthened by the fact that the freedom to form as many parties as people want is seen to be incompatible with a totalitarian régime. An ideal Communist government is run by a single party composed of the working class; a Fascist government is similarly run by one party in the interests of the capitalist class.

This type of thinking is based on a misconception of the true nature of democracy. It confuses cause and effect. There were parties before the advent of democracy. The first political parties in Britain, for example, are believed to have come into being in the reign of Charles II. This was long before the Reform Act of 1832, which was the bare beginning of change in the direction of democracy.

At present there are political parties in countries which do not even admit the correctness of the thinking behind democracy. Has not the U.N.'s 17-nation committee on colonialism ruled that there is no self-government— let alone full democracy—in Southern Rhodesia because of the denial of equal voting rights to Africans? And yet Southern Rhodesia has political parties which fight and win elections and form governments. South Africa also has parties which have been governing the country for over 50 years against the will of the majority of the people. No one can suggest South Africa enjoys anything like democracy.

The same conclusion is reached if we look at the circumstances

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which bring parties into being. In Britain there was an attempt to exclude James, Duke of York, from the succession to the throne because he was a Roman Catholic. Some people sympathized with him and started agitating in his favor. Their opponents called them Tories (which was the name popularly given to Irish pirates). Tories returned the compliment by calling their opponents Whigs (which was the name given to highwaymen in Scotland).

In giving such names to each other, the parties seem to have suggested that there was not much to choose between them. In my own country, Africans were united in a single political organization which put up a united front at the 1960 Constitutional Conference. Then, independence came into sight and politicians started dreaming of loaves and fishes. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was created as soon as Africans were permitted to form national political organizations. The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) followed three months later, but it had no separate program and found it difficult to justify its existence until somebody's brain wave came up with the platform of "Regionalism." This fitted in with the traditional regard shown by British politicians and the press for the interests of the so-called downtrodden minority tribes or communities.

A great deal of political confusion and weakness in dependent countries has resulted from this sort of practice. A national movement starts sooner or later in every country seeking independence. It has a universal appeal and quickly gathers strength. This alarms the ruling race which tries to find forces to counteract nationalism. Agencies of propaganda (the press, the radio) are fully used, but they alone are hardly equal to the task of convincing world opinion that nationalism is wrong. What is really needed is an indigenous opposition to the nationalist movement. Because no foreign government could possibly succeed in setting up a completely artificial opposition party, the policy is adopted of giving every encouragement to disgruntled politicians, especially if they belong to a different religious denomination, tribe, race or area from that of the main body of leaders of the nationalist movement. Such disgruntled elements are sought out and supported.

India, for example, had one nationalist party at the beginning of its political struggle for independence. Later, props were offered to the leaders of a minority group. This induced other minority groups to demand special representation, and in every case the demand was acceded to. This process continued until the whole

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population was divided into warring sections. The same sort of thing has been seen recently in Kenya, where KANU originally represented the national front. Then KADU was formed and received the fullest support from the local press, which is largely European-owned. The European population generally, and also certain sections of the Asian community, joined it. In the first general election KANU received 67 percent of the African votes cast; KADU received 17 percent. But the constituencies had been so formed as to give KANU 19 seats and KADU 15.

The European press and radio have always been willing to give full publicity to new, dissident groups, although their policies seldom reflect a national outlook; they are sectional or tribal groups whose only effect—if not their purpose—is to delay the coming of freedom. Parties are formed because they are free to form, not because there is need for them. In our country a new trade union may not be formed if there is already one which serves the interests of workers in that field. No similar test of need is laid down for political parties. Anyone who feels like starting a political party can do so. The more sensational and unnecessary its program, the more publicity it will receive in the European press.

The worst of it is that in dependent countries imperialism has managed to keep the level of illiteracy and ignorance high so that every person who takes it into his head to become a leader can find some followers in his own district or tribe or religious denomination. No wonder that the parties in dependent, or erstwhile dependent, countries are not divided on ideological lines. There is generally one party which presses—and whose leaders suffer for—the nationalist cause. Other parties exist because the law allows them to, and because their alien sympathizers give them limelight, encouragement and sometimes money.

II

It is quite clear that the party system can exist without democracy. The only question is whether the converse is also true. To put it more strongly—and I hope agreeably to those brought up in the traditions of the West—we must ascertain whether democracy can function fully and fruitfully without a party system.

Here, a further distinction is necessary. There are states which allow the fullest freedom for the formation and working of political parties but where the multi-party system (which is what we really mean by the expression "party system") fails to flourish.

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In Tanganyika it has, in the past, been possible for anyone to start a political party. At least two parties have in fact existed there. Nevertheless, one of the parties (the Tanganyika African National Union led by Mr. Julius Nyerere) was able to win 70 seats out of a total 71 in a straight, completely free, general election. To all intents and purposes, therefore, Tanganyika has had a single-party system. Does it cease on that account to be a democracy?

To take another illustration, India has a multiplicity of political parties and there is freedom to form more if the people so desire. The country has had three general elections during the 15 years or so of her freedom, and each of them was vigorously contested. One of the parties (the Indian National Congress led by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru) has won all three elections and still occupies a more or less unchallengeable position. Is India not to be called a democracy because of this?

The only conclusion one can draw from the political experience of newly freed countries in Asia and Africa is that the party system is not a necessary part of democracy, which is truly concerned with the views, wishes and interests of the individuals making up the nation. Democracy is not fundamentally or necessarily concerned with the existence or well-being of parties, which may represent either sections or cross-sections of the population.

A good, relevant definition of democracy is suggested by the late Dr. C. E. M. Joad:

> If we define democracy as a method of government under which every citizen has an opportunity of participating, through discussion, in an attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what shall be done for the good of the whole, we shall conclude that in offering to its members opportunities to shape its policy and to realize in action the policy they have shaped, it offers them also opportunities for the development of their nature. . . . It enables the individual to realize himself in service to the State, while not forgetting that the true end of the State must be sought in the lives of individuals.[1]

Even those who believe that there is a connection between democracy and the party system must therefore agree that what is necessary is the freedom to form parties. It is not necessary that more than one should in fact exist and function effectively.

Let us take the argument one step further. The chief theoretical justification for the party system is that it increases the force and effectiveness of the people's views. It is an instrument, a means to

[1] "Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics," London: Gollancz, 1938, p. 807.

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an end, not the end itself. If the end can be achieved by an alternative means, there is no reason why that alternative should not be adopted. And as in democratic theory the people are sovereign, they can, of course, decide to achieve their ends by another means. A sovereign legislature parts with its sovereignty to the parliament of a new state (say in Africa) which was hitherto a dependency. In the same way, the sovereign people may decide to forego their right to form parties and decree that there shall in future be only one party in the country.

Now, it can be argued that no people will ever do that, but the theoretical possibility is there. And can anyone question the competence of the sovereign people to make such a decision? The only condition is that the decision should be voluntary, and arrived at after free and frank discussion. But, it will be objected, dictators in the early years of their rule always command a persuasive tongue; will they not misuse the weapon of a single party which has been placed in their hands? Have they not in fact misused it in the past?

Perhaps the single-party system will be misused. But has anyone the right or power to stop the sovereign people from decreeing such a system? At the most, we can insist on two things. First, the original decision should be completely voluntary and without any coercion. Secondly, the people should be able, if they so desire, to restore the multi-party system by a further amendment of the constitution. Nevertheless, it should be said that if the people have the right to take a revocable decision to establish a single-party system, they also have the right to say that that decision shall be irrevocable. It is this unfettered right of the people which is difficult to exclude or outlaw.

Now, the people can either express themselves in the words of a constitutional amendment or by their conduct. Suppose Mr. Nyerere's party in Tanganyika repeats its electoral performance once, twice, thrice. Can anyone then doubt what are the wishes of the people? My view, therefore, is that the question whether a country is to have a single party or several parties is to be answered not in terms of any preconceived ideas of "democracy" but in the concrete terms of the wishes of the people.

III

It is unfortunate that the intentions and declarations of African leaders are so often misunderstood. Immediately the people of a

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country feel a need to strengthen their central government and take steps in that direction, there is a hue and cry in the West that a dictatorship is being created. The fears expressed may in some cases turn out to be justified, but the readiness with which they are expressed shows that the critics start with preconceived notions.

Only a short while ago, Mr. Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika made a public announcement on the subject of party organization in his country. Most newspapers noticed in his long, carefully prepared speech nothing but a determination to put an end to the party system. His essential arguments were carefully excluded from newspaper reports. I should like to quote only a few passages from the speech, omitting the general arguments against the multi-party system which can be found in any good political textbook:

> In Tanganyika . . . we adopted the Westminster type of representative democracy. . . . But it soon became clear to us that, however ready we leaders might have been to accept the theory that an official Opposition was essential to democratic government, our own people thought otherwise . . . in spite of our having only one party, we were very democratic. But we were more democratic within the Party. . . . In Parliament it is no longer permissible for each Member to express his own personal opinion. . . . There is a party line to be followed . . . where there is no Opposition party, there is no reason why the debate in Parliament should not be as free as the debate in the National Executive. . . . It seems at least open to doubt, therefore, that a system which forces political parties to limit the freedom of their members is a democratic system, and that one which can permit a party to leave its members their freedom is undemocratic. . . .
>
> The existence of a Two-Party system in the older democracies is best explained by reference to the history of those countries. . . . the genesis of the Two-Party system was a class society. . . .
>
> Our own parties had a very different origin. They were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own people, they were formed to challenge the *foreigners* who ruled over us. They were . . . nationalist movements.
>
> . . . where there is *one* party—provided it is identified with the nation as a whole—the foundations of democracy can be firmer, and the people can have more opportunity to exercise a real choice, than where you have two or more parties. . . . we can conduct our elections in a way which is genuinely free and democratic. . . .
>
> . . . a National Movement is open to all. . . . Those forming the Government will, of course, be replaced from time to time; that is what elections are for. The leadership of our Movement is constantly changing. . . . since such a National Movement leaves no room for the growth of discontented elements excluded from its membership, it has nothing to fear from criticism and the free expression of ideas. . . . Any member of the Movement . . . would be free to stand as a candidate if he so wishes . . . the voters would be able to make their choice freely from among these candidates.

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To elaborate briefly on the ideas expressed by Mr. Nyerere, there are circumstances in Africa which favor emergence of single parties, or systems in which there are many parties but with one in a dominating position. Those circumstances can now be listed.

First, the new states of Africa have hardly got out of the woods. In the days of struggle against a foreign nation or against a racial minority placed in power by a foreign nation, the minds of the people are preoccupied with their political troubles. They experience these troubles not as individuals but as a racial group, all of whom suffer the same disabilities and indignities. There are no exceptions made in favor of anyone. Therefore, when the victims of discrimination combine to form a single party, it tends to be based on race. Small "moderate" groups may be formed here and there, but they are of no consequence. The essential point is that all opposition to foreign rule or a mono-racial rule comes from what is to all intents and purposes a single political party. As the tempo of struggle against racial policies rises, this political party becomes better organized and more widely based. In time, it becomes the mouthpiece of an oppressed nation, a possible successor to the alien government.

Secondly, this party or movement comes to have a leader who, by reason of his sincere and effective advocacy of the national cause and by reason of his sacrifices in that cause, is regarded by the masses as *the* leader, the hero, the father of the nation. He is a symbol of national unity. He is identified in the mind of the people and the outside world with the party, with the nation. This serves to solidify the foundations of the political organization and the general movement for unity.

Thirdly, this movement for unity continues after independence. The original party which fought for, and brought about, freedom continues in being—maybe as the government of the country. The same leader with the same group of collaborators is now the leader of both the people and the government. This in itself works against the emergence of a multi-party system. Again, the problems facing the new government are serious and urgent. It was easy in the pre-independence days to blame the foreign or the racial minority government for the poverty, the ignorance and the poor health of the people. Now, these causes of backwardness have to be removed—a process which requires planning, money and popular enthusiasm. This is the time when the government feels it must somehow persuade the people to give it all

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the support possible. The opposition parties, which were always small and weak, try to justify themselves by increasing their opposition to government measures—opposition largely for its own sake. This irritates the government which is engaged in the work of nation-building. At this stage, two courses are possible: either the government acts as a steamroller, ignoring the existence of the opposition, or it takes steps to put an end to opposition for its own sake—completely and permanently.

There is another force which militates against the establishment of a multi-party democracy of the Western type. The majority party in a dependent country—that is, the party which represents the nationalist movement—comes into conflict with the ruling race almost from the start. To establish a counterweight the rulers choose dissident individuals and groups and build them up. When the nationalist majority, naturally, demands a one-man-one-vote democracy on the Westminster model, the favorite minorities oppose it and ask for safeguards against majority rule. The rulers side with the minorities and a democratic system crippled by a crop of entrenched clauses is ultimately introduced. The majority party has to agree to this crippling in order to get rid of the foreign rule.

Our own experience in Kenya serves as an illustration. The African community was united in its demand for freedom and had the support of many of the Asians and some of the Europeans. At the Constitutional Conference in London in 1960, the African Elected Members presented a unanimous demand, speaking as one single party led by one leader. This Conference accepted two aims of constitutional development in Kenya: "first, to build a nation based on parliamentary institutions on the Westminster model and enjoying responsible self-government under certain traditional conditions; and secondly, a general acceptance by all of the right of each community to remain in Kenya and play a part in public life."

In pursuance of the second of these aims, the majority party (that is, KANU) proposed a comprehensive Bill of Rights guaranteeing full and equal political, economic and social rights to members of all races. As regards the first aim, the memorandum presented by KANU to the 1962 Constitutional Conference stated: "We understand this to mean majority rule, with the majority party, for the time being, running the Government, and the acceptance of an opposition party or parties who—on their part—

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accept parliamentary rules and methods as the means of advancing their policies and in pursuance of their political activities."

Can anyone in the face of these clear statements maintain that the majority party wanted to establish either a dictatorship or a one-party system? Nevertheless, we did not get the necessary backing from the British Government and many British papers were hostile to us.

IV

I think it will be useful if I now summarize my conclusions in a few brief paragraphs:

1. Democracy is government of the *people,* by the *people,* for the *people.* The supporters of the party system argue as though the word "people" in this definition read "party."

2. A government which gives all citizens the right to vote, the right to contest elections and the right to express themselves freely inside and outside parliament is not undemocratic.

3. The current aims of, and the history behind, the parties in the older countries of the West are different from the aims and history of the parties (or national movements) in the countries of Africa.

4. The responsibility for the emergence in African countries of a single political party or of one strong and several weak parties must be laid at the door of imperialist nations which created the conditions militating against the establishment of democracy based on two or more political parties.

5. The imperialist nations of the West and the Western press continue their traditional attitude of encouraging and actively instigating disgruntled, dissident elements which oppose the establishment of a parliamentary system of government (implying one-man-one-vote and majority rule). The Western statesmen and their representatives in Africa never tire of asserting that majority rule suits the countries of the West but that in Africa the minority tribes and races stand in need of special protection against majorities.

6. The countries of Africa emerging from political subjection are entitled to modify, to suit their own needs, the institutions of democracy as developed in the West. No one has the right to cavil at this so long as all citizens—irrespective of their racial, tribal or religious affiliations—are treated alike.

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CANADA IN SEARCH OF ITS ROLE

By John W. Holmes

CANADIANS like to remind their more turbulent friends that they have grown by evolution rather than revolution. In the language of the country, therefore, the present might be described as a pre-evolutionary phase. The change of Government from Conservative to Liberal in April may usher in changes, but politics are only the surface manifestation of a crisis which involves the whole fabric of national life. For several years there has been an intense examination of Canada's economic, constitutional and cultural foundations, conducted in a charged political atmosphere, by no means entirely rational, but a grand debate nevertheless. Canadians have been staring with less blinking than usual at the harder facts, even asking themselves whether the continued existence of the country is justified. They have been stung by criticism from abroad which reached beyond the acts of the Government to question Canadian institutions and traditions—criticism which was unqualified by the benevolent indulgence to which nicely behaved lesser powers have become accustomed. Canada has perhaps suffered too long from the illusion that it is a young country with the license of youth in world affairs, and its course may be firmer as Canadians realize that they are not only middle-powered but middle-aged. The sobriety which has followed a tumultuous election, with the world for the first time looking on, is a mood in which fundamental changes can be accepted. On the eve of the hundredth anniversary of confederation, Canadians in anguish have been discovering its worth and seem disposed to meet present challenges with restored faith—if only they and their leaders can work out some answers.

At issue are: the viability of Canada in the modern age; its role in the world; the unity of the federation; and the national identity of the Canadian people. The relationship with the United States is a factor in all of this, but it is a distortion to see in the Canadian debate a contest between pro- and anti-American forces.

The economic malaise is fundamental because, more than anything else, it has undermined confidence in the future of the nation. At the moment, the economy is looking up. Trade balances

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have improved in 1963, and the growth rate of 8 percent compares more than favorably with those of the Common Market countries. Disquiet comes from the persisting high rate of unemployment because this bears on Canada's expectation of population growth. For a vast country bent on developing an economy sophisticated enough to nourish a full national life, population is the heart of the matter. Canadians now see their destiny as that not of an eventual great power but of a high-class performer in the minor league. Nevertheless, it is a conviction that the population of 19,000,000 ought to be doubled if Canada is to maintain an economy which it can control and is to fulfill its international obligations. Prosperity isn't necessarily good unless it supports more Canadians on Canadian soil. Canadians are bothered not only by the profits which cross the border but also by the skilled and talented citizens steadily drained away. Fear that the perpetual skimming process will leave the country a second-rate home is a strong element in the malaise.

The Conservative Government's lack of enthusiasm for a broader European union was not shared by economists and businessmen who, by and large, were tantalized by the economic miracle of the Common Market, favored Britain's entry and minimized the dislocations Canadian trade would suffer. However, prevailing ideas about the inevitability of economic regionalism inspired the fear that Canada would become, as was said, "the Outer One." Contrast with European prosperity stimulated bitter self-disparagement. Criticism was intensified by reason of the increasing disapproval of the Government by the economic community, and Mr. Diefenbaker's charge that the Opposition were prophets of "gloom and doom" had some justification. After a decade and a half of heedless confidence, this self-criticism has been purgative, but it was beginning to paralyze the national will.

In such a mood Canadians wondered whether a continental solution was inevitable. They have on occasions contemplated—and a century ago even practiced—forms of continental economic union, and consideration has of late been given in private to ways and means. It is a prospect, however, which Canadians approach grimly, fearful of gambling on the political consequences. Some are single-minded enough to believe that economic considerations alone matter, but the attachment to a political entity called Canada is strong. Because of the political uneasiness and the lack of industrial self-confidence, interest is directed toward schemes

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for rationalizing industries and production on a continental basis as preferable to headlong precipitation into a common market or free trade area. In spite of indications to the contrary, Canadians are not easily moved from the assumption that Americans would digest them unhesitatingly if they offered themselves.

Preoccupied with Commonwealth trade and the E.E.C., Canada was slow to recognize in President Kennedy's trade expansion proposals the route for a country excessively dependent on trade but geared to no regional configuration. Washington, likewise, was so fascinated with Europe that it omitted Canada from its calculations. Although the United States does more business with Canada than with the whole of the Common Market area, Canada was not included in the "dominant supplier" category of the Trade Expansion Act. By the end of 1962, however, Canada was adjusting itself to Britain's entry and looking to the trade expansion program as a means of establishing acceptable relations with a united Europe. When the unblessed event failed to come off, Canadians were left in a state of arrested development, more uncertain than ever on what set of facts to plan their future. It would be imprudent to suggest that Canada's problem is more a depression of the mind than of the economy, but it is at least partly one of morale. The country is unlikely to proceed far toward solving its problems unless it can find some formula for its place in the sun which makes an increased national effort worthwhile.

II

The debate over Canada's function in the world came to a head in the argument over accepting nuclear arms. Though the circumstances differ, the problem for Canada is similar to that of other Western countries: how to work out a reasonable basis of association with a super-power in an alliance of unequal partners. There are two elements in the disinclination to have nuclear weapons on Canadian soil which illustrate the dilemmas of the lesser ally. One is the suspicion that Canada is the victim of questionable military decisions in Washington over which it has no control. The other is the desire to make some national contribution to halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The present Canadian malaise had its roots in the cancellation of the Arrow aircraft in 1959. Canadian industry had perfected a military aircraft which it had reason to consider the best of its

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class, but the United States could not be persuaded to adopt it. Production was stopped and hundreds of Canada's best technical experts left for California. It was a traumatic experience, and a mood of hopelessness about Canadian industrial and military prospects settled on the land. The suspicion that Canadian interests had been sacrificed to the U.S. aircraft industry was inevitable, in spite of persuasive arguments for the decision. At the time, it was hard to see that Canada was a victim of the inevitable integration of Western defense production and the inexorable technological developments which affect American and non-American producers alike. This kind of trouble is more easily absorbed, however, into a versatile economy, especially when the causes can be traced to domestic rather than foreign decisions. Canada accepted American Bomarc missiles and Voodoo aircraft to replace the Arrow—under the pressure, it should be said, of circumstances rather than the Pentagon. Bomarcs, like Skybolts, however, are contraptions on which long-range policies cannot be based. It is inevitable that decisions be made in Washington because Washington alone has the requisite knowledge and responsibility. It is equally inevitable, however, that countries like Canada and Britain will seek after strategic roles which are distinct, as self-contained as possible, complementary rather than merely supplementary. From one point of view, this search for a special function may seem petty in a perilous age, but it reflects an understandable desire of a country to have a defense policy which is, in so far as possible within an alliance, adjustable to the requirements of its own foreign policy and its own economy—and which does not blow up in its face every five years.

The opposition to nuclear weapons reflected also the persistent Canadian anxiety to make some useful contribution beyond the cold war to the cause of world order. This urge was confused by arguments of dubious logic and morality, but behind it was a conviction that, regardless of who retained ultimate control, as few countries as possible should have nuclear weapons. The willingness to leave nuclear defense of the West to the United States is not an intrinsically anti-American position and reflects a trust which the United States might be grateful to find among its European allies. There is, of course, in Canada as elsewhere (including the United States), criticism of American nuclear policy. The objections to nuclear weapons cannot, however, be attributed simply to pacifists, unilateralists or neutralists. It would be a

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mistake, furthermore, to see in the election a simple victory for accepting nuclear weapons. Canada has yet to be convinced that the cause of the Alliance, of the United States, or of the international community is necessarily served by Canada's having nuclear weapons. It is not a question, as is often charged, of Canada's hypocritically seeking shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. It is a question of a rational distribution of functions, having in mind both the military effectiveness of the Alliance and its interest in reducing the peril from nuclear weapons. The Liberals think Canada should fulfill its agreed commitments, whatever they might be, but they have carried into office their doubts over the advisability of continuing indefinitely the strategy which assigns nuclear weapons to Canadian bases and nuclear weapons to Canadian forces in Europe. Whether these doubts will survive the friendly persuasion of high NATO and NORAD councils is, of course, questionable.

Canadians are, of course, open to the charge of inconsistency in that they have not extended themselves to provide non-nuclear forces for NATO. The excuse is partly that conscription of any kind would exacerbate already strained relations between English- and French-Canadians. There is also widespread skepticism about the logic of Canada's maintaining expensive forces in a populous and prosperous country like Germany. Canadian Governments have been reluctant to rock the NATO boat by withdrawing their forces, but this is a further reason why the new Government wants a reëxamination of NATO assignments. In Canada there is also a strong opinion that its most useful services are those which it provides for international peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, the Congo, Indochina and elsewhere and that its armed forces should to an increasing extent be trained and organized for these middle-power functions. There is no sound reason, however, why the two need be incompatible if the establishment is large enough.

The need for a special function in the world may reflect a pretentious nationalism, or it may reflect the need of a country, particularly a country uncertain of its identity, to feel responsible, to fulfill a mission, limited though this may be. Canadians tasted the exhilaration of a mission well done in the first decade after the War, and their recent irascibility is partly attributable to a feeling that they have lost the way. Unlike the great empires of the past, Canada has had to adjust itself to a swift cycle of rise

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and decline in international rank even while it was growing in experience and strength. It is superficial simply to attribute this depreciation to the change of government in 1957 and assume, therefore, that the new Liberal Government will automatically restore the status of six years ago. Canada has been reverting to a more natural position after a giddy experience in the postwar years as one of the major Western countries during the temporary exhaustion of the European powers. Furthermore, the rise of new nations, powerful in political influence if not in resources, and the multiplication of United Nations members, have increased the roster of middle powers and altered old patterns. Instead of being a fresh new power in international diplomacy, Canada is a relatively elderly member, and in the course of an active diplomacy has acquired enemies and stimulated grudges. Perhaps, too, something of the earlier pragmatism has been lost.

III

The economic question may be fundamental, but the question of unity is critical. These two issues, however, set up contradictions because the economy requires national direction at a time when the bonds of federation may have to be eased if Quebec is to remain part of it.

The crisis of unity is partly ethnic and partly regional. A source of recent disquiet was the disintegration of the national consensus revealed in the election of June 1962, when the two minority parties gained strength and the voting of the regions was so at variance as to leave doubt whether they were all participating in the same election. The threat to the convention of two major parties roused anxiety not so much because coalition government is impossible as because the governing party is expected to embrace all regions and is looked to, therefore, as the most important institution for holding the country together. The election this spring did not alter the pattern greatly, but the forces of disintegration were checked. It accentuated, in fact, a growing breach between the big cities, where the Liberals and New Democrats flourish, and the small towns and the countryside, dominated by the Conservatives and Social Credit. In that it counters the graver dangers of regionalism, this schism may even be healthy.

The election's most important contribution to unity is that the governing party now has an equally solid basis in Ontario and Quebec, and French Canada will have greater strength in the

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Cabinet than under the previous régime. The Canadian political instinct abhors a French party and an English party. At this of all times, such a division would be disastrous, because the most critical issue for the country arises from the new intransigence of French-Canadians.

Though historians differ, French-Canadians look upon confederation as a compact, an agreement to political coexistence between partners. The position of French Canada is in no way comparable to that of any ethnic groups in the United States or with other ethnic groups in Canada. The French are not immigrants but first settlers, not a conquered race but one of the two communities which, by various understandings and statutes over two centuries, have agreed to union within a bicultural country. Over these centuries French and English have learned to live in amiable coexistence, accepting rather than understanding each other. Prevailing attitudes among the English-speaking majority have been mellowing. The acceptance of a bilingual state as a burden has given way, particularly in intellectual circles, to a warming enthusiasm for the French element as something unique in Canadian life. Unfortunately, however, these relatively happy relations have been based on the convention that the English speak English and the French are bilingual; the nation's business is conducted in the English language and in the Anglo-Saxon way, although the rights of the French to translations are to be respected.

Such arrangements have assumed the continuing docility of the French, but the political, social and cultural revolution which followed the ousting of the reactionary régime of Maurice Duplessis in Quebec in 1960 has roused a new spirit of assertiveness in that province. Unlike previous French nationalist movements, this one is neither protective nor nostalgic but progressive. The irony of the situation is that the liberation of the French spirit, with its emphasis on reform in education, is welcomed by English-Canadians as the new factor which could bring English and French closer together and make equal partnership possible. French demands for a revision of the practices of confederation get a surprising amount of sympathy in English Canada. Militant separatism has had a useful shock effect, but the danger cannot be ignored that extremist demands and terrorist acts will awaken old animosities. It remains a question, furthermore, how far English-speaking Canadians, culturally and commercially embedded in an English-speaking continent, are prepared or are free in prac-

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tice to make the institutional as well as personal sacrifices which true biculturalism involves. Meanwhile the French are impatient for change. Although only a minority are separatists, many more say that they will give confederation one last chance.

The mentality of French-Canadian nationalism has much in common with that of new nations. The emphasis on French culture draws them toward Paris but there is no suggestion of political enosis. With Gaullism the nationalists have little in common save a suspicion of Anglo-Saxondom. Rather, they are anti-imperialist and anti-militarist, socialist or at least statist in their ideas about developing and protecting their resources. They are not deliberately anti-American but are out of tune with contemporary attitudes in the United States. French Canada is united in opposing nuclear weapons for Canada, and although the nationalists are non-Communist they can evince sympathy for Castro and Latin Americans struggling against the power and wealth of the Anglo-Saxons. The stronger voice that French Canada has now obtained in foreign policy is not likely to be exerted in favor of orthodox NATO policies, not because French-Canadians are opposed to NATO but because they are more interested in other aspects of international policy—forming ties with Latin America or French-speaking Africa, for example. It should be borne in mind, however, that although these nationalist attitudes are important because they are the views of the articulate, the solid middle classes of French Canada—particularly the million or more who live outside Quebec—are more conditioned to the continental climate of opinion and traditional attitudes such as those reflected by Premier Lesage.

Quebeckers complain of the domination of Anglo-Saxons in much the same terms as Canadians in general use about the prevalence of Americans. Concern over the national identity is an important cause of the present malaise and a factor which paradoxically draws English and French together, because it is the presence of the French that contributes the sharpest quality of individuality to the country. Concern over identity is often expressed in the misguided proposition that Canada is becoming Americanized. Canada cannot be Americanized, however, because it is already an American country. Its cultural habits are, as they have been for nearly two centuries, part of a continental pattern with regional and historic variations. The American way of life is not an alien culture but one in the development of which Ca-

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nadians participate. Even French Canada, easily identifiable in language and literature, is American in its habits of work and play. To say that Canada is becoming Americanized is like saying that Belgium is being Europeanized; it may mean something but not much.

What is distinct, however, is the Canadian political identity—both in the structure and purposes of government and in political attitudes.[1] "Canadian history," as Professor W. L. Morton has pointed out, "is not a parody of American, as Canada is not a second-rate United States, still less a United States that failed."[2] Canada is closer in principle to Switzerland in that it is a constitutional framework within which people of different language and historical association group themselves. Because of the quite different concept of a nation existing in the United States, Canada, as Professor Morton says, is not a creation of a covenant, or a social compact embodied in a declaration of independence and written constitutions, but the product of treaty and statute. "As America is united at bottom by the Covenant, Canada is united at the top by allegiance. Because Canada is a nation founded on allegiance and not on compact there is no process in becoming Canadian akin to conversion, there is no pressure for uniformity, there is no Canadian way of life."[3]

Such is the pressure of American political assumptions, however, that Canadians themselves have too often lost sight of the peculiar quality of their constitution. Now, however, the yearning for identity, which in cultural matters is often artificial, encourages appreciation of the significance of creating a nation in which two cultures and diverse regions can flourish—an experiment significant not for Canada alone. Multi-tribal political structures must be proved viable in a world threatened by the excessive proliferation of states on a tribal basis. This is, of course, a sophisticated approach to sell to the general public, and even among the highly educated the contemporary prejudice against nationalism and sovereignty—a prejudice which makes sense in specific applications but as a nebulous generalization encourages anarchy—inhibits the acceptance and frowns upon the glorification of even

[1] If proof of the latter were required, one need only look at the recent elections. In spite of the vertical cultural affinities along the Pacific Coast, British Columbia, a near neighbor of California, sent a majority of socialists to represent them in Ottawa; and the provinces bordering on the American Midwest voted for the party which sold their wheat to Communist China.

[2] W. L. Morton, "The Canadian Identity." Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962, p. 93.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 85.

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a respectable idea of national mission. In spite of their petulant patriotism, it is difficult to persuade Canadians to take their country seriously.

IV

In such a climate of opinion, what has been the significance of the April 1963 election? The most important may be the mood of the fresh start. The voters made no decisive choice of who was to lead the fresh start but indicated they wanted someone to lead them out of frustration and discouragement. The fact that the Liberals will be somewhat dependent on the support of the socialist-inclined New Democratic Party might suggest to Americans a leftish trend. It is unwise, however, to apply exotic terms like "right" and "left" to the pragmatic politics of Canada. It would be difficult to say, for instance, whether the Liberals are left or right of the Progressive-Conservatives. In the last election they had the support of big business, but within their brain trusts are those who are interested in using the state in unorthodox ways to achieve practical results in the specific Canadian context. They are admirers of the European Common Market which has made planning respectable.

Stimulation rather than protection of the national economy seems to be the aim of policy. The new Government, however, is likely to be more active than its supposedly anti-American predecessors in seeking to reduce the percentage of American ownership of Canadian industry. The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Gordon, has continually stressed the problem presented by the imbalance of payment with the United States and the implications of too much absentee ownership. This does not mean that expropriation is to be expected or United States capital banned. Mr. Gordon speaks rather of changing the tax laws to discourage Canadians from selling out and of establishing a National Development Fund to expand the Canadian share of ownership.

Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the new Minister of Trade and Commerce, wants to stimulate Canadian industry by subjecting it to more international competition. "Protectionism," he declared in his first major statement in office, "is no answer to our problems of unemployment and under-utilization of Canadian abilities and resources or to our balance-of-payments problem." Thereupon, he set off for Geneva where he promised to be a tough but not reluctant bargainer. The Government is committed to joining

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with the United States in a world-wide trade liberalization program, but neither the Government nor Canadians in general are convinced that the present American proposals for across-the-board tariff reductions, designed for populous units like the United States and a united Western Europe, are acceptable without modification for a country in Canada's position.

With a former diplomat as Prime Minister, the orientation is bound to be more international than that of the previous Government, although the change may be mostly in style. Mr. Howard Green was a dedicated internationalist in the ends he sought, though he insisted on independent Canadian means. On many issues of importance the new Government will be closer to the Washington view. It is making a determined effort to restore Canadian influence in Washington and may even find it difficult to resist the too friendly embrace. Public opinion, however, would not be pleased by a speedy alignment on such subjects as trade with China or relations with Cuba. On Atlantic and European questions there is likely to be closer harmony and special appreciation for United States support of the United Nations. The Atlantic idea was nourished by a previous Liberal régime, and Mr. Pearson has a progenitor's concern for NATO. He is, however, almost unique as a statesman associated closely with both the United Nations and NATO, and he is unlikely to support the North Atlantic isolationists.

The new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, has had a long and successful experience in the United Nations and especially in disarmament negotiations. He has always advocated and practiced easy and confidential relations with the United States, but it is worth recalling that his most notable diplomatic achievement was in 1955 when he led the lesser powers in revolt against the great powers, despite the wrath of Mr. Dulles, to secure the admission of 16 new members and thereby alter the history of the United Nations.

Although past Liberal Governments were not disposed to bring Canada into the Organization of American States, both Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin have recently indicated a more favorable attitude. The obstacle to membership in recent years has been not so much theoretical as practical: the heavy diplomatic commitments and financial involvements of a country of 19,000,000 people—commitments which usually loom larger in office than in opposition. If the step toward O.A.S. should be taken, it would

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reflect the venturesome internationalism of Messrs. Pearson and Martin and a growing public interest in Latin America rather than a break-away from traditional alignments. In the O.A.S. the Canadian Government would certainly have independent views, even on Cuba, but the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary are too sophisticated to accept membership, as some Canadians advocate, with a calculated determination to act as a "mediator" between Latin America and the United States. For Canada a hemispheric association would be not an exclusive regional tie but an additional sphere of interest which, along with NATO and the Commonwealth, would add flexibility to its middle-power role—and a few more complications. It is a basis which might not be acceptable to the Latin Americans.

A neat but inaccurate formula for foreigners is that the Conservative Party is pro-British and anti-American and the Liberals pro-American and anti-British. It is doubtful, however, if any national party could be successful in Canada if it were anti-American or anti-British beneath the skin. Genuine anti-Americanism of the virus kind, as distinct from the resistance to American pressure which is endemic, or vigorous disagreement with specific American policies, is rare in Canada. Anti-Americanism was not, as reported, a decisive element in the election; most of the talk about it came from those who got various forms of satisfaction out of deploring it. A sharply critical pronouncement from the State Department touched off the events leading to the fall of the Government, but it is ludicrous to suggest that Washington, either intentionally or unintentionally, overthrew it. If the Administration was conspiring to get rid of Mr. Diefenbaker, which is highly unlikely, then their tactics of intervention have improved little since the Bay of Pigs; every pronouncement by the State Department or Mr. McNamara was, to say the least, counter-productive. In the election the Conservatives stressed Canadian independence and American interference but never questioned the basis of the alliance.

Relations with Britain also cooled during the Conservative régime—partly because the Canadian Conservatives irritated the British Conservatives by supporting the non-white members of the Commonwealth over South Africa and the Common Market. Nowadays, favoring the Commonwealth does not necessarily mean favoring Britain. The new Liberal Prime Minister, however, went to London a week after taking office and was received with

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indiscreet enthusiasm by the British Conservatives. As for the Commonwealth, the Canadian Liberals have been prominent among its begetters. Their attitude toward the institution is still friendly although the Commonwealth itself has suffered a sea-change. The souring of opinion in Britain toward the Commonwealth, and the prevalence there of regionalist dogma, have lowered the priority accorded the relationship by other members as well. Regionalism, however, makes the continued existence of the Commonwealth as a political if not an economic entity more, rather than less, necessary as a counter-force—complementary rather than contradictory to continental alignments.

In its foreign policy Canada has sought an equilibrium between the requirement to be a loyal ally and the requirement to play an independent role on the world's stage. Attachment to NATO on the one hand and the Commonwealth on the other, with a predominating respect for the United Nations, has provided historic justification and an appropriate framework for such a diplomacy. In the view of Canada's associates, however, the role of ally has of late been subordinated to that of knight-at-arms (or knight-without-arms). Having had considerable success with the equilibrium, the Liberals may be expected to return to it instinctively. It is a sophisticated policy, eschewing absolute positions—a package which does not appeal to the unsophisticated citizen but responds to the consensus of a complex nation in which are mixed continentalists and internationalists, isolationists and imperialists, neutralists and nationalists, most of them taking their views skeptically. The late disequilibrium in Canadian foreign policy is attributable, however, not only to the attitude of the Conservative Government but also to the fact that the inexorable concentration of power and decision in the hands of the United States has been twisting the alliance from its early assumptions about what Mr. Pearson once called "coalition diplomacy." Much has changed since 1957. The trend toward polarization between Europe and the United States has threatened Canada with isolation. On the other hand, the exorcization of Anglo-Saxondom by General de Gaulle has, for the time being at least, tilted us back toward the triangular relationship with Britain and the United States on which Canadian foreign policy traditionally rested. It is tempting to see here a mediatory role for bicultural Canada, but there has never been a meeting of minds between Paris and Ottawa.

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Perhaps the climate of opinion has swung against independent action by lesser powers. Unity, integration and community are in the air, and regard must be paid to these worthy if amorphous principles. Mr. Pearson was never one to concern himself unduly with the theoretical role of a middle power; he sought merely to make use of the particular advantages Canada enjoyed in international politics to do whatever needed doing. In spite of all the emphasis on unified action and the abandonment of sovereignty, the inescapable fact is that the world in general and the United States in particular constantly need the services and initiative of useful and responsible middle powers of which Canada can be one. The new Canadian Government may be expected to pay honest tribute on all occasions to the need for Atlantic integration while demonstrating by its actions the general advantage of the independent middle power, integrated in its intentions but not in its tactics.

It is always easier for a junior partner to demonstrate its independence when the larger partner is behaving, in its eyes, foolishly. Canadian governments differed honestly with Mr. Dulles because they did not share his view of the world. It will be harder to demonstrate independence of the Kennedy-Rusk approach. There is no justification for Canada's picking quarrels to prove its non-conformity, but it is under some compulsion to make clear that it is an independent agent, not merely to satisfy domestic opinion but also to reassure its associates in the United Nations that they are not dealing with a chosen instrument of American policy. This can be done, however, positively rather than negatively. In the present age a country satisfies the requirements of national mission more effectively by a vigorous contribution to international causes than by a rigid concern for things that were once the symbols of sovereignty. It is more profitable, furthermore, for a lesser power to be known as a wise and trusted counsellor than a bold public critic. The United States, in spite of its generous effort to extend nuclear responsibility to its European partners, will become more and more lonely in its ultimate decisions. Lonely power corrupts the perspective of even the wisest governments, and the United States will have more and more need of loyal but candid no-men at its elbow. It is a relationship which is, of course, easily acceptable by governments in communiqués but less easily sustained by public opinion in days of crisis.

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THE TROUBLED BIRTH OF MALAYSIA

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THE Federation of Malaysia is scheduled to come into existence on August 31 of this year by the merger of the existing Federation of Malaya with Singapore, the British colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo and the British-protected Sultanate of Brunei, thus forming a crescent well over a thousand miles long from the borders of Thailand almost to within eyesight of the southernmost Philippine islands. Although many difficulties stand in the way, the British and Malayan Governments say categorically that they will not be deterred from pushing the plan through. Some of the difficulties are historical and local, for the new Federation will be a rather arbitrary assemblage of widely separated territories with mixed populations at different stages of development. More important are the objections raised by Indonesia and the Philippines.

President Sukarno of Indonesia condemns Malaysia as a colonialist project because it will have a British defense guarantee; he sees no inconsistency, however, in criticizing it in the same breath as so weak that it will open the way for the southward march of Communist China. The Philippines began by taking the same position; but because its history gives it a different outlook on the relations of independent states with former colonial powers, it decided on second thought not to stress the criticism of Malaysia as a device to prolong colonialism. However, it joins Indonesia in claiming that China will find easier pickings in a Malaysian federation than it would if the component territories remained separate bits of real estate with an uncertain future. What they would like that future to be is not much of a secret. An agitation is being carried on in Indonesia, without official hindrance, for self-determination of the British territories as a halfway house toward their inclusion in Indonesia; and the Philippine Government has put forward a claim to residual sovereignty in a part of North Borneo, based on a complicated chain of inheritances from the last Sultan of Sulu.

This controversy has brought new uncertainties to the tense situation already existing in Southeast Asia and given it a sharp new focus in world politics. The conflict is particularly acute between Indonesia and Malaya. They are the two nations of the

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area which are most closely related in race, language, customs and religion. But they have had very different colonial experiences, attained independence in different ways, pursued different political and social goals by radically different methods and are led by statesmen of different training, experience and temperament, looking at the outside world with different eyes and seeking support there in opposing camps.

No such differences exist between the Philippines and Malaya. Both are democratically organized; both secured their independence with the consent of the colonial power; both belong, with Thailand, to the Association of Southeast Asian states (A.S.A.) and have been negotiating for closer cultural and commercial ties. For this reason, the Philippine Government has avoided using the invective and open threats that mark the Indonesian attacks on Malaysia, and recently President Macapagal has tended to serve as mediator between the leaders of the two other countries. Apparently the main reason the Philippines joined Indonesia in opposing Malaysia was to exert pressure on Britain to recognize its claim in North Borneo, or at any rate to ensure that the claim will be considered seriously and settled by a legal procedure, preferably in the International Court of Justice. For when President Macapagal first raised the matter formally in May 1962, Britain brushed it aside as so insubstantial as to be hardly worth discussing. Last November President Sukarno of Indonesia, passing through Manila on his way home from Japan, had a talk with President Macapagal. The two Presidents seem to have reached an understanding that the Philippines would make common cause with Indonesia in opposing Malaysia and that in return Indonesia would support Philippine ambitions in North Borneo. (Interestingly enough, although some of the territory included in the Philippine claim lies within Indonesia, nothing is now heard of that part of it.) They doubtless were encouraged by the disorders in Brunei in early December which revealed that the proposed Federation faced internal difficulties. President Sukarno immediately gave the revolt his blessing and proclaimed his "confrontation" policy against Malaya—a word imprecise in the context but obviously intended to be threatening.

Now there are understandable reasons why the Philippines should wish to identify itself with Asia, if only to show that it has a larger role to play than as an American protégé. Membership in A.S.A. was a natural step in that direction. But to jump

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into bed with Indonesia, particularly if it means destroying A.S.A., seems going to extremes. For partnership with President Sukarno involves risks that cannot be calculated in advance.

One thing which does seem certain about President Sukarno's plans is that they aim to make Indonesia the dominant power in the area. Half of the 200,000,000 people of Southeast Asia live under his control, compared with a population of about 28,000,000 in the Philippines and about 10,000,000 in what will be Malaysia. To back up his ambitions he has a well-trained army, enlarged to 300,000 for the projected invasion of New Guinea and still maintained at that strength, plus 125,000 Mobile Guards. Until recently, the Indonesian forces had rather miscellaneous arms—Dutch, Japanese, British, Czech and American—but these have been overshadowed by the military aid received from the Soviet Union, which now reaches the value of one billion dollars.



As first steps in his program, President Sukarno hardly disguises his belief that Indonesia should naturally include the territories now under British control in the western and northern parts of Kalimantan (the Indonesian name for Borneo), and he takes it for granted that Portuguese Timor is to be had for the

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taking at any convenient moment. It would be out of character if in addition he did not have his eyes on the Australian-administered half of New Guinea (though this is disclaimed, as is common form in such cases). But this is not the whole menu. A propaganda also flourishes in the Indonesian press and from Indonesian territory over the "Voice of the Unitary State of Kalimantan"—without official disapproval and therefore with official consent—favoring the concept of *Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesia) as a substitute for Malaysia. In it, Indonesia would absorb not only the Bornean territories but also Malaya and Singapore. Spokesmen for the project are left-wing Malayan refugees in Djakarta and the leader of the revolt in Brunei last December, Sheik Azahari, who directed his forces in Brunei from a safe distance in Manila and later transferred to Djakarta. The government-controlled press in Djakarta now refers to Azahari as Prime Minister of Northern Kalimantan. (Something which President Macapagal seems to have overlooked is that there also is talk in these same circles about the similarity in race and religion between the southern Philippine Islanders and their brothers in the Indonesian part of Kalimantan.)

Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia would frustrate for the time being President Sukarno's hope of extending Indonesian control over the whole of Borneo. But it would not foreclose the possibility of guerrilla action across the jungle-deep frontiers of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo, through "volunteers" for which Djakarta would of course disclaim responsibility. Indeed, sporadic raids are already occurring. Even if this action involved the use of modern arms in addition to the poison blowpipes talked about in the Djakarta press, it would cost Indonesia little; but since Britain will extend to Malaysia the defense guarantee it gave Malaya, it would have to reply to this attack, and the operation might be protracted and costly. The possibility of a campaign in the jungles of Borneo is disquieting; the repercussions would spread through all the western Pacific and would soon reach the United Nations.

II

The strongest Indonesian and Philippine argument against Malaysia is based on the need of the two countries to protect themselves against an impending Chinese Communist surge into Southeast Asia, executed not by force of arms but by infiltration

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and subversion. The proposed Federation, they assert, will be a soft sponge, ready to suck up Communist influences, and as evidence they cite the fact that Chinese will form the largest single element in the population and that even the Chinese who are not Communists have little feeling of identity with or loyalty to their overseas homes but on the contrary take pride in the new power and prestige of Mainland China. In Malaya the population is 49 percent Malay and 37 percent Chinese. In Malaysia the Chinese will form 42 percent of the population and the Malays 39 percent (the remainder being Bornean tribesmen, Indians, etc.).

Admittedly, a most delicate spot in the new Federation will be Singapore, where the population is 75 percent Chinese. But that great port, the fifth port in the world and as vital to Malaya as Malaya is to it, will be a problem in any event, and the question is how to regulate the problem best. The Communist section of the population has been held in check by what the canny Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, calls a "non-Communist" policy. In December 1961 he was able to win approval in the Legislative Council by close to a two-thirds majority for a proposal to merge Singapore with Malaya independently of the project for a further merger into Malaysia.[1] And in the autumn of 1962 he risked taking the merger proposal to the people of Singapore and gained their approval by a big majority. The financial terms of the merger are still under discussion, and a last-minute hitch might occur as to the division of Singapore's surplus revenue between the city state and the Federation Government. However, agreement has been reached that Singapore is to have autonomy in the critical fields of education and labor (the former of intense importance for the Chinese, the latter for everybody), and in return for this concession Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew agreed that Singapore shall have only 15 seats in the Federation Parliament, less than it would be entitled to in terms of population. Internal security will be in the hands of the Federation. The British base in Singapore will continue, and this seems to suit everybody but the most extreme Communist elements, since the support services for the base bring in a large revenue and employ more than 40,000 dockers and other workers. As this is written, the extent of British financial help in training Malaysia's enlarged defense forces is still being discussed.

Given the basic facts of the situation, the British and Malayan

[1] See "Singapore: Problem Child," by William P. Maddox, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1962.

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Governments feel that the problem of Singapore is being handled as wisely and safely as possible. If it were left a separate unit, the Communist elements among the Chinese majority might one day open the gates to an outside predator. If it were combined just with Malaya, it might play a preponderant role that it cannot play in the larger Malaysia. There remains the possibility that local disorders may occur, but the Federation Government will have authority to deal with them, and if they assumed proportions endangering international security it could call on Britain for help. Some British officials do not hesitate to say that it is not because of prospective weaknesses in Malaysia that President Sukarno fights it but because (aside from making Indonesian expansion in Borneo more difficult) it promises to stabilize a spot where the situation has been fluid and the future uncertain. Singapore will be immunized so far as practicable against a takeover by the Communists and anchored in a political base where it will be less vulnerable to the designs of an envious neighbor; the risk of racial conflict between the Chinese and Malays will continue but it will be minimized in a homogeneous economic and political structure giving scope for the abilities of the Chinese in business and finance and the talents of the Malays in politics.

III

President Sukarno has additional reasons, both foreign and domestic, for doing his best (or worst) to prevent the formation of Malaysia on schedule and, if he fails in that, for continuing efforts to sabotage it. One reason (which can hardly be shared by President Macapagal) is that since he is himself a socialist and claims to have established a socialist régime in Indonesia he must prove its superiority to the free-enterprise régime in Malaya. But this pretense he is finding it exceedingly hard to maintain, for Malaya is prosperous and the Indonesian economy is in chaos. To claim superiority for the Indonesian system would become even more difficult if the Malayan economy, based too heavily at present on two commodities, tin and rubber, were to become more diversified by the addition of the oil of Brunei, the timber, cacao, copra and bauxite of North Borneo, the timber and pepper of Sarawak, and other Bornean products, and if the whole of Malaysia became, as is suggested, a common market with a pan-Malaysia tariff, served by the great free port of Singapore.

What seem to be irreconcilable differences in temperament

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between President Sukarno and the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, are another reason why the dispute between their two countries has become so intense.

President Sukarno is too often described in the American press in unflattering terms only; and his voracious love of pleasure and lack of interest in economy do lay him open to criticism. (Item: The helicopter given him by President Kennedy stands on the palace lawn at Bogor. But it is so noisy, Sukarno told me, that he is ordering another. "Besides, the wind from this machine blows the petals off the water-lilies.") But this is only one side of his character. He is in addition a man with energy to match his ambition, a demagogue of magnetic power and a politician of marvelous skill in manœuvre. Who without that skill could cavort confidently around the circus ring, not only mounted on two horses anxious to go in different directions but guiding two other pairs of horses also?

His main team is composed of the Eastern horse and the Western horse. They pull hard against each other and it takes great dexterity on the President's part to keep his footing on each and not either land on the tanbark or find himself deserted by one of his steeds and left clinging precariously to the other.

The second team which he must somehow keep under control consists of two most incompatible horses. One, pressing hard to the right, is the Indonesian Army, led by anti-Communist General Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; the other, pressing even harder toward the left, is the Communist Party of Indonesia (the P.K.I.), two million strong, the only effectively organized political grouping in the country.

The third team consists of the Moscow horse and the Peking horse. President Sukarno needs to continue receiving Soviet aid and he must pay increasing deference to Communist China. Mao's aggressive policy is much more popular in the P.K.I. than Khrushchev's more moderate line, and the P.K.I. is a vital element in the political structure on which Sukarno's régime rests.

The pull between Moscow and Peking may still topple him. Southeast Asia is—for the time being, anyway—a battleground between the Soviet Union and Communist China; and a point of special friction is Indonesia. This was underscored this past spring when Marshal Malinovsky and the President of China, Liu Shao-chi, visited Djakarta within a few weeks of each other. The Chinese President urged Sukarno to push his fight against Malay-

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sia unremittingly and to avoid any plan for stabilizing the Indonesian economy that would require (and perhaps receive) American aid. Peking and the P.K.I. do not oppose economic and financial reform just because it would require aid from "imperialist" America; they know too it would ameliorate misery in the sprawling suburbs of the crowded cities and the *kampongs* of Java which are breeding-grounds of Communism. *Pravda* has called Malaysia a "cunning invention" of neo-colonialism, but in general Moscow's line is more moderate than Peking's. It deprecates revolutionary activity inside Indonesia at present, is satisfied that representatives of the increasingly pro-Peking P.K.I. should not be taken into Sukarno's cabinet and does not favor even an unofficial Indonesian war in Borneo. It would be to the Soviet Union's advantage if Britain were forced to transfer troops from Europe to Southeast Asia to deal with attacks on the former British colonies there; but Soviet leaders seem to fear that if Indonesia pushed the contest with Malaya and Britain to such extremes it might get out of hand and involve other powers, possibly even the United States.

So far, President Sukarno has been adroit enough to steer his three pairs of antagonistic horses round and round the ring without a fall and to the applause of a bedazzled audience.

By comparison with President Sukarno the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, is staid and unpicturesque. They are as unlike in externals as they apparently are in inner motivations. Sukarno is always in uniform with half a dozen rows of decorations, his cap set at a jaunty angle, a swagger stick under his arm. The Tunku ordinarily dresses inconspicuously in a sarong or blue cotton tunic and trousers. Where Sukarno is given to hyperbole, quips and taunts, the Tunku is dignified, almost ponderous. Each can and does speak contemptuously about the other, but Sukarno's sarcasm is viperous, the Tunku's blurted out, often at undiplomatic moments, almost by inadvertence. Nobody who works for Sukarno can feel secure except by showing him fidelity verging on sycophancy; the Tunku, as one associate described him, is "sometimes bumbling but always open to reason." Each understands his own people and has a flair for manœuvre in domestic politics. In international matters Sukarno often resorts to bluff and his bluff often wins; the Tunku is less of a gambler, but once he takes a position, as on Malaysia, he is immovable. Sukarno calls himself "a man of the world's new

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emerging forces" and refers to the Tunku as "a man of the old status quo forces." The Tunku considers Sukarno a shallow fellow, an *arrivist* who must be ever staging some spectacle in order to hold his popularity or seeking a new political success to divert attention from his inability to organize and run the daily affairs of a modern state.

IV

Indonesian officials complain that the Malayan Government is chronically unfriendly. They say that anti-Sukarno rebels during 1957 and 1958 found refuge in Malaya and subsequently were permitted to speak over the Malaya radio in an effort to arouse discontent in nearby Sumatra. It is true that rebel bands crossed the narrow Straits of Malacca and hid in swampy islands along the Malayan coast, and that Indonesian and Malayan patrols found it impossible to control them; also that Sumitro and some other rebel leaders escaped to Singapore and eventually, when the rebellion was over, came to live in Malaya, though under strict injunctions against political activity. It is denied categorically in Kuala Lumpur that they have ever been allowed to speak over the Malaya radio. It is admitted that when Foreign Minister Subandrio asked the Malayan Government in January 1961 (some time after the rebellion ended) to sign an extradition treaty the request was not granted; Indonesia specified that the treaty should cover political offenses and Malaya considered this contrary to international practice. A furor was raised in the Indonesian press when in October 1960 the Tunku made efforts to find a compromise for the West Irian question which was unsettling the whole of Southeast Asia. His visits to The Hague, Washington and the United Nations were attacked in Djakarta as preposterous interference. What was not mentioned, perhaps because it was not known, was that the Tunku had corresponded with President Sukarno in advance and had been encouraged in his quest.

A specific grievance emphasized in Djakarta is that the Malayan Government does not consult Indonesia about matters of common concern. As examples of this "bad neighborship" Dr. Subandrio gave me the failure of Malaya to inform him about the projected Association of Southeast Asia and later about the plans for Malaysia. The chronology of events does not seem to support this indictment.

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A.S.A. was first adumbrated in a speech made by the Tunku at a dinner given by President Garcia of the Philippines in Manila on January 3, 1959. His suggestion was then rather vague, merely that as wide as possible a group of nations in Southeast Asia should join together to ensure their independence, stability and progress. In October of that year he wrote to the chiefs of state of all the nations that might be interested in discussing such an association. His invitations went to President Sukarno, President Garcia, Marshal Sarit of Thailand, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, President Diem of South Viet Nam, Premier Sananikone of Laos and General Ne Win of Burma. President Sukarno replied in January 1960 that he did not favor multilateral agreements but preferred bilateral ones. Only with the Philippines and Thailand did the negotiations proceed to a satisfactory conclusion.

The first mention of the project which gradually took shape as the Federation of Malaysia was in a speech by the Tunku in Singapore, May 27, 1961. He said:

> Malaya today as a nation realizes that she cannot stand alone and in isolation. . . . Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say how this closer understanding can be brought about, but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic coöperation.

Two months later Malaya made the first major move to translate this idea into reality by establishing the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee composed of leading personalities from each of the five territories (the Brunei representatives sitting as observers). They were asked to study the feasibility of the plan, develop a program of action and suggest how local interests and requirements might be reconciled. The committee held four series of meetings in the North Borneo and Sarawak capitals and in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. By autumn the discussions had progressed so well that the Tunku was encouraged to visit London for a discussion of ways and means with the British Government. On November 23 he reached agreement in principle with Prime Minister Macmillan on the advisability of creating Malaysia and, as a procedural matter, on the appointment of an Anglo-Malayan commission to inquire into the proposal on the spot and make recommendations. Lord Cobbold, former Governor of the Bank

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of England, was named head of the Commission, with two experienced members of the British Civil Service and two nominees of the Malayan Government as his associates.

It was at this juncture that Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia intervened in the discussion of the Malaysia proposal. He was then in New York, attending the U.N. General Assembly at which the Indonesian claim to West Irian was being considered. In order to dispose of the idea that the acquisition of West Irian would be only a first step in an Indonesian program of expansion, he wrote a letter to *The New York Times,* dated November 13, 1961, citing "as an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent" the fact that Indonesia does "not show any objection" toward the Malayan policy of merger with the British territories in Borneo. And speaking in the General Assembly a week later, November 20, 1961, Dr. Subandrio said further:

> We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island (Borneo), but—more than that—when Malaya told us of its intention to merge with the three British Crown Colonies [*sic*] of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom.

The friendly attitude thus expressed did not long survive.

V

The Cobbold Commission arrived on the scene in February 1962 and in the course of 50 meetings in 35 different centers throughout Sarawak and North Borneo heard the views of over 4,000 persons who appeared before it in groups varying in size from 1 to 50. It also consulted with the Legislative Councils in the two colonies and received 2,000 memoranda and letters from town boards, district councils, political parties, chambers of commerce, religious and trade-union leaders, native chiefs and others. The hearings were private and the memoranda were treated as confidential. The Commission also made use of the report of the Solidarity Consultative Committee as a guide in asking questions and seeking compromises where divergent views were expressed. The question of Brunei's accession to the Federation is separate from that of Sarawak and North Borneo, for it is run by an hereditary ruler whose decision in the matter is final. (Actually, the Sultan's negotiations with the Malayan Government have turned mainly on the division of Brunei's oil reve-

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nues.) The Commission nevertheless visited Brunei Town and had discussions with the Sultan and his Ministers. As for Singapore, its amalgamation with Malaya had already been agreed upon. The Commission's report, signed June 21, 1962, summarized the problems involved in setting up the Federation and made a series of unanimous recommendations; it also included separate recommendations by the British and Malayan members.

Prolonged negotiations followed among members of an Inter-Governmental Committee representing Malaya and the two Borneo colonies, this time with Lord Lansdowne as Chairman. Agreement was reached on the necessary safeguards for individual liberties, religious freedom and the special position of native peoples, on the continuance and development of education along accustomed lines, on rural improvement, finance and trade, the control of immigration, representation in the Federation parliament and other matters which had roused apprehension among various elements in the two territories.

For example, both Chinese and Christians in Sarawak and North Borneo had resented the statement in the Constitution that "Islam is the religion of the Federation." It was agreed that religion is a matter about which each state must decide for itself; religious freedom is guaranteed for ten years, and after that it cannot be limited in any way without the consent of the respective state legislatures. Meanwhile if the Federation gives any subvention to Moslem religious or educational bodies it will put equivalent sums at the disposal of the state governments for non-Moslem uses. On education, which particularly concerned the Chinese, who had built and supported their own schools, it was stipulated that present policies should continue. To reassure the Chinese that a flood of Chinese immigrants from Singapore would not impair their economic position, it was provided that federal regulations about immigration into the Bornean states would be subject to approval by those states. In the end, the "package deal" satisfied the main requirements of all but two sets of opponents: the radical Chinese, who took their ideas from the Peking radio (an effective and powerful propaganda instrument throughout Southeast Asia) and from the Mainland Chinese periodicals which circulated in the colonies until after the Brunei revolt; and the tribal leaders who wished to continue in the familiar pattern of benevolent British tutelage.

Both Sarawak and North Borneo are vast in extent and con-

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tain rich and varied resources, largely undeveloped; and in both, the populations are just emerging from primeval conditions. Except in the two capitals, Kuching and Jesselton, neither of the two colonies has until recently known much organized political life. Both, however, possess Legislative Councils, partly appointive, partly elected in about as democratic a manner as the current degree of political sophistication warrants. In Sarawak, the elected membership of what is called the Council Negri is chosen by a "three-tier" system, according to which the people elect District Councils, which in turn elect Divisional Councils, which in turn elect members of the Council Negri. On March 8, the Council Negri voted to join the Malaysian Federation with the agreed safeguards of state and individual rights and interests. To give the population more direct representation, it also decided that the next Council Negri will consist of 36 elected members (an increase from 24), three members appointed by the Governor (a decrease from 15), and three ex officio. It will choose Sarawak's representatives in the Federation parliament.

The elections for this new Council will already have begun before these lines are published, but the distribution and collection of ballots in remote long houses and up-river settlements will be a long process and the results cannot be determined promptly. Some opposition to the Malaysian scheme will doubtless be registered. Though the vote in the Council Negri in favor of the Federation was unanimous, four members abstained, and Ong Kie Wie, leader of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), walked out before the vote. SUPP, the oldest and best-organized party in Sarawak, mainly Chinese in membership, had for some time been infiltrated with Communist elements. After the Brunei revolt several of its leading Communist members were jailed and others deported to Mainland China. Though Ong Kie Wie is opposed to the "package deal" agreed upon by the Inter-Governmental Committee, he calls himself a moderate and claims to favor Malaysia in principle (a statement which brought grumbles from the party's Secretary-General, Stephen Yong, when I met with him and other party members in Kuching). If the new elections produce a Council Negri containing a large element opposed to Malaysia, a fresh hurdle will be raised to the smooth formation of the Federation; but the action of the previous Council in March is being taken as final and no action of the new Council will be allowed to block Sarawak's adhesion.

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In North Borneo, where political institutions have not evolved at the same pace, the Legislative Council has been composed of 18 "unofficial" members appointed by the Governor from among those recommended by town boards, district councils, the Native Chiefs' Conference and other organizations, plus four ex-officio and three appointed members, with the Governor as Chairman. In the latest local elections, in which over a third of the people voted, Malaysia was the issue. The Sabah Alliance campaigned in favor of joining the Federation, and won. As a result, Donald Stephens, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Alliance, introduced a motion in the Legislative Council proposing membership in Malaysia, and on March 13 it was unanimously adopted. Mr. Stephens emphasizes that the discussions in the Inter-Governmental Committee were full and free. "I wish those who call us stooges of colonialism could have been there," he told me, "to see how strongly we insisted on every necessary provision for the protection of our Bornean interests. The Malayan Government met us at all essential points. We have had self-determination. Our decision has been made."

British officials would have preferred, of course, that the preparation of the two colonies for taking part in representative government had been longer and more intensive. Even so, as they point out, the political development of the peoples involved—tribal, Malay and Chinese—seems to have gone at least as far as in many member states of the United Nations, and the opportunities they have had and will have to express themselves are certainly greater than those given the citizens of many respected one-party states. The *tu quoque* argument is never a very satisfactory one; but if Indonesia, supported by the Communist bloc, ventures to raise the question of self-determination when Malaysia applies for U.N. membership, President Sukarno can be reminded that he refused a plebiscite in West Irian before annexing it.

VI

Indonesia's attitude toward Malaya and the Malaysia project hardened gradually, but the drastic change came only after the rebellion in Brunei on December 8, 1962. President Sukarno at once announced his policy of "confrontation," and what had been criticism turned into open opposition and threats. Although the Philippine Government expressed its opposition in more con-

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ventional terms it permitted the rebel leader Azahari to use Manila as a headquarters even after he had proclaimed himself Prime Minister of the "Unitary State of Northern Kalimantan" and announced that it included not only Brunei but the British colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo also. At first there was suspicion that the Sultan had connived with Azahari to restore the realm of his forefathers, of unlamented memory. And two rebels were actually captured at the gates of the palace, on the outskirts of Brunei Town, with a proclamation to that effect ready for the Sultan's signature. However, he had already taken refuge in the police station in the town, and since this was before the outcome of the rebellion was known it discounts the idea that he was in on the plot.

One reason the rebellion misfired was that it seems to have been scheduled for the spring of 1963 and to have been set off prematurely when the local leaders found that their preparations had become known. Newspapers in Kuala Lumpur, reflecting what was known to the Malayan intelligence, ran stories about the "secret" preparations for a revolt and reported that the Sarawak police had arrested several persons involved (for the revolt spilled over into the border region there). Knowing that surprise was their best weapon, the rebel leaders decided not to delay. Actually, the reports from Brunei and Sarawak do not seem to have been taken in Singapore as portending anything very serious, either by Lord Selkirk, the British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, or by the intelligence officers on whom he relied. Early on December 8 crowds of three to four thousand rebels, many of them acting in a desultory way but under a hard-core determined leadership, took over a good part of Brunei Town (though they failed to capture the police station or the Sultan who had fled there) and overran the Seria oil fields. British troops were at once flown from Singapore, and in the course of the fighting which ensued lost seven officers and men before the rebels scattered into the jungle and mangrove swamps. In the course of the following weeks most of them were captured or gave themselves up. All but a few of the leaders were eventually returned to their families.

Just why the revolt occurred is not altogether clear. The Sultan's relatives and court hangers-on were regarded as inefficient and corrupt and believed to profit outrageously from the rich oil revenues. But the people of Brunei shared in the oil wealth too.

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They have had sickness and old-age insurance, educational and medical facilities and many of the other advantages of a welfare state, besides the pride of being able to pray at the tremendous blue-domed mosque built by the Sultan out of Italian marble. Despite this, Azahari was able to organize the only successful party in Brunei on the basis of resentment against the Sultan's feudal court (not, curiously, against the Sultan) and its favoritism for the urban as against the primitive country population. It is debatable how much the Malaysian issue counted. Some of the disliked court ministers were Malays, lent to the Sultan from Kuala Lumpur, but on the other hand Brunei Malays probably outnumbered the Kadayans and other indigenous people among the rebels. This does not signify as much as would appear because Brunei Malays may well have felt that Malays from Malaya were lording it over them. To the extent that Malaysia was an issue, it probably did awaken some natural apprehension of the unknown; and obviously Azahari's promised alternative—the annexation of spacious Sarawak and North Borneo to tiny Brunei—would have had a strong local appeal.

The suddenness of the revolt took its backers in Indonesian Kalimantan by surprise, and may have prevented them from sending aid which had been scheduled. As it was, a number of the rebel leaders had been trained in a camp at Malinau, a small town in the northern part of Kalimantan, whence they passed in groups up the Semakong River, penetrated into a backward area of North Borneo and eventually reached Brunei by a mountainous route through northern Sarawak. There was no time to reënforce them, for when word reached Malinau the fighting was over. The Indonesian Government disclaimed any foreknowledge of the revolt, but at once gave it its backing. President Sukarno called it an example of the power of the new "emerging forces" and the Ministry of Information instructed the press to give the rebels every support, which of course it enthusiastically did; and on December 15 the Indonesian Parliament passed a resolution making this position official. As Willard A. Hanna has pointed out,[2] the West Irian issue had been settled, but here was a new one of comparable appeal, and the Indonesian government apparatus mobilized to popularize it, substituting Britain for the Netherlands as the colonialist scapegoat.

[2] "Malaysia, A Federation in Prospect," Part XV, American Universities Field Staff, Reports Service (Southeast Asia Series, v. XI, no. 3).

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The Philippine authorities had gradually become so embarrassed by Azahari's activities in Manila that when Indonesia invited him to Djakarta they saw him depart on January 31 with relief. In Djakarta foreign opinion is divided as to Azahari's present whereabouts and future role—whether he has been persuaded to go into Kalimantan to organize new "volunteer" forces to make raids into British Borneo or whether he prefers to remain as before outside the zone of operations. There also is divided opinion as to whether President Sukarno is likely to authorize any substantial operations this summer against the British, or later against Malaysia. Some fear that the temptation to embarrass Britain and take revenge on the Tunku will be too strong to be resisted. He must know, of course, that for Indonesia to start hostilities in Borneo, directly or under a disguise, would end any prospect of American aid. But it must be set down as at least an open question whether he is of a temperament to put an economic goal ahead of a dramatic political one.

VII

Complicating the situation as the August 31 date approaches is the claim put forward by the Philippines to residual sovereign rights in a part of British North Borneo. The claim is too complicated historically and legally to be more than touched on in the broadest outlines. It turns, essentially, on whether the Sultan of Sulu in 1878 ceded or leased in perpetuity a section of the coast of North Borneo lying mainly in what is now the British crown colony but partly in the Indonesian territory of Northern Kalimantan, with undefined limits inland, to two private individuals representing a British company; and on whether after a number of confusing transactions by various persons and companies and negotiations and treaties by various governments, including those which transformed the Spanish Philippine Islands first into an American dependency, and afterward into the independent Philippine Republic, that Republic inherited or otherwise possesses any sovereign rights in the territory in question. The original deed was written in the Malay language and in Arabic characters. The British Governor of Labuan, who witnessed the negotiations, translated the vital part of it to the effect that the Sultan did "hereby grant, concede and cede of our own free will and in perpetuity to Baron de Overbeck of Hong Kong and Alfred Dent of London as representatives of a British company co-jointly, their

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heirs, successors and assigns forever and in perpetuity all the rights and powers belonging to me over all the territories and lands being tributary to us on the island of Borneo." There followed a rather loose description of those lands and the stipulation that the Sultan and his heirs should be paid $5,000 annually as compensation. (This sum has been paid regularly whenever the proper heirs could be identified among many claimants.)[3]

Several years ago, when President Macapagal was a member of the Philippine Foreign Office, he became interested in a dormant claim which the Philippines had to the Turtle Islands, lying to the north of Borneo; and the British Government, which considered the islands inconsequential, agreed without difficulty to transfer them to Philippine control. Later he studied the claim to a part of North Borneo, and when he became President advanced it vigorously. In retrospect, it is plain that Britain would have done well either to work out a compromise at the start or agree that if the Philippine Government considered the claim good enough to subject it to judicial determination the dispute could be taken jointly to the World Court. Even if the latter course were adopted now it would not delay the formation of Malaysia; it simply would mean that the Federation would come into being subject to clearing the title to a small part of its territory. The Government of Malaya would of course have to commit the future Federation to follow through the policy inaugurated by the British Government.

Various advantages might be offered the Philippines to compromise their claim to territorial sovereignty rather than face a long judicial process and an outcome that is at best dubious. One inducement of great value to the Philippines would be an arrangement to deal jointly with the piracy and smuggling that go on in the Sulu Sea. At the wharves in Jesselton one sees fast Philippine boats lined up, waiting to load cargoes of cigarettes which are then smuggled into the Philippines at great fiscal loss to the Philippine Government. The traffic goes on quite openly, the North Borneo Government claiming that it cannot prevent the free sale of cigarettes and that the responsibility for policing Philippine waters belongs to the Philippines. The situation seems one in which the two sides could agree to coöperate to

[3] For a careful exposition of the Philippine case see "Legal Aspects of the North Borneo Question," by Pacifico Aortiz, in *Philippine Studies: A Quarterly*, Manila, January 1963. A brief account from the British viewpoint is "The Claim for North Borneo by the Philippines," a pamphlet by K. G. Tregonning, Professor of History at the University of Malaya, Singapore.

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end both piracy and smuggling; North Borneo could offer Philippine patrols the right to come into Borneo harbors to fuel and to spot and follow boats engaged in smuggling; and North Borneo could be given reciprocal rights to follow pirates into Philippine waters. Other advantages that the Philippines might receive could be a preferred position for Philippine capital in developing industrial projects in North Borneo and landing rights for Philippine airlines throughout Malaysia, so that businessmen and tourists could go freely back and forth (something already discussed, incidentally, in A.S.A. meetings).

VIII

The United States has favored steps toward the consolidation of Southeast Asia. SEATO in its original concept included the hope that if outside protection were provided the nations of the area which are ethnically and culturally related might in time draw together on a basis of individual independence and mutual self-help. A.S.A. seemed a step in that direction. When the Malaysian project was broached, Washington considered it a logical way for Britain to divest itself of its colonial possessions in Borneo and provide them with opportunities for political and economic development within a congenial democratic framework. And it was satisfactory, too, that a federation was in prospect instead of the fragmentation into fragile national states which has often followed the end of an era of colonial rule. President Kennedy therefore gave the project his blessing. In a press conference on February 14 he was asked whether Britain's plan to relinquish its colonial possessions in Southeast Asia and merge them in a Malaysian Federation threatened to create new dangers in the area. He replied that the United States has supported the Federation proposal, although he recognized that it is under pressure from several directions. "But I am hopeful it will sustain itself, because it is the best hope of security for that very vital part of the world."

Thus the United States not only seems to feel that Malaysia is the best solution for developing the backward Bornean territories, with proper assurances for the protection of their individual rights and interests, but agrees that it will be a stronger barrier to southward Communist Chinese pressure than would a series of disjointed and weak territories without a common policy and without a British defense guarantee. Washington has made this plain in Manila, though with care to avoid anything that might

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seem improper pressure, and undoubtedly President Sukarno has been given the same advice, though it is recognized that in his case advice from the West is always weighed against advice from the East, and the latter has usually prevailed. Until recently one might have hoped that Moscow would tend to discourage President Sukarno from risky enterprises abroad; but Soviet influence seems to have become less effective in Indonesia, as in Laos and North Viet Nam, and unless Moscow and Peking can resolve their general and extensive conflict of interests, their tendency to pull in opposite directions in Indonesia will continue, with the likelihood that Peking's pull will be increasingly effective inside the Indonesian Communist Party and therefore increasingly influential on Indonesian policy.

Continued trouble in Borneo cannot be ruled out. If President Sukarno keeps his propaganda against Malaysia boiling even after the Federation actually comes into being, and if he decides that this agitation can profitably be worked up into a guerrilla war along the jungle frontiers of Borneo, we must be prepared for a new time of tension and danger—not just in a limited area but in the whole region where there is a conflict of ambitions between Malaysia and an Indonesia backed by Communist China for its own revolutionary and expansionist purposes. We have seen in Viet Nam how far this sort of conflict can lead. In Sarawak many members of SUPP, the best-organized party, still have Communist leanings; and in North Borneo there is a colony of 30,000 Indonesian immigrants, a potential fifth column. Sukarno can use either of the two propaganda approaches that are available to him to enlist one or other of these groups, or both. The fact that General Nasution recently threw his weight against the formation of Malaysia is a bad augury for peace. In a provocative speech on May 8, at a town in Kalimantan, he said that Malaysia "economically and militarily will be dominated eventually by a non-Malay power" and thus will become a source of subversion against Indonesia. He called on the youth of Kalimantan to intensify their training and support their brothers to the north with all their might, which in plain language means either to join the rebel groups or help them in their raids into Malaysian territory.

There are two ways of meeting these threats. The British already have considerable garrisons at strategic points in Borneo; and word came in early May that they were being increased both by land forces and by naval vessels, including the commando car-

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rier *Albion* and transport aircraft and helicopters. It was also announced that Australia will, contrary to expectations, continue to maintain the Australian air squadrons in Penang as an indication that it is more than theoretically interested in the security of Malaysia. The second method will be gradually to spread a screen of special police forces along the jungle frontiers. The British and the Malayans have had valuable experience in dealing with the Communist guerrillas in Malaya. But as that experience showed, the process can be gruelling and protracted.

The situation, then, is at best potentially explosive. Whether it does or does not explode rests primarily at this time with President Sukarno. Although outside pressure can sometimes have a reverse effect from that intended, it would seem that in dealing with a pragmatist like the Indonesian President we would be wrong not to state unequivocally where our national interests lie —namely that we are deeply concerned to see that a flanking movement shall not develop around our present delicate and indeed dangerous position in South Viet Nam, and that we consider the best way of forestalling this is for Malaysia to be a success.

Senator Mike Mansfield, after visiting parts of Southeast Asia before the controversy over Malaysia became intense, called for an American attitude of "cordial non-involvement." Given the enormous U.S. military and economic investment in the security of neighboring countries, the President's blessing for Malaysia and Senator Mansfield's attitude of cordiality toward it may not provide effective protection for American interests in the region as a whole. The territories which will join to form Malaysia have been primarily a British interest and the protection of them remains primarily a British responsibility. But if any of them are attacked, American relations with the attacking nation, however camouflaged its participation in the aggression might be, would be drastically affected; at a minimum, the United States would cease any and all help to that nation and might well break diplomatic relations with it. If the hostilities spread, and if the American position in Viet Nam became endangered by a creeping flanking movement by Communist China in support of Indonesia, no one can be sure that a policy of non-involvement would be adequate. The position assigned the Seventh Fleet would become of paramount importance.

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TWO YEARS OF THE PEACE CORPS

By Sargent Shriver

OSCAR Wilde is said to have observed that America really was discovered by a dozen people before Columbus, but it was always successfully hushed up. I am tempted to feel that way about the Peace Corps; the idea of a national effort of this type had been proposed many times in past years. But in 1960 and 1961 for the first time the idea was joined with the power and the desire to implement it. On November 2, 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy proposed a "peace corps" in a campaign speech at the Cow Palace in San Francisco. Thirty thousand Americans wrote immediately to support the idea; thousands volunteered to join.

The early days of the Peace Corps were like the campaign days of 1960, but with no election in sight. My colleagues were volunteer workers and a few key officials loaned from other agencies. "I use not only all the brains I have, but all I can borrow," Woodrow Wilson said. So did we. Letters cascaded in from all over the country in what one writer described as "paper tornadoes at the Peace Corps." The elevators to our original two-room office disgorged constant sorties of interested persons, newspaper reporters, job seekers, academic figures and generous citizens offering advice. Everywhere, it seemed, were cameras, coils of cable and commentators with questions.

An organization, we know, gains life through hard decisions, so we hammered out basic policies in long, detailed discussions in which we sought to face up to the practical problems and reach specific solutions before we actually started operations. We knew that a few wrong judgments in the early hours of a new organization's life, especially a controversial government agency, can completely thwart its purposes—even as a margin of error of a thousandth of an inch in the launching of a rocket can send it thousands of miles off course. And we knew the Peace Corps would have only one chance to work. As with the parachute jumper, the chute had to open the first time. We knew, too, that a thousand suspicious eyes were peering over our shoulders. Some were the eyes of friendly critics, but many belonged to unfriendly skeptics. The youthfulness of the new Administration, particularly the President, enhanced the risk; an older leadership would

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have had greater immunity from charges of "sophomorism."

Even the choice of a name took on serious overtones. The phrase "Peace Corps" was used in the original San Francisco speech, but many of our advisers disliked it. "Peace," they claimed, was a word the Communists had preëmpted, and "Corps" carried undesirable military connotations. We did not want a name contrived out of initials which a public relations firm might have devised; nor did we want to restrict participation in the program by calling it a "Youth Corps." What we did want was a name which the public at large could grasp emotionally as well as intellectually. Whatever name we did choose, we would give it content by our acts and programs. We wanted it, also, to reflect the seriousness of our objectives. We studied dozens of other names and finally came back to the original. Peace is the fundamental goal of our times. We believed the Peace Corps could contribute to its attainment, for while armaments can deter war, only men can create peace.

The ambitiousness of the name, of course, was only one reason for early skepticism about the Peace Corps. Fears were voiced that it might be a "second children's crusade." I was astonished that a nation so young had become so suspicious of its youth. We had forgotten that Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence at age 33. Forgotten also was the fact that more than half of the world's population is under 26, the age of the average Peace Corps Volunteer. Sixteen of the nations in Africa have heads of state under 45; five have leaders in their thirties.

Of course, youthful enthusiasm and noble purposes were not enough. They had to be combined with hard-headed pragmatism and realistic administration. In the early days of the Peace Corps we were looking for a formula for practical idealism. The formula worked out by experience has "the sweet smell of success" today, but it was far less clear two years ago.

Would enough qualified Americans be willing to serve? Even if they started, would they be able to continue on the job despite frustration, dysentery and boredom? Could Americans survive overseas without special foods and privileges, special housing, automobiles, television and air conditioners? Many Americans thought not. The Washington correspondent of the respected *Times of India* agreed with them in these words:

> When you have ascertained a felt local need, you would need to find an American who can exactly help in meeting it. This implies not only the

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wherewithal (or what you inelegantly call the "know how") but also a psychological affinity with a strange new people who may be illiterate and yet not lack Wisdom, who may live in hovels and yet dwell in spiritual splendor, who may be poor in worldly wealth and yet enjoy a wealth of intangibles and a capacity to be happy. Would an American young man be in tune with this world he has never experienced before? I doubt it. . . .

One also wonders whether American young men and tender young girls, reared in air-conditioned houses at a constant temperature, knowing little about the severities of nature (except when they pop in and out of cars or buses) will be able to suffer the Indian summer smilingly and, if they go into an Indian village, whether they will be able to sleep on unsprung beds under the canopy of the bejeweled sky or indoors in mud huts, without writing home about it.

At a time when many were saying that Americans had gone soft and were interested mainly in security, pensions and suburbia, the Peace Corps could have been timorous. Possible ways of hedging against an anticipated shortage of applicants could have included low qualification standards, generous inducements to service, cautious programming, a period of duty shorter than two years, an enforced period of enlistment such as the "hitch" in the armed forces, or draft exemption for volunteer service in the Peace Corps. We deliberately chose the risk rather than the hedge in each case and created an obstacle course. The applicant could remove himself any time he realized his motive was less than a true desire for service. This method of self-selection has by now saved us from compounded difficulties abroad.

Our optimism about sufficient recruits was justified. More than 50,000 Americans have applied for the Peace Corps. In the first three months of this year, more Americans applied for the Peace Corps than were drafted for military service. This happened notwithstanding the fact that young men who volunteer for the Peace Corps are liable to service on their return.

Selection was made rigorous. The process was fashioned to include a searchingly thorough application form, placement tests to measure useful skills, language aptitude exams, six to twelve reference inquiries, a suitability investigation and systematic observation of performance during the training program of approximately ten weeks. We invite about one in six applicants to enter training, and about five out of six trainees are finally selected for overseas service.

We debated hotly the question of age, and whether or not older people should be eligible. We listened to proposals for an age limit in the thirties and then in the sixties and finally decided to

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set no upper age limit at all. Our oldest volunteer today happens to be 76, and we have more grandparents than teenagers in the Peace Corps. Some older volunteers have turned out to be rigid and cantankerous in adapting to a standard of living *their* parents took for granted, but the majority of them make a lot of us in the New Frontier look like stodgy old settlers.

From the beginning we decided that effective volunteers abroad would need systematic administrative support and direction. Leaders of several developing nations, eager to have the assistance of trained manpower, warned against repeating the experiences of other highly motivated volunteer workers who had failed abroad for lack of cohesive leadership. A good program would need good people—not only as Peace Corps Volunteers but as Peace Corps staff members abroad. There was no counterpart in the U. S. Government of civilian leaders serving abroad on a volunteer basis. There was no precedent for what these men would have to do in programming, logistics and personal support for the volunteers in their charge. We needed the ablest of leaders in each position. Could we attract them even though we did not offer post differentials, cost-of-living allowances, commissary or diplomatic privileges?

Fortunately, the answer has been a continuing "yes." The Peace Corps has attracted intelligent and dedicated men to all positions on its overseas team. Ironically, the same critics who once complained that we would unleash hordes of uninstructed adolescents on the world are now complaining that we spend substantial sums to provide instruction and adequate direction.

Some of my colleagues proposed that Peace Corps Volunteers act as technical helpers to I.C.A. technicians, "extra hands" for the more experienced older men. Peace Corps practice has moved in another direction. A natural distinction between the A.I.D. adviser at a high level in government and the Peace Corps Volunteer making his contribution as a "doer" or "worker" at the grass roots soon became apparent. It also became clear that the Peace Corps Volunteer had a new and perhaps unique contribution to make as a person who entered fully into host-country life and institutions, with a host-country national working beside him, and another directing his work. This feature of the Peace Corps contributed substantially to its early support abroad.

Discussion of the possibility that the Peace Corps might be affiliated with the I.C.A. led into the question of its relationship

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to U. S. political and information establishments overseas. The Peace Corps in Washington is responsible to the Secretary of State. Volunteers and staff abroad are responsible to the American Ambassador. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps maintains a distinction between its functions and those of Embassies, A.I.D. and U.S.I.A. offices. There was a design to this which Secretary Rusk has aptly described: "The Peace Corps is not an instrument *of* foreign policy, because to make it so would rob it of its contribution *to* foreign policy." Peace Corps Volunteers are not trained diplomats; they are not propagandists; they are not technical experts. They represent our society by what they are, what they do and the spirit in which they do it. They steer clear of intelligence activity and stay out of local politics. Our strict adherence to these principles has been a crucial factor in the decision of politically uncommitted countries to invite American volunteers into their midst, into their homes and even into their classrooms and schoolyards to teach future generations of national leaders. In an era of sabotage and espionage, intelligence and counter-intelligence, the Peace Corps and its volunteers have earned a priceless yet simple renown: they are trustworthy.

Another contested issue in the early days of the Peace Corps concerned private organizations and universities. We were advised by many to make grants to these institutions, then to leave recruitment, selection, training and overseas programming in their hands. That road would have led to an organization operating very much like the National Science Foundation. For better or worse, the Peace Corps chose not to become a grant-making organization and those decisions which give character to our operations—selection, training, programming, field leadership and so on—are still in our possession.

Nevertheless, the involvement of private organizations and universities has been crucial to the Peace Corps' success. America is a pluralistic society and the Peace Corps expresses its diversity abroad by demonstrating that the public and private sectors can work coöperatively and effectively. We consciously seek contracts with private organizations, colleges and universities to administer our programs. We gain the advantage of expert knowledge, long experience, tested working relationships and often even private material resources. For example, CARE has contributed more than $100,000 worth of equipment to the Peace Corps

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in Colombia. Initially, there was suspicion by some of these agencies that the Peace Corps, with the resources of the United States taxpayer behind it, would preëmpt their own work abroad. Suspicion has turned into understanding, however, as the United States Government, through the Peace Corps, has facilitated the work of private organizations and has focused new attention on the needs and opportunities for service abroad.

In our "talent search" we went to government, academic life, business, the bar, the medical profession and every other walk of life where leadership was available. We deliberately recruited as many Negroes and representatives of other minority groups as possible for jobs in every echelon. We knew that Negroes would not ordinarily apply for high-level policy jobs, so we decided to seek them out. Today 7.4 percent of our higher echelon positions are filled by Negroes as compared to .8 percent for other government agencies in similar grades; 24 percent of our other positions are filled by Negroes, compared to a figure for government agencies in general of 5.5 percent.

How big should the Peace Corps be? Everyone was asking this question and everyone had an answer. Advice ranged from 500 to 1,000,000. There were strong voices raised in support of "tentative pilot projects," looking to a Peace Corps of less than 1,000. However, Warren W. Wiggins, an experienced foreign-aid expert, took a broader view. He pointed out that ultra-cautious programming might produce prohibitive per capita costs, fail even to engage the attention of responsible foreign officials (let alone have an impact) and fail to attract the necessary American talent and commitment. Furthermore, when the need was insatiable why should we try to meet it with a pittance?

There were also arguments in those early days about "saturation" of the foreign country, either in terms of jobs or the psychological impact of the American presence. I have since noticed that the same arguments made about a 500–1,000 man program in 1961 were also made about our plans to expand to 5,000 volunteers (March 1963), to 10,000 volunteers (March 1964) and to 13,000 (September 1964). I am not suggesting that the Peace Corps should continue to grow indefinitely. But I am proposing that much time and energy are wasted in theoretical musings, introspections and worries about the future. Peace Corps Volunteers are a new type of overseas American. Who is to say now how many of them will be welcome abroad next year, or in the next

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decade? Our country and our times have had plenty of experience with programs that were too little, too late.

The question of the health of the volunteers concerned us from the beginning. The Peace Corps represents the largest group of Americans who have ever tried to live abroad "up country." Even in World War II our troops were generally in organized units where safe food and water could be provided and medical care was at hand. This would not be the case for the Peace Corps. And an incapacitated volunteer would probably be worse than no volunteer at all. How could we reduce the risks to a rational level? The Surgeon General studied the problem at our request. We then worked out a solution by which preventive health measures are provided by public health doctors assigned to the Peace Corps, while much of the actual medical care is handled by doctors of the host country. Of the first 117 volunteers returned to the United States, only 20 came back for medical reasons (21 returned for compassionate reasons, 71 failed to adjust to overseas living and 5 died or were killed in accidents). Our medical division's work is already showing up in the pages of scientific and medical journals. As an example, we recently decided to use large injections of gamma globulin as a preventive for hepatitis, which has presented one of the worst health problems for Americans overseas. Since then, there has not been a single case of infectious hepatitis reported among those who received the large injection in time.

II

Many of the original doubts and criticisms of the Peace Corps have not materialized. On the other hand, substantive problems have emerged which were little discussed or expected two years ago. One of the most difficult is the provision of adequate language training. This was foreseen, but most observers thought that the exotic languages such as Thai, Urdu, Bengali and Twi would give us our main problem, while Spanish and French speakers could be easily recruited or quickly trained. The opposite has been true. The first volunteers who arrived in Thailand in January 1962 made a great impression with what observers described as "fluent" Thai. As the volunteers were the first to point out, their Thai was not actually fluent, but their modest achievement was tremendously appreciated. Since then, of course, a large proportion of the volunteers there have become truly fluent.

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On the other hand, a considerable number of volunteers going to Latin America and to French Africa have been criticized for their mediocre language fluency. Expectations are high in these countries and halting Spanish or French is not enough. We have learned that America contains rather few French-speaking bus mechanics, Spanish-speaking hydrologists or math-science teachers who can exegete theorems in a Latin American classroom. Can we devise more effective and intensive language training, particularly for farmers, craftsmen, construction foremen, well drillers and other Americans who never before have needed a second language? Should we take skilled people and teach them languages, or take people with language abilities and teach them skills?

We still need more volunteers, especially those who combine motivation and special skills. The person with a ready motivation for Peace Corps service tends to be the liberal arts student in college, the social scientist, the person with "human relations" interests. The developing countries need and want a great many Americans with this background, but they also want engineers, agronomists, lathe operators and geologists. We cannot make our maximum contribution if we turn down requests for skills which we have difficulty finding. There are presently 61 engineers in the Peace Corps, 30 geologists and 236 nurses, respectable numbers considering the ready availability of generously paying jobs in the domestic economy. But requests still far outnumber the supply.

Other industrialized countries may soon supplement our efforts by providing volunteers to developing countries with languages and skills we lack. The motivation to serve is not distinctively American, and half a dozen industrialized nations have established equivalents of the Peace Corps within the past few months. These programs grew out of an International Conference on Human Skills organized by the Peace Corps and held in Puerto Rico last October. The 43 countries represented at the meeting voted unanimously to establish an International Peace Corps Secretariat to help spread the concept of voluntarism as a tool of economic and social transformation. The response to this initiative is a reflection of the innate vitality of the Peace Corps idea.

We face increasingly difficult choices as we grow. Should we concentrate in the future on the countries where we now have programs and resist expanding to new areas? We are already

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committed to programs in 47 nations. Should we favor a program where there are relatively stable social conditions, good organization and effective leadership? Or should we take greater risks and commit our resources in a more fluid and disorganized situation, usually in a poorer country, where the Peace Corps might make a crucial difference or find a great opportunity? Where should we draw the line between adequate material support to the volunteers and the perils of providing them with too many material goods? Where is the equilibrium between safeguarding the volunteer's health and morale and protecting the Peace Corps' declared purpose that he should live as does his co-worker in the host country, without special luxury or advantage?

When is a particular program completed? In Nigeria the answer is relatively easy. That country's coördinated educational development plan projects a need for 815 foreign teachers in 1965, 640 in 1966, 215 in 1968 and none in 1970. By then enough Nigerians will have been trained to fill their own classrooms. Progress may not follow so fine a plan, but the Peace Corps can look ahead to a day when its academic, teaching work in Nigeria will be done.

The answer is not so simple in Colombia, where volunteers are working on community development in 92 rural towns. There is no lack of change and progress: the Colombian Government has trebled its own commitment of resources and staff to this progressive community development program. Scores of individual communities have already learned how to organize to transform their future. When volunteer John Arango organized the first town meeting in Cutaru almost two years ago, for example, not one soul showed up. Twenty months later almost every citizen turns out for these meetings. The townsmen have changed an old jail into a health clinic; they have drained the nearby swamps; they have rebuilt wharves on the river; they have cleared stumps out of the channel to make it navigable; and they are now building the first 18 of 72 do-it-yourself houses designed by the volunteer.

John Arango's Colombian co-worker is equally responsible for the results in Cutaru. In community development, particularly, the ability of the host organization to provide able counterparts is crucial to a program's success. I might also mention that host countries have in every case made voluntary contributions to the Peace Corps programs. In Africa alone, they have supported the program to the value of $2,500,000. During and after the Puerto Rico conference, three countries in Latin America announced

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plans to establish home-grown Peace Corps organizations; when implemented these will help solve the shortage of counterparts. We believe North American and Latin American volunteers will complement one another and increase the total effectiveness.

The first "replacement group" in the Peace Corps is about to complete training for service in Colombia. Should we send these volunteers to fill the shoes of their predecessors in the villages which are now moving ahead, albeit shakily? Or should we send the volunteers to new communities where nothing has been done? We know that more is needed than two years of work by a North American and his Colombian co-workers to effect self-perpetuating change. On the other hand, we do not want the volunteer to become a crutch in a community's life. Some of the new volunteers in Colombia will, therefore, try to follow through with their predecessor's work, but others will take on villages where no American has served. In the meantime we are planning to study what happens in those towns where volunteers are not replaced.

Earlier I mentioned there has been a change in the nature of comment and criticism about the Peace Corps. In the beginning, the doubters worried about the callowness of youth and the ability of mortals to make any good idea work. The more recent criticism is more sophisticated and more substantive. Eric Sevareid recently observed: "While the Corps has something to do with spot benefits in a few isolated places, whether in sanitizing drinking water or building culverts, its work has, and can have, very little to do with the fundamental investments, reorganizations and reforms upon which the true and long-term economic development of backward countries depends." Mr. Sevareid acknowledges that "giving frustrated American youth a sense of mission and adding to our supply of comprehension of other societies fatten the credit side of the ledger." He adds: "If fringe benefits were all the Corps' originators had in mind, then this should be made clear to the country." I do not agree with him that the second and third purposes of the Peace Corps Act—representing America abroad in the best sense and giving Americans an opportunity to learn about other societies—are "fringe benefits." Fulton Freeman, the United States Ambassador in Colombia, believes the whole Peace Corps program could be justified by its creation of a new American resource in the volunteers who are acquiring language skills and intensive understanding of a foreign society. Former volunteers will be entering gov-

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ernment service (150 have already applied to join U.S.I.A.), United Nations agencies, academic life, international business concerns and a host of other institutions which carry on the business of the United States throughout the world. Others will return to their homes, capable of exerting an enlightened influence in the communities where they settle. Many trite euphemisms of the ignorant and ready panaceas of the uninformed will clash immediately with the harsh facts that volunteers have learned to live with abroad.

Is the second purpose of the Peace Corps Act—to be a good representative of our society—a "fringe benefit"? Peace Corps Volunteers are reaching the people of foreign countries on an individual basis at a different level from the influence of most Americans abroad. The Peace Corps Volunteer lives under local laws, buys his supplies at local stores and makes his friends among local people. He leaves to the diplomat and the technicians the complex tools which are peculiarly their own while he sets out to work in the local environment as he finds it.

I am not suggesting that life for the volunteer is always hard. A visiting Ghanaian said: "The Peace Corps teachers in my country don't live so badly. After all, they live as well as we do." I agree that this is not so bad; nor is our objective discomfort for discomfort's sake, but rather a willingness to share the life of another people, to accept sacrifice when sacrifice is necessary and to show that material privilege has not become the central and indispensable ingredient in an American's life. It is interesting to note that the happiest volunteers are usually those with the most difficult living conditions.

Although I disagree with Mr. Sevareid's emphasis in dismissing two of the three purposes of the Peace Corps Act as "fringe benefits," he does get to the heart of an important question when he compares the direct economic impact of the Peace Corps to fundamental investments, reorganizations and economic development. The Peace Corps' contribution has been less in direct economic development than in social development—health, education, construction and community organization. We are convinced that economic development directly depends on social development. In his valedictory report this past April as head of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch observed that there are *not* "grounds for expecting that economic development will take place first and be followed in the natural course of events

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by social development. Both social and economic development must be achieved in measures that require the exercise of rational and deliberate action. . . . There can be no speed-up in economic development without a change in the social structure." While they have their differences, Theodore W. Schultz and J. Kenneth Galbraith have no disagreement on the essential role of social development in economic progress. In contrast, some who argue from the European-North American experience overlook the vital need for social development which had already been substantially achieved in the countries of the Atlantic community. This is the basic difference between the problem of the Marshall Plan, which was concerned with economic reconstruction in societies with abundant social resources, and the problem of forced-draft economic development in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Notwithstanding the Peace Corps' primary emphasis on social development, volunteers are making a direct economic contribution in a variety of situations. They are helping to organize farmers' coöperatives in Chile, Ecuador and Pakistan; credit unions and savings and loan associations in Latin America; demonstration farms in the Near East. A group of volunteers in the Punjab sparked the creation of a poultry industry of some economic significance (using ground termite mounds for protein feed). These are "grass roots" projects. More of them will someday cause us to look back and wonder why it took so long to discover that people—human hands and enthusiasms—are an essential part of the relationship of mutual assistance which we must establish with our neighbors abroad.

The Peace Corps is not a "foreign aid" agency. Two of the three purposes of the Peace Corps as defined in the Act deal with understanding, not economic assistance. Moreover, our financial investment is in the volunteer who brings his skills and knowledge home with him. Seventy-five percent of the Peace Corps' appropriated funds enters the economy of the United States; of the remaining 25 percent, more than half (57 percent) is spent on American citizens, the Peace Corps Volunteers themselves.

A Jamaican radio commentator recently asserted that "a great distance between people is the best creator of good will. Jumble people up together on a sort of temporary basis of gratitude on one side and condescension on the other, and you'll have everyone at each other's throat in no time." If I believed this were inevitable, regardless of the attitude, preparation and mode of life

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of volunteers, I would advocate disbanding the Peace Corps—as well as most other programs overseas. But I have greater faith in the universality of men's aspirations and of men's ability to respect each other when they know each other. It is the American who lives abroad in isolation and the thoughtless tourist who create distrust and dislike.

I believe the Peace Corps is also having more impact than we may realize on our own society and among our own people. To take an example of the Peace Corps' impact on an institution, the President of the State University of Iowa, Virgil M. Hancher, recently observed:

> The Peace Corps project (training Volunteers for Indonesia) is already having salutary effects upon this University, and these seem likely to be residual. The members of our faculty are having to come together across disciplines. They are having to think through old problems of education freshly and to tackle new ones. Along with the trainees, they are learning—learning how to teach languages in the new method, how to teach new languages, how to teach area studies better, and how to adapt old and test new methods. The project is deepening the international dimension of the State University of Iowa. This international dimension is being shared, in various ways, with the people of the state, the eastern area in particular.

American schools and students may soon benefit from the Peace Corps' initiative in another fashion. Two countries, Ghana and Argentina, have expressed interest in making the Peace Corps a two-way street by sending volunteer teachers of special competence to interested American high schools or colleges. Ghana would provide experts in African history and Argentina teachers of Spanish. Other countries may follow suit.

Our own Peace Corps Volunteers are being changed in other ways in the acquisition of languages and expertise. They will be coming home more mature, with a new outlook toward life and work. Like many other Americans, I have wondered whether our contemporary society, with its emphasis on the organizational man and the easy life, can continue to produce the self-reliance, initiative and independence that we consider to be part of our heritage. We have been in danger of losing ourselves among the motorized toothbrushes, tranquilizers and television commercials. Will Durant once observed that nations are born stoic and die epicurean; we have been in danger of this happening to us. The Peace Corps is truly a new frontier in the sense that it provides the challenge to self-reliance and independent action which the vanished frontier once provided on our own continent. Sharing in

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the progress of other countries helps us to rediscover ourselves at home.

The influence of the Peace Corps idea might be described as a series of widening circles, like the expanding rings from a stone thrown into a pond. The inner, most sharply defined circle represents the immediate effect of the program—accomplishments abroad in social and economic development, skills, knowledge, understanding, institution-building, a framework for coöperative effort with private organizations, research and experiment in "overseas Americanship," language training and improvements in health.

The second ring moving outward on the water might be the Peace Corps' influence on our society, on institutions and people, on the creation of a new sense of participation in world events, an influence on the national sense of purpose, self-reliance and an expanded concept of volunteer service in time of peace.

There is still a wider circle and, being farthest from the splash, the hardest to make out clearly. Perhaps I can explain it by describing the relationships I see between the Peace Corps and our American Revolution. The Revolution placed on our citizens the responsibility for reordering their own social structure. It was a triumph over the idea that man is incompetent or incapable of shaping his destiny. It was our declaration of the irresistible strength of a universal idea connected with human dignity, hope, compassion and freedom. The idea was not simply American, of course, but arose from a confluence of history, geography and the genius of a resolute few at Philadelphia.

We still have our vision, but our society has been drifting away from the world's majority: the young and raw, the colored, the hungry and the oppressed. The Peace Corps is helping to put us again where we belong. It is our newest hope for rejoining the majority of the world without at the same time betraying our cultural, historic, political and spiritual ancestors and allies. As Pablo Casals, the renowned cellist and democrat, said of the Peace Corps last year: "This is new, and it is also very old. We have come from the tyranny of the enormous, awesome, discordant machine, back to a realization that the beginning and the end are man— that it is man who is important, not the machine, and that it is man who accounts for growth, not just dollars and factories. Above all, that it is man who is the object of all our efforts."

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

By Emilio G. Collado

MORE rapid economic development for the less developed areas of the world is something which most of us in the United States want very much. We want it for humanitarian reasons and we want it because we believe it is in our national interest. There is, therefore, great public concern about our programs of assistance to developing areas, and in recent months there has been considerable discussion of the appropriate roles of public assistance and private international investment in contributing to economic development. These are important issues; but it is also important to keep them in perspective. What developing countries do for themselves is more important than what others do for them. In the majority of developing countries the adoption of a framework of law and regulations conducive to the full use by their citizens of productive resources that already exist would probably make a greater contribution toward their development than is now provided by all external assistance from both public and private sources.

It could be that in some countries nothing short of the shock of the cessation of all forms of external assistance will lead to a reconsideration of present policies inhibiting economic growth. Such a suspension of aid is not, of course, likely. Normally, measures to encourage the productive use of domestic resources serve also to attract private investment from abroad, and increasingly the national and international aid agencies are conditioning their programs of aid on the adoption by the receiving countries of constructive measures of self-help.

In fact, the policy discussions in the United States now focus on how our aid may best contribute to development when taking into account the effects of that aid on the developmental efforts of the countries concerned. The desirability of aid has not been at issue. Despite differing views on how large our aid appropriations should be, there does seem to be a consensus in the United States that it is wise for our Government to assist selectively the less developed areas of the world. There seems to be agreement also that among the objectives of such development are a broader distribution of rising economic benefits through planned measures for the

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improvement of "conditions of rural living and land use," "of housing and community facilities," "of public health" and of "the equity and effectiveness of existing tax schedules"—to use the words of the 1960 Act of Bogota adopted by the American states.

In my opinion, these measures are in most cases desirable and necessary. Yet, during the past year I have joined others in expressing a fear that their success was being jeopardized by two trends—both relating to the use by the developing nations of their own resources—which the United States aid program may unwittingly have been encouraging. Fortunately, the problem is increasingly recognized and some corrective steps have been taken. It is the purpose of this article to discuss the problem and the remedies.

II

The first of the disturbing trends of recent years has been the growth of an excessive preoccupation with the direct introduction of measures for social improvement and a consequent neglect of the bases for economic development on which such social improvements must fundamentally depend. The second trend has been the increasing introduction of governmental activity and control into fields of economic activity which could be more productively pursued by private initiative and which, when undertaken by governments, divert their limited administrative and financial resources from social development programs.

These tendencies have been commented upon not only by observers in the United States but also by responsible businessmen and political figures in the developing nations. Certainly one should expect some opposition in these countries to specific measures of reform, such as higher taxes affecting particular groups, but the concern expressed goes beyond this. In some countries private businessmen so far despair about the prospects for private initiative that at times the flight of capital has exceeded the inflow of public assistance from abroad. In these circumstances, it is not pleasant to be told by citizens of developing nations that our programs are contributing to the destruction of private enterprise and initiative in their economies.

Many changes in economic organization and past practices are required if these countries are to develop modern economies consistent with the best in their traditions and yet incorporating the flexibility and efficiency necessary to produce the rising stan-

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dards of life demanded by their citizens. And reforms are needed to improve the social distribution of economic benefits. We must remember, however, that increases in a nation's output cannot be just legislated. They must be earned.

There are, of course, differences—both philosophical and practical—in the approaches to development followed by various countries. In some areas, however, so much attention is being paid to procedures for dividing the national output that there is a danger of not even maintaining the present size of the total output—and this in the face of the expanding requirements of rapidly growing populations.

Preoccupation with measures for social improvement schemes has been evident in many ways. A glance at the resolutions adopted at Bogota, at Punta del Este, and in the gatherings of the United Nations and its regional and specialized agencies, for example, shows that attention has been devoted primarily to detailed exhortations in the fields of social welfare and planning. At these and other international economic gatherings the prerequisites for optimum growth have occasionally been presented with force. Yet the typical speeches of the representatives both of foreign governments and, until recently, of the United States have stressed the need for more and more government activity. At the same time the neglect of the basic conditions conducive to private economic activity has been painfully apparent to businessmen, both local and foreign, who have attempted to operate in many of the less developed areas. Outright expropriation aside, unreasonable exclusions, controls and exactions have drastically limited the opportunities and incentives for private economic endeavor.

These tendencies have not been unrelated. They have all to some extent reflected a widespread intellectual belief that government should conduct an increasing part of a nation's economic activity. The origins of this belief are many. Some people have been influenced by the fact that in the past decade the Soviet economic growth rate, building on a relatively low base, has exceeded that of the United States. But they often fail to recognize the special nature of the Russian growth, dependent as it has been in large part upon the adaptation of existing technology to the tasks of economic reconstruction, and they have tended to ignore the higher rates of growth achieved in Japan and Germany.

The French record, though less impressive than that of Japan

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and Germany, has recently had its impact. Some economists in the less developed countries have been inordinately impressed by the alleged accomplishments of "indicative" planning as practiced in France; they have not questioned whether the primary impetus for French growth did not arise perhaps from the postwar opportunity to introduce a backlog of technical advancement into an economy with highly developed skills and institutions. And they have often shown little awareness of the special features—a tradition of centralization and of close contact between government and business technicians—which may have facilitated the planning procedures used in France. In suggesting the adoption of French methods these observers may not have taken sufficiently into account the tendency of "planning" in less developed areas to become direct governmental intervention in the working of the economy.

In many parts of the less developed world there has also been an unreasoned ideological association of private enterprise with conditions of political oligarchy and limited growth at times in the past. This view fails to recognize that, while private enterprise is not an automatic guarantee of political democracy and economic growth, it has been historically one of the most effective forces both for broadening the base of political power and for economic advance. In the century before the great depression of the 1930s (which had its source in the more developed areas in the world, not within the economic systems of the less developed nations), private enterprise did not reach every corner of the world and there were some performances by private firms—and by governments—that we would not condone today; but over vast areas private initiative broke down feudal social structures through a dispersion of economic power, and in many places economic advance occurred at rates which modern planners would envy.

It would also be wrong to conclude, as some have, that the economic slowdown, which has—at least temporarily—followed some efforts at currency stabilization in less developed nations, is proof of the need for increased governmental economic activity to spark development. If any generalization applies to these situations it is probably the reverse: that retrenchment has been relatively less in governmental outlays and disproportionately large in the volume of credit available for the expansionist, job-creating projects of private businessmen.

Despite the lack of persuasive theoretical underpinning, the

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intellectual climate favoring public enterprise in the less developed areas has resulted in a proliferation of state-owned businesses. In my own industry, that of petroleum, the resulting mismanagement and waste by some government agencies have been glaring, but the same tendencies have been exhibited in other fields, whether railroads in Argentina, truck factories in Indonesia, or fertilizer plants, steel mills or national airlines in a variety of countries. In some cases the predominant problem has been planning on a grandiose scale in the interests of national pride rather than economic reality; in other cases the problem has been political interference, overstaffing and operating inefficiency. But whatever the problem, state enterprises have generally attempted to mask their inefficiency by restrictions not only on the import of cheaper foreign products but also on the import of foreign capital into competitive enterprise within the country. And monopolistic practices have not been exercised solely at the border. Purely local firms as, for example, the private refiners in Brazil, have been prevented from expanding and competing. The general restraint upon the entire range of domestic private economic activity through discriminatory controls and taxes has probably been the most detrimental result of the general urge for increased governmental intervention.

III

Even those less developed nations now embarking on wide-scale programs of government enterprise normally produce the bulk of their economic output by private enterprises. It would seem clear that the road to economic advancement would be through building upon this existing base rather than adopting measures which stunt its performance. In many instances, then, the most helpful thing our Government could do to promote the economic future of a less developed nation would be to bring home to the leaders of that nation the need to preserve and build upon the private enterprise base which the nation already has. Yet in recent years there were times when the actions of our own Government seemed to display no conviction in the productive superiority of private enterprise.

The public speeches of our officials laid great stress on the right of every country to choose its own form of economic organization; but they did not couple such remarks with any recognition of the likely results of unwise choices upon economic growth. Our

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spokesmen concentrated on land reform, tax reform, planning and the alleged need for government action to push economies to an assumed "take-off." There was virtually no reference to measures to preserve the health of the productive private sector that already existed. There was no concerted effort to ensure that our aid loans and grants did not in practice serve to diminish the opportunities for private enterprise in the developing countries. There were, to be sure, commendable procedures to see to it that contracts for construction, supply and sometimes initial operation of aid projects were open to private bidders on an equitable basis, but there is a vast distinction between a contract for a "turnkey" job and a true equity interest in a continuing venture.

In recent years the international investor has been given somewhat more attention than the local private entrepreneur. The United States investment guaranty program has undoubtedly brought some newcomers into the foreign field and has resulted in the adoption of some beneficial projects which would not have been undertaken without this kind of insurance. At the same time the United States Government has adopted some oversimplified doctrines which have tended to discourage private investment in the developing areas. One of these doctrines is that strong preference should be given to joint ventures, and that normally aid should be considered for a project originated by a U.S. investor only if he takes in a local partner. Superficially this policy might seem designed to build up local enterprise, and this may have been the result in some instances; but the reverse has also been true. Private investment from abroad has a strong incentive effect in encouraging independent local firms to become suppliers and processers, further manufacturers, and sellers of the product of the foreign-financed venture. If limited local resources are forced into the ventures initiated by a foreign investor, there is less available for the truly independent and complementary local enterprise, and the nation's scarce foreign exchange resources may be depleted. The availability of a local partner may sometimes encourage an investment from abroad, but in other circumstances a prospective investor may wish to avoid the managerial problems, financing difficulties, disagreements on dividend and reinvestment policies, tax burdens and political favoritism that are sometimes involved in joint ventures. Each project needs to be judged on the basis of its own special circumstances. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the Government seems to have

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adopted such a hard and fast stand in support of joint enterprises. This policy has encouraged other governments to impose rigid requirements for local participation which have served to deter investment from abroad.

Also, the United States Government has probably acted to the long-run detriment of both private investment and economic development by its exaggerated acclaim for the settlements reached by several U.S. companies for properties in Brazil which had been seized or seemed likely to be acquired by governmental authorities. The managements of the companies concerned apparently felt that acceptance of the compensation offered was better than the practical alternatives facing them. But it should be remembered that these alternatives seemed to involve at best unreasonable governmental restraints which were likely to make profitable operation impossible; and the terms of compensation—which provide low valuation, partial down payment and decades for payment of the remainder—can only serve to excite the interest of nationalistic groups in other countries. Yet even with the limited compensation described, the Brazilian settlements will involve the use of foreign exchange by a country whose development is already hampered by a shortage of exchange and by unbelievable complexities of exchange control.

IV

In recent months, however, there have been strong indications of a changing attitude within the United States Government. In Mexico City last October, on the occasion of the first annual review of the Alliance for Progress, the Secretary of the Treasury stated: "There is one area in which during the past year we have not only made no progress but where we have suffered a serious setback. Private investment, both domestic and foreign, has suffered damaging blows and has lost confidence. . . . The plain fact of the matter is that private enterprise has not always been made to feel that it is truly a part of the Alliance. And yet the private sector must become stronger and more vigorous every year if the Alliance is to flourish. Public funds simply do not exist anywhere on a scale adequate to finance the enormous needs of the Alliance." In March the Clay Committee stated its conviction that "it is the private sector, operating with the coöperation of a vital and democratic labor movement and enlightened management on the basis of essential government services and sensible policies,

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which will make the greatest contribution to rapid economic growth and overall development." In April, the President in his annual foreign-aid message to Congress stated that "the primary new initiative in this year's program relates to our increased efforts to encourage the investment of private capital in the underdeveloped countries. . . . I believe much more should be done . . . to urge more forcefully the importance of making full use of private resources and improving the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign."

There are other signs of change as well. After a long period of opposition, government officials now appear to have an open mind on the desirability of the treaty proposed by our partners in the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development which would state a few basic common-sense rules on the fair treatment of investment abroad. This is a treaty which would be forced on no one but which would be open for voluntary signature by any nation. It also appears that the Administration has come to recognize some of the advantages of the Hickenlooper Amendment which would deny United States aid to any nation expropriating United States property without proper compensation. At the same time aid officials have been working more actively to explore the possibilities of achieving development through more loans directly, or through development institutions, to private enterprises. So far, the actual disbursement of aid of this kind has been minor, but a hopeful new departure has been made, and there seems to be a new will to find ways of achieving close coöperation between public assistance and private enterprise.

When aid is given on a government-to-government basis, there are understandable administrative and political pressures for the large "showcase" project. On the other hand, when the assistance is provided to private projects, economic and political pressures help to assure that economically productive projects are chosen. Naturally only projects of a certain size can be directly assisted by an external public agency, but the use of local investment institutions which can channel funds to small private local firms has only begun to be explored. The managers of such institutions, unlike those of the large investment banks and underwriting houses of the developed nations, will have to be able to think small; they must dig deeply into the details of proposed projects, and they must continue their involvement in management once funds have been advanced. This is an area in which much is yet

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to be learned, but there is probably no other field in which foreign assistance can have a more catalytic effect.[1]

As further evidence of a new emphasis on the potential of private initiative in the developing lands, the President has suggested two legislative changes designed to encourage American private investment in these countries. He proposes an enlargement of the guaranty program and the granting of a credit against U.S. taxes equal to 25 to 30 percent of the amount of a taxpayer's new direct investment in the developing countries. When the full details become known, these proposals will merit careful consideration. We must, however, maintain a balanced program. We must not allow ourselves to be diverted from the importance of removing the obstacles which prevent private initiative in the developing areas from making its potential economic contribution. We must not, by overly generous subsidy, give the impression that private investment is a weak reed on which to rely.

Despite the difficult times through which investors have been living in many parts of the less developed world, the death notices on private investment are premature. Statistically this is easier to demonstrate for foreign than for local private investment, even though the latter is far greater in magnitude. It is true, for example, that in 1962 the flow of new U.S. private investment to the Latin American republics, as reflected in our balance-of-payments statistics, had halted and had in fact turned into disinvestment to the extent of an inflow of $24,000,000 to the United States. The impression given by this single statistic is misleading by itself, however, for two reasons. First, the flow of investment to countries other than Venezuela amounted to $158,000,000 net, but this was offset by a net disinvestment of $182,000,000 in Venezuela, where there is only limited scope at present for additional investments by the oil companies. Second, and more basically, it should be realized that the balance-of-payments outflow is of little use as a yardstick because it leaves out investments financed from the retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries and the funds available

[1] Acting on this belief and in an attempt to contribute long-run strength to countries in which large investments are at stake, two affiliates of my company have established investment companies, the Creole Investment Company in Venezuela with an initial capital of $10,000,000, and Inversiones Esso de Colombia, S.A., with an initial capital of $5,000,000. In the respective countries these companies offer to provide not more than 49 percent of the equity finance required by promising new or expanding private ventures. No effort is made to run the show, but the projects are studied carefully and company representatives are placed on the boards of the companies to assist them and to assure that good management principles are followed. The results so far are most encouraging.

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from depreciation and depletion of past investments. Excluding those financed by local borrowing, the total investment activities of U.S. businessmen in Latin America for the year 1961, when the balance-of-payments outflow was only $168,000,000, is estimated at approximately $1.03 billion—more than the total of U.S. economic aid to the area.

Serious damage may already have been done by the lack of understanding of the nature of the statistics on private foreign investment. A glaring statistical inconsistency was incorporated in the much publicized and often quoted goals adopted for the Alliance for Progress in 1961. At the Punta del Este Conference our Government promised capital assistance of $1 billion for the first year, and it has been generally anticipated that a similar amount would be provided in subsequent years of the decade. It was stated that this $1 billion would need to be supplemented annually by $300,000,000 in private U.S. investment. On the basis of these figures *The New York Times* editorialized recently that "the understanding reached . . . in Punta del Este . . . was that governmental loans and grants would play a far greater role" than private foreign investments in Latin American development. The fact is that the figure for government aid was on a gross basis, excluding repayments and other remittances. If the estimate for U.S. private investment had been figured on the same basis, the total would be, as mentioned above, more than $1 billion, despite the fact that such investment is only a fraction of what it could be under improved conditions. Yet the impression is now imbedded in many Latin American minds that private investment is just a small and delicate shoot and that real sustenance can come only from concentrating on a harvest of government largesse. My own experience in the oil industry has convinced me that private investment abroad is not such a fragile growth. A really determined government can render any soil barren, but I have seen private capital planted and patiently nursed into health in surroundings which were initially forbidding.[2]

[2] Last year, despite the unfavorable trends in many of the less developed nations, the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and its affiliates invested a gross amount of approximately $120,000,000 in Latin America alone and a total of about $250,000,000 in all less developed areas, primarily for facilities for producing, manufacturing, transporting and marketing of oil, chemicals and fertilizer products. Substantial additional amounts were spent in the search for oil. The company is well aware of many projects which would swell that total if simple steps were taken in various countries to remove outright prohibitions and impossible operating conditions for the foreign investor.

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Despite all handicaps, total private investment in the less developed areas of the world is impressive. One estimate is that in 1961, when the balance-of-payments capital outflow from the United States to all less developed countries was $424,000,000, gross private U.S. investment activity was about $1.75 billion. European and Japanese businessmen probably provided at least as much again. Unfortunately, comparable statistics on private investment within the developing areas themselves are not available. From partial evidence I am convinced that in most countries the domestic private investment greatly exceeds that from abroad.

It is possible, moreover, to point to examples of impressive accomplishments by private enterprise in less developed settings. The story of Puerto Rico's growth in the decade of the 1950s, since the change from an earlier orientation to public enterprise, is now common knowledge. Fewer people know that in less than a decade private investors, primarily Peruvian nationals, have developed a fish-meal industry in Peru which now accounts for annual exports on the order of $100,000,000—the country's largest single source of foreign exchange. In Malaya, despite the problems of achieving independence and suppressing Communist insurrection, an economy with an overwhelmingly private orientation has achieved healthy growth without massive injections of aid. In the Philippines, in the 18 months since the new administration removed many of the restrictions which were inviting corruption and hampering growth, the economy has spurted ahead, and the prospects for further growth are good. In India the private sector over-fulfilled its plan targets long before the end of each of the first two five-year plans, despite increasing governmental restrictions. Even in Brazil, in the face of disruptive inflation and unsympathetic governmental policies, private enterprise has sparked significant economic progress, which in part has overcome the drain of some misdirected government enterprises. In short, there is evidence that the most powerful weapon which can be called into play in the world-wide campaign to raise the standard of living in the less developed nations is the productive capacity of private enterprise.

V

The tasks ahead are still staggering. Economic progress must be spread not only among nations but also among the regions within nations—not only to Paraguay but also to the northeast of Brazil. Stratified societies and rigid economies must be "un-

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frozen" and rendered flexible. In this task private enterprise can be both a prime agent of productive change and a beneficiary of more liberal opportunity. Competition among private firms with their many different approaches can be a mighty engine for change and development. A good climate for private investment cannot be created just by a stroke of a pen; a consistent pattern of fair treatment by government must be established over time, but success in removing traditional barriers to enterprise will lead to ever-increasing commitment of private resources for further development.

Even if far wider recognition of these truths can be obtained throughout the less developed areas, we cannot expect all unreasonable barriers to private initiative to be removed overnight. In our own country we can all point to governmental policies which are inimical to growth, and we know how slowly progress is made in amending them.

In the developing countries, particularly, more is needed than an educational effort; people must be persuaded by actions as well as words. Businessmen must work together on community projects. Already organizations such as *Accion* and the Community Action Institute in Venezuela are demonstrating the contribution that private enterprise can make to broad economic and social programs through projects aimed specifically at community needs for education, technical training and physical facilities. Business groups must also be ready to work together, as recently suggested by David Rockefeller, to assist and advise governments and aid agencies on their development programs. They must seek increasingly to enlist the coöperation of the free labor movement, for the support of democratic labor groups is essential for long-range improvement in the environment for private enterprise. A good beginning has been made in the generous contributions of business and labor groups to the initial programs of the American Institute of Free Labor Development.

Another promising undertaking, announced by Senator Jacob Javits, is the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America, an organization privately financed by grants from foundations and by United States, West European and Latin American businessmen. The purpose of this organization is to pull together private investment projects which pool the capital and talent of the three continents.

Here in the United States a fuller recognition of the impor-

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tance of the environment for private enterprise does not mean that we should abandon other aspects of our foreign economic policy. Where public assistance would promote domestic decisions effecting development rather than serve as an excuse to avoid them, foreign aid should be used to accelerate the development process. Certainly there will continue to be many cases in which aid may properly be given to expand and improve education, health, roads and other basic public services.

At the same time our campaign for a broad international reduction in the restraints on trade should be pursued with determination. Reciprocal reductions should encompass both those trade barriers which in the less developed lands distort economic activity, raise the costs of production and lower the standards of life, and those barriers in the developed nations which particularly discriminate against the products of the developing nations. Many of the less developed countries could profitably barter away their expectations of future external assistance in exchange for elimination of the barriers—tariffs, quotas, "voluntary" restrictions, discriminatory excises, etc.—on their shipments of oil, sugar, lead, zinc, textiles, coffee and other products to the developed nations. Such a bargain would be beneficial to many less developed nations even if the aid foregone included that anticipated through the price support features of commodity stabilization schemes.

The efforts of our Government to arrange a judicious distribution of aid and to negotiate reductions in trade barriers must continue; they can contribute much to the economic development of the free world. But at the same time we should recognize that the potential for the most dramatic contribution lies in creating opportunities for the citizens in the developing nations to apply their own skill and resources productively without unjustifiable interference and restraint by governments. We can yet demonstrate the great force of private enterprise for creating conditions for human opportunity and dignity, and the evolution of stable and democratic institutions.

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AFTER BRUSSELS

By Andrew Shonfield

IN 1962 the European enthusiasts in Brussels were explaining regretfully that although British membership would slow down the process of European integration—perhaps severely impede the whole movement toward a United States of Europe—it was a price that had to be paid for widening the geographical spread of the Community. No doubt these people, while regretting the manner of General de Gaulle's rupture of negotiations with Britain, are now privately relieved that the price will not have to be paid. Their view is that Britain's inherent weakness is such that she will be compelled sooner or later to come back and knock on the door again and plead for entry into the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). On the whole, better later than sooner. The European Community will by then have consolidated itself; it will be able to impose its terms with less difficulty and, in fairness it should be added, will be less niggling about making small concessions which may contravene the letter, though not the spirit, of the Treaty of Rome.

All told, then, in the view of this school the British negotiation was premature. It was forced on the Community by British diplomatic pressure and carried forward almost within sight of a successful conclusion as a result of British diplomatic skill. Only a major coup in the contemporary rough diplomatic style of the French could have stopped it. That it was the French has some incidental advantages. Having been so rough with their own partners and caused them much loss of face, the next moves from France, it is argued, must surely be placatory. And one sure-fire way in which de Gaulle could placate the offended Europeans would be to offer to speed up the process of European integration. The end product in that case could therefore be an offer of more supranational powers to the European Commission in Brussels. Thus, in spite of Voltaire and the recurrent and variegated manifestations of the astringent French spirit, all may still be for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

The argument rests on two major assumptions: first, continuing British weakness and sense of isolation; second, steadily growing cohesion and strength in the European Economic Community. As to the first, it is quite true that the ground swell in favor of

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joining the Common Market, which affected a wide segment of British public opinion, was partly prompted by the sense of national disillusion. There was the discovery that the special relationship with the United States was not after all very special; that the position of leadership in the new Commonwealth was more a matter of ritual than of substance; and, above all, that the traditional methods of managing British economic affairs seemed to be grossly and irretrievably inefficient by comparison with the group of West European nations which habitually set themselves ambitious economic tasks and then fulfilled them. However, it would be wrong to suppose that Britain was simply waiting for membership in the E.E.C. to tackle the various problems that had contributed to this sense of failure. On the contrary, since 1961 there have been a number of important initiatives in different fields of British domestic policy designed to prepare the ground for a series of fresh starts. Outstanding among these are the creation of the new economic planning organization, the National Economic Development Council, which has now produced an elaborate five-year program of accelerated growth; a drastic scheme for the reorganization of rail transport on a nation-wide basis; and moves toward an overhaul of the whole system of agricultural support.

The truth is that joining E.E.C. would have provided the *occasion* for putting over these and other radical changes of policy, with the help of an appropriate supporting political fanfare. But the act of joining would itself have solved nothing. At best it would have served to make the compulsion to act quickly exceedingly obvious. The failure to get into Europe could now, if skillfully exploited, be used to make it only a little less obvious. The significant point which may be overlooked is that British policy has evolved in the course of the 15 months of negotiation in Brussels—and earlier in the course of reaching the decision to negotiate—to the point where the country and the Government are ready to accept decisions which would have been barely conceivable not so long ago. Just take one example: having contemplated the complete elimination of tariff protection for a number of extremely tender British industries, other measures which involve awkward competitive pressures no longer terrify. One immediate practical consequence is that the tariff reductions on goods coming from EFTA countries[1] are to be speeded up, and

[1] The countries of the European Free Trade Area are Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

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probably eliminated altogether by 1966. Having traversed a lot of fresh and interesting ground in the approach to the E.E.C., the Government plainly has no intention of going backward.

Perhaps the most striking thing in London immediately after the breakdown in Brussels in February was the absence of any sensation of rebound. The Government gave no encouragement whatsoever to the people who were calling for a sharp turn toward the Commonwealth; nor did it countenance any recriminations with the Common Market. One or two small gestures of displeasure toward France were all that the Government permitted itself—little enough in view of the fact that the major plank of its present policies and future election program had suddenly and brusquely been knocked away by the French President. It is known that the British Cabinet did briefly consider the possibility of *démarches* and ritual fuss on a large scale, and the idea of bringing in the United States to put pressure on the European Community. Certainly the United States was willing to help. But the view which finally prevailed in London was that nothing should be done which might prompt the Six to draw demonstratively together against anything that looked like an Anglo-American initiative. Throughout, British policy has remained ostentatiously European, not only in direction but also in method.

Looking ahead, the series of British economic measures which started last autumn and reached their climax in the budget tax reliefs in April suggest that the Government is set on a policy of economic expansion. Assuming that the Government means what it says when it promises not to be panicked this time into acts of restriction by a sudden balance-of-payments crisis, it is by no means clear that, say, by the end of 1964, the British economy will look either unprosperous or feeble. There is no mystery about the causes of the economic stagnation and high unemployment of last winter. They were the result of deliberate policies—perhaps a better description would be self-inflicted wounds—chosen in 1961–62. These policies have now been sharply reversed.

Britain will of course suffer certain economic disadvantages through exclusion from the Common Market. But there are offsetting gains which are not inconsiderable. British exporters are in an exceptionally favored position in two groups of markets, EFTA and the Commonwealth, which together take more than twice the amount of the British trade that goes to the European Common Market. Moreover, in these sheltered markets (respon-

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sible for nearly 45 percent of her export earnings) Britain has no serious industrial competitor such as there would have been inside E.E.C. Admittedly neither of these trading blocs is as dynamic as the European Community, but it is worth noting that at least in one of them, EFTA, Britain will benefit in the period ahead from the increasing discrimination against the goods of competitors like the Germans. That should allow Britain to capture an increasing proportion of the business done in EFTA markets and offset the prospective loss of business in E.E.C.

II

The future of British policy toward Europe will of course be influenced largely by what happens inside the European Community itself. The evidence so far, on the basis of the short period since the breakdown of negotiations in Brussels, suggests two things. First, the Six are not going to remain stubbornly split; there is enough consensus to allow decisions to be carried out in a number of fields of economic and social policy. But secondly, there is no sign that France is prepared, as the European optimists hoped, to pay some sort of penalty for its intransigence toward Britain by making special concessions to the European Community. Nor is there evidence so far of any abatement of General de Gaulle's hostility toward the aggrandizement of the European Commission, which is the heart and the essence of the E.E.C. He has previously dealt summarily with the supranational pretensions of one Frenchman in Brussels, Etienne Hirsch, by having him dismissed from his post as President of EURATOM. Another, Robert Marjolin, who is a vice president of the European Commission, is an open opponent of the Gaullist régime. It should always be remembered that the top officials of the Community are appointed for a four-year term only, that their jobs are in the gift of national governments, and that they will in the end be no more European and supranational in spirit than each of their governments encourages them to be.

All this is relevant to the prospect of achieving more cohesion among the Six during the period ahead. The Six are now facing a series of difficult decisions on major issues which will be solved only if governments are prepared to take risks involving their political future at home. It is unlikely that they will do this unless they are given a clear guarantee of reciprocity which they can show to their own electorates. The most obvious example at the

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moment is the set of decisions which have to be reached on the E.E.C.'s common agricultural policies. For the first time in the Community's history, governments—notably the German Government—are asked to accept the prospect of a serious sacrifice of electoral advantage; that would surely be the consequence if several million peasant voters were told that they must henceforth expect a large reduction in the guaranteed prices for their produce. This is a different kind of test from anything to which ruling parties have been subjected in the past. The mood of the participants, and above all the presence or absence of the mutual trust which comes as a result of the assurance of reciprocity, is in such circumstances all-important.

Dr. Gerhard Schröder, the German Foreign Minister, has in effect demanded that France demonstrate its good intentions. At the beginning of April he told the Council of Ministers that in Germany's view the Community's effort had been excessively concentrated on agricultural policy, which France regards as the sine qua non of further progress by the Community, and that there must now be mutual concessions in other equally important spheres of policy. It is possible that France will eventually give the sign that is asked of her. But there are other issues waiting to be tackled outside the field of agriculture, where agreement will be just as hard to come by. For instance, the complicated and ambitious proposals for oil and coal—where the interests of the Six are widely divergent—await action. More profound is the issue of economic planning for the Community as a whole; the German opposition to any such exercise, whether on a national or a European basis, has been raised in a sharp form by the European Commission's Program of Action for the Second Stage.

Indeed it can be argued that the impression of increasing cohesion which the Community has given in the recent past owes a great deal to Britain. There is no doubt that the British negotiation with E.E.C. was a potent instrument for compelling agreement among the Six on difficult issues like agriculture. Some of the concessions to French views made by France's partners were certainly intended by them as a contribution toward the concurrent bargaining with Britain. At that stage the negotiation with Edward Heath supplied a kind of linchpin for the Six. The British negotiators had a more difficult time in consequence, for once the Six had agreed among themselves they became extremely rigid. It is, however, questionable whether the Six will be able to

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build much, in the immediate future, upon the agreements provisionally reached among themselves in the course of the negotiations with Britain. In this respect Britain almost certainly got the better of the bargain: the negotiations pushed Britain into making a number of decisions on policies which are unlikely to be reversed, whereas no comparable residue has been left behind for the Six.

There is of course the possibility that some fresh external pressure will fulfill the same function for the Common Market that Britain performed in 1961–62. At one stage it was thought that the Kennedy Round under the Trade Expansion Act might indeed fulfill a dual purpose: on the one hand, force a coherent external policy on the European Community; on the other, help Britain, by bringing European tariffs down, to repair some of the damage caused by her exclusion from the Common Market. But subsequent feelings both in London and in Brussels are that the Trade Expansion Act will probably prove to be a far less powerful instrument for international negotiation than the Americans originally thought. In spite of the eagerness of Walter Hallstein and the European Commission to take advantage of the opportunity now offered, the E.E.C. countries led by France are likely to demand from the United States firm commitments which the Administration will find it hard to give.

It is a mistake to imagine that the demands which are likely to be made on the American negotiators in the Kennedy Round are exclusively a French design to make life more difficult for another branch of the Anglo-American family. France is to a large extent acting as the spokesman for doubts which are widespread in the Common Market. The essential point which the whole incident underlines is that it has by now become exceedingly difficult to treat tariff negotiations as a thing on their own—in the traditional style—without bringing all sorts of other matters, often of a domestic character, into the argument. At the very least that is likely to impose a limit on the mutual concessions that will be made in the Kennedy Round. If, however, the French decide to press their point to extremes in order to keep the common external tariff of the E.E.C. inviolate, it might be more serious than that. This has led to suggestions in Brussels that an effort should be made to strike a bargain between the French and the other members of the Community, tying an agreement on the E.E.C.'s agricultural policy to the tariff negotiations with the

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Americans. In its simplest and most optimistic form, the idea is that the French should be offered an attractive deal on agriculture on condition that they agree to bring forward the date of the Third Stage of the Common Market, which is not due for another two and a half years. The significance of the Third Stage is that decisions on tariff changes will then be made by the Council of Ministers on the basis of a qualified majority (instead of unanimously as now), which means that France could no longer impose a veto on a big bargain in the Kennedy Round.

Once again, the characteristic feature of this scheme is the hope that France can be brought to accept a deal with a European price tag attached to it. Needless to say, this type of proposal is regarded with no enthusiasm in London. Indeed, the British fear has been that the United States Government might become so obsessed with the desire to make a splash with the Kennedy Round that it might induce the friendly E.E.C. countries to make unfortunate concessions on vital issues to the French point of view. The alternative, as it is seen from London, is for the E.E.C. members to stand pat until the Third Stage of the Rome Treaty, and if necessary delay any serious tariff negotiations with the United States until the Community can make its decisions by qualified majority voting. That will happen at the end of 1965, and no action by France can now stop it. It would be foolish to bargain away anything of importance in order to gain a short extra period of lower tariffs.

The standpat argument can of course be applied more broadly, taking into account the various other fields of European policy in which the unanimity rule will give way to qualified majority voting in the not very distant future. Indeed, tactically it has certain attractions for the extreme European integrationists, as well as for the British. It could be used as a means of bringing home to the French that there are a number of acts of further integration in Europe which will take place anyhow. France can no longer impose a veto on the progressive limitation of national sovereignty in these particular fields; the right to do so was surrendered when the Six passed from the First to the Second Stage of the Rome Treaty in January 1962. This fact, if firmly pressed home with a policy of no-blackmail-by-France, might then persuade the French Government that its wisest course, after all, would be to accelerate the process of integration and thus recapture the good will of its partners in the E.E.C.

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But if the tactical pressure failed to produce the desired result, would the European leaders in Brussels be prepared to face a period during the next two and a half years in which the momentum of integration in all major spheres, other than tariff reductions, was drastically slowed down? That seems most improbable. After all, the central doctrine of the Treaty of Rome is that tariffs cannot be isolated as a separate compartment of national policy; making a customs union in modern conditions necessarily involves a wide range of other decisions taken in common. But an even more potent consideration would be the psychological effect on European business of a period during which the machinery of integration was retarded. It is a familiar point that the success of the European Community to date owes a great deal to the fact that businessmen have anticipated the realities of the Common Market in their own business decisions. They powerfully assisted European integration, because they were convinced that integration would occur. And they were convinced in large part by the practical evidence of the "Community spirit" among the governments which consented to the stream of decisions emerging from Brussels. Now, it is not being suggested that they would promptly reverse their positions if the stream were turned into a thin trickle. But they would surely be inclined, over a period, to hedge their bets more and more on European integration; and one simple way of hedging is to delay.

III

All this is another way of saying that integration is a highly cumulative business. The maintenance of visible tempo is the first essential. It follows that for all the initial tough talk of some of the Brussels leaders, like Dr. Sicco Mansholt, a vice president of the European Commission, they are likely in the end to be ready to make very extensive concessions to the French viewpoint in order to maintain the appearance of momentum. However, the more important question—since integration is only given shape in Brussels, but has to be willed elsewhere—is whether the national governments will be prepared to follow suit. I have already mentioned reasons for doubting whether they will. One of the key issues in this connection is the treatment that will be accorded to the permanent British delegation at Brussels; and this brings the argument back again to the future of British policy. It now looks as if the British Government, having con-

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sidered and rejected a variety of possible devices to fill the post-Brussels gap, has plumped for a reinforced diplomatic mission to the Six which by its presence will constantly assert Britain's special relationship with the Community. While this may seem a flat and disappointing conclusion to the whole affair, the arrangement could have more important consequences than appear at first sight.

The Six have, after all, stated it to be their policy to ensure that the E.E.C. and Britain shall consult closely on matters which might impede any future attempt to negotiate British entry into the Community. Secondly, it has been suggested that Britain herself should try to ensure, so far as possible, that EFTA and E.E.C. move in step with one another on major decisions of policy. Plainly, Britain and the Scandinavian countries at least are going to try to use EFTA as a means of providing some compensating trade advantages for the increased discrimination that will be exercised against them by the E.E.C. With the further EFTA tariff cut scheduled for July 1963, the total reduction will amount to 60 percent, which is large enough to make German exporters to Scandinavia feel the draft. There are, therefore, good commercial reasons, quite apart from political considerations, why the German Government should be anxious to establish a formal arrangement which will keep EFTA and E.E.C. in regular and intimate contact.

It is not clear at this stage how far Britain is planning to go in reinforcing EFTA and using it as an instrument of international trade policy. There has been talk about a possible attempt to "harmonize" the external tariffs of the EFTA countries, at present widely different from one another; such a move would clearly help the group to operate from a position of much greater strength in any world-wide tariff negotiation. But any serious attempt to convert EFTA into a more closely integrated group, with common institutions analogous to those of E.E.C., comes up against the objection in London that the interests of the members are, in fact, too disparate to fit easily into a single harmonious system. No doubt something more will now be made of EFTA than its British founders, at any rate, originally intended. But it is unlikely to set itself up as a rival community to E.E.C.

Potentially, the most important consequence of keeping a powerful British mission in Brussels is that it could provide the means of consolidating the relationship established between Bri-

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tain and five members of the Six during 15 months of negotiation. Whether it will in fact produce this result depends partly on how seriously Britain takes the whole enterprise and partly on the energy which the Community countries are prepared to apply to the business of consultation. There is no doubt that the Benelux representatives and the Germans are in earnest about it at this stage. If the British coöperate by producing a mission of the right type, the practice of close consultation on the details of E.E.C. policies as they develop could quickly become rooted. For practical purposes it would be a continuation in another form of the dialogue which developed between the British delegation and the E.E.C. representatives during the later stages of the negotiations in 1962. Moreover, it would be more difficult for France to sabotage the process of consultation than an actual negotiation, and there would be no question of a veto.

It is possible to conceive of day-to-day consultation of this type becoming so intimate and close as to be barely distinguishable from the making of joint decisions. A formal hearing in the meetings of the Council of Ministers would be unnecessary—just as the United States Ambassador, in the heyday of the Anglo-American special relationship, required no access to British Cabinet meetings in order to ensure that the American Government's needs and wishes were a potent factor in shaping relevant decisions. However, the content of the relationship envisaged with E.E.C. will be very different from the Anglo-American one, since it will specifically involve the domestic policies of both sides—something which the British and the Americans have always been at such pains to avoid. If, for example, the E.E.C. wants to go ahead with a common energy policy, the relevant questions on which agreement will need to be reached will include the size of the British subsidy, if any, to be paid to unproductive coal mines; the home price of coal charged by the National Coal Board; the amount of the excise duty levied on oil; the countries from which oil is to be imported and perhaps the quantity of stocks to be kept in storage. Just as the whole Common Market technique has involved systematic mutual interference in the domestic affairs of member countries, a successful attempt to keep a non-member marching in step with the Community must involve the same kind of interference—*from both sides*.

One consequence of this form of consultation would be to complicate and delay still further the already difficult process of reach-

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ing agreement on major policy decisions in E.E.C.—a tendency which the European Commission, guardian of the tempo of the Common Market, can be expected to oppose. Quite reasonably, the Commission would point out that the E.E.C. was having the worst of all worlds—by allowing an outsider an influential voice in decisions for which he bears no ultimate responsibility. If the system is to work, the central idea of the E.E.C., which is the unremitting search for a fresh consensus in a constantly wider range of policies, must willy-nilly include the outsider. The real problem is that almost any decision which welds the existing members closer together, *e.g.* over agriculture, is likely to carry E.E.C. and EFTA further apart. To keep the two blocs moving in parallel with one another, as they have done so far in their timetables of tariff reductions, will not prevent them from excluding each other's trade. The temptation therefore will be to delay such decisions.

All this assumes firstly that powerful consultative machinery between Britain and E.E.C. is established, and secondly that the Six are unable to agree among themselves on an ambitious new program of accelerated European integration. If they were, in fact, able to agree—more specifically, if France were willing to accept a major sacrifice of national sovereignty—the group would almost certainly refuse to allow the imperatives of European union to be trammelled by any commitment to an outsider like Britain. Consultation would have to wait. If France turns out not to be ready to pay the price, then the prospect is that in, say, two years from now Britain will not be faced with a tight and ever more coherent Community, but with an entity which is still fundamentally as loosely knit as the E.E.C. is today—and whose looseness is much more apparent. The process of formal integration, which puts a compulsion on national governments to subordinate their own decisions on important matters to a collective will, is much less advanced than is often imagined. Britain's adhesion to the E.E.C. in 1963, with the obvious sacrifices of national and Commonwealth interests which this would have entailed, would have powerfully reinforced the mood making for more rapid European integration. There is no comparable compelling force now in sight. A loose Europe would of course be a club which Britain would find it easier to join—though from the point of view of a British European it would be far less worth joining.

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BRITISH LABOR LOOKS AT EUROPE

By R. H. S. Crossman

IF, as the Labor Party hopes and expects, Britain will soon have its first Socialist Government since 1951, it may be of interest to know Labor's attitude to the Common Market—our attitude to the past negotiations which were suddenly ended by General de Gaulle's notorious press conference, as well as our attitude to the possibility of negotiations after the next general election.

But if I am to make our Socialist view of British relations to Europe intelligible to non-British readers, I must first sketch, in broad outline, the background of party politics against which our great debate on the Common Market has been taking place. In Britain as in the United States, great decisions in the sphere of international relations are not usually taken solely in terms of international relations; normally they are very largely determined by domestic considerations. It should cause no surprise, therefore, to discover the role played by internal political pressures in Mr. Macmillan's sudden decision to apply for British entry into the European Economic Community, and Mr. Gaitskell's decision a year later to oppose the Macmillan terms as completely unacceptable.

It is unnecessary here to resume the case which the Prime Minister, together with Lord Home and Mr. Heath, propounded for breaking the inhibitions of insular and imperial self-sufficiency and declaring entry to the Common Market to be a precondition of British economic and political revival. Since we are seeking to analyze not the Government's but the Labor Party's attitude, what concerns us are not so much the real deep-seated motives of the Government's sudden change of front, but how it appeared to the politicians who faced them on the Opposition front bench. Seen from this point of view, Mr. Macmillan and his colleagues seemed to be still staunchly attached to traditional Conservative policies, even when the Commonwealth Conference was summoned in the early months of 1961. Neither in the published account of that conference, nor apparently in its private proceedings, was any suggestion made that Britain should depart from the attitude to the Six which the President of the Board of Trade had propounded two years earlier on February 12, 1959:

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> We must recognise that to sign the Treaty of Rome would mean having common external tariffs, which in turn would mean the end of Commonwealth free entry, and I cannot conceive that any government of this country would put forward a proposition which would involve the abandonment of Commonwealth free entry. It would be wrong for us and for the whole of the free world to adopt a policy of new duties on foodstuffs and raw materials, many of which come from under-developed countries at present entering the major market duty free.

This completely unambiguous statement by Mr. Maudling—now Chancellor of the Exchequer—had been adopted as official Conservative policy in the election campaign which brought the Party its third consecutive victory in the autumn of 1959. And at first it looked as though the new Macmillan administration would continue to uphold the traditional Conservative attitude to the Commonwealth on the one side, and to Europe on the other, with the aid of which it had won its new mandate from the electorate. Then within a matter of months the Prime Minister tore down both these pillars of faith. His "wind of change" speech—delivered ironically enough while he was a guest of the South African Government—heralded the beginning of a process of disengagement from the defense of the White Settler which Sir Roy Welensky has recently described as the complete betrayal of all that Britain once stood for in Central Africa. It was soon followed by a second and equally sensational break with party tradition—the sudden proclamation by Mr. Macmillan and his Foreign Secretary of the quite new doctrine that in a world of giants Britain could not afford to stay outside the Common Market.

No one in the Opposition could doubt that these two breaks with Conservative tradition were closely linked. Though he has a great sense of history and an immense respect for the aristocratic tradition, Mr. Macmillan has never been an orthodox Conservative; but in practical politics he has long impressed his opponents as a highly successful gambler—a leader who, if things go wrong, can suddenly lose patience, cast round for a new idea, and having found it decide to risk all on a single throw.

And that in our eyes is what happened in the summer of 1961. For a whole decade successive Conservative leaders had sought to combine a return to the easygoing British form of laissez-faire economics, with the maintenance of Britain's status as America's closest partner and the third nuclear power. For the first five years of the 1950s, the effort was by no means unsuccess-

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ful. But then came the Suez fiasco—the complete collapse of Lord Avon's attempt to restore Britain's imperial power in the Middle East. This attempt to "go it alone" was ended ignominiously after less than a week by a surrender to American oil and financial sanctions. Six months after Suez, the Prime Minister resigned, a broken man, and the first act of his successor was to try once again to "go it alone," this time in the field of nuclear weapons. In the spring of 1957, Mr. Macmillan's new Defense Minister, Duncan Sandys, proclaimed a completely novel policy under which the large sums required for creating a truly independent British deterrent would be found at the cost of abolishing national service and ruthlessly cutting back our conventional forces.

Once again an initial success was followed by dramatic failure, when the abandonment of the Blue Streak project in 1960 indicated clearly enough that Great Britain did not possess sufficient economic strength to make her own missile. This "nuclear Suez" was soon followed by an attempt to "go it alone" in terms of diplomacy—the Macmillan journey to Moscow which foundered during the U-2 episode in Paris.

Twelve months later, in the early summer of 1961, Britain was hit by one of her recurring balance-of-payments crises, and the Government, which at first had complacently welcomed the efforts of the Six to get together, suddenly felt it was faced with a new threat. The Common Market was becoming only too demonstrably a political and economic success at the precise moment when it was impossible any more to disguise the facts of Britain's industrial stagnation and financial weakness. In the eyes of the Opposition leaders, it was the piling of an acute economic and financial crisis on top of a long series of military and diplomatic disappointments that finally persuaded the Prime Minister to stake everything on an attempt to halt Britain's decline by a speedy entry into the Common Market.

In order to give a faithful picture of the Opposition's attitude, I must add that many of my colleagues on the Labor benches were convinced at the time, and are still convinced today, that President Kennedy's intervention was the sole and sufficient cause of Mr. Macmillan's abrupt turnabout. But this seems to me one of the legends that oversimplify history. The President's talks with the Prime Minister may have provided the occasion for his change of heart; but they were not its cause. And although Mr. Macmillan was no doubt shocked by Mr. Kennedy's failure

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to recognize any special British connection with the United States, his decision to enter Europe had been prepared for by a lengthy process of disillusion which had finally driven him to the conclusion that the Commonwealth as an effective economic and strategic unit was finished, and that a nation state of 52,000,000 people was no longer a viable entity.

In this description of the motives that prompted the Conservative initiative in 1961, I lay no claim whatsoever to historical objectivity. My sole purpose is to describe as faithfully as I can the impression that Mr. Macmillan's completely unexpected reversal of policy made on the Opposition benches. For it is this impression which is relevant to an understanding of the Labor Party's attitude to the Common Market. Up to this point, both Government and Opposition had taken it for granted that whatever other policies might be considered, entry to the Common Market was a "non-starter" owing to its incompatibility with our Commonwealth obligations. So whereas foreign observers—particularly across the Atlantic—could regard the Government's sudden conversion as proof of Mr. Macmillan's statesmanlike vision, the Opposition in Parliament was bound to view it in the first place as a party political gimmick—an attempt by a most adroit and ingenious politician to extricate himself from his domestic difficulties and manœuvre himself into a situation where, having successfully negotiated terms of entry, he could appeal to the country posing as the greatest statesman since Disraeli.

In order to realize the hazardous nature of the enterprise, one has only to glance at the state of public opinion in the summer of 1961. The British public—above all the Conservative Party workers—were completely unprepared for Mr. Macmillan's initiative. Indeed, a Gallup Poll taken at an early stage in the negotiations revealed that a majority of the population thought Britain was already a member of the European Community. Even a year later, when the subject had been debated *ad nauseam* in Parliament and in the press, and when an annual Conservative Party Conference had unanimously accepted the terms provisionally agreed to and an annual Labor Party Conference had equally unanimously rejected them, public opinion was still both ignorant and lethargic. Obstinately, the British people still continued to regard the Common Market as the kind of complicated and remote political issue that the politicians could be left to mull over

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in the Palace of Westminster. A disastrous series of by-elections in November 1961 demonstrated that the Government's conduct at the negotiations in Brussels had not regained it any public confidence, and was almost certainly losing it farmers' votes in what had been previously considered true-blue Tory constituencies. Whatever the advantages or disadvantages that would accrue, once Britain became a member, it was already clear that Mr. Macmillan had completely failed to create a mass movement in favor of entry. On the other hand, Mr. Gaitskell's declaration of outright opposition to entry on the Macmillan terms had won him an unprecedented popularity within his own party, and for the first time compelled the general public to accept him as a genuine alternative to Mr. Macmillan.

That these facts were scarcely appreciated in the United States was very largely the result of the reports cabled by most of the American correspondents in London. So ardent was their enthusiasm for British entry, and so confident were they that the negotiations would soon be successfully completed, that they tended to write off anyone who opposed the Government as an embittered left-winger or a prejudiced reactionary. This misunderstanding of British public opinion was a pardonable mistake. For in no other country in the world do the opinion-formers constitute such a coherent oligarchy as in London. Whitehall, once the Treasury had come round, was in full support of the Government. So were Fleet Street (apart from *The Daily Express*) and most of the organized pressure groups of industry and finance. Apart from agriculture—whose political importance in Britain is in inverse relation to its economic strength—organized opposition seemed limited exclusively to the Labor Party. It was only too easy for a foreign correspondent to write off Labor's opposition as "party political" and conclude that "no fair-minded person of any importance was now against entry."

Yet in fact the British people had been scarcely affected by the sudden wholesale conversion of the Whitehall establishment; and the only important domestic consequence of Mr. Heath's activities in Brussels was a still further deterioration in the Government's electoral position, a swing to Labor, and a sudden and very remarkable rise in the standing of Mr. Gaitskell. Yet it was clear enough that if an agreement were signed in Brussels, Mr. Macmillan with the majority he possessed in the Commons would be able to obtain whatever legislation he required. It was equally

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clear that, despite the virtuosity of the Prime Minister's leadership, the Tory voters were not taking kindly to a New Conservatism which seemed to involve damaging the Commonwealth, selling the White Settler down the river and abandoning national sovereignty in order to enter Europe. If Mr. Macmillan had gone to the country in order to obtain a mandate for entering Europe, he would have conceded to the Labor Opposition the unprecedented advantage of presenting itself as the only party that still stood for the Commonwealth and for national independence, and that still believed in British greatness.

Any reader who regards this as a prejudiced judgment should reflect on the developments in British domestic politics since last January. The Conservative electoral fortunes which began to decline in the summer of 1961 have taken a slight but undeniable turn for the better. Of course I am not suggesting that either Mr. Macmillan or Mr. Heath wanted the negotiations broken off. Nevertheless, if General de Gaulle had been deliberately planning to save the British Government from electoral defeat, he could not have devised a measure more appropriate to his aim than his assumption of personal responsibility for excluding Britain from the Common Market. Whatever its long-term effects may prove to be, in the short term Britain's exclusion from the Common Market has proved a merciful deliverance for a Conservative Party which seemed to have doomed itself to certain electoral defeat.

II

I now turn from the background of party politics to a consideration of the issue itself. What is the Labor Party's attitude to the Common Market? What motives prompted its leaders to adopt this attitude, and what prospect is there of the attitude being modified in the event of a Labor Government being formed after the election?

Perhaps the most convenient way of answering these questions would be to start by stating my conclusions in the briefest possible form, and then substantiating each of them by references to official declarations.

1. Although it is completely opposed to the third-force policies of General de Gaulle, the Labor Party was not opposed to the ending of the Brussels negotiations by his notorious press conference. In its view, the main differences between Britain and the

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Six had not been reconciled when the negotiations were broken off; and the British Government could scarcely have reached agreement except at the cost of breaking the three pledges it had made a year before, and doing irreparable damage to the Commonwealth and to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). In terms of British national interest, therefore, General de Gaulle's intervention was providential.

2. The breakdown at Brussels has not altered the Labor Party's belief in the value of the European Community and the advantage both to Europe and to Britain of changes in its structure and philosophy which would permit the admission of Britain and the other members of EFTA, and so transform it into an outward-looking part of the Atlantic Community. When the de Gaulle-Adenauer epoch is over, a Labor Government would welcome the opportunity for a new round of negotiations. But in any such negotiations, a Labor Government would start from the position described in the National Executive Committee statement of September 29, 1962.

3. Since, however, there is no immediate prospect of a change in the French attitude, the Labor Party believes that Britain should concentrate all attention on putting its own house in order and working out with EFTA, the Commonwealth and the United States an alternative to the enlargement of the Six.

There can be no question that the most powerful and moving statement of Labor's position is to be found in the late Mr. Gaitskell's address to the Annual Party Conference last autumn. This speech, however, was a highly personal and emotional declaration. It delighted the vast majority of the assembled delegates who were passionately opposed to the Common Market, precisely because in certain respects it seemed to go far beyond the agreed party line. What pleased the militant rank-and-filers caused deep distress to a number of prominent parliamentarians and trade-union leaders who had taken an active part in the Common Market campaign. When Mr. Gaitskell, after the conference, discovered the distress he had caused in these circles, he was careful to emphasize that the policy to which the whole party was committed was to be found not in his own speech but in the statement of the National Executive Committee which he himself had presented to the conference after the differences between Common Marketeers and anti-Common Marketeers had been reconciled at the end of a day and night of painful argument.

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It was this statement, moreover, not Mr. Gaitskell's speech, that was later accepted by the Parliamentary Party, in which the Common Marketeers exercised a far stronger influence than they did in the party as a whole.

Since Mr. Gaitskell's death, Mr. Wilson has emphasized on more than one occasion that this statement remains a fair expression of the party's policy, and that this has not been affected by the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations. In particular, the key paragraph which lays down "the essential conditions for British entry" is still to be treated as the official party line:

> While deliberately refraining from hobbling the Brussels negotiations by laying down in advance a series of rigid and detailed terms, the Labour Party clearly stated the five broad conditions that would be required:
>
> 1. Strong and binding safeguards for the trade and other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth.
> 2. Freedom as at present to pursue our own foreign policy.
> 3. Fulfilment of the Government's pledge to our associates in the European Free Trade Area.
> 4. The right to plan our own economy.
> 5. Guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture.
>
> The acceptance by the Six of these 5 conditions . . . would mean a conscious decision to liberalise their commercial policy and to become an outward-looking rather than an inward-looking community—one that recognises, in deeds as well as words that it has obligations not only to the 170 million people within the Common Market but to the hundreds of millions outside.

It has sometimes been suggested that these five conditions were deliberately constructed as a platform from which to oppose British entry. That this allegation has no foundation becomes clear as soon as we recall that the policy statement was accepted without objection not only by those members of the National Executive Committee who opposed entry to the Common Market but also by the large number who ardently desired it. If it is true that Mr. Wilson, for example, was among the skeptics who from the first predicted that General de Gaulle would torpedo the negotiations, it is equally true that Mr. George Brown, who made no secret of his ardent desire for British entry, accepted these five conditions as perfectly reasonable demands. Winding up the Brighton debate as deputy leader, he made his attitude clear:

> We do not believe that these terms are extravagant or unattainable. We believe that these terms are not only necessary for us; they are the terms that the Six could grant without harm to themselves. We believe that they are the terms that our Socialist comrades in the Six and elsewhere in the world

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expect us to demand. Some ask, "Can you get these and be within the Treaty of Rome?" If the Six want to let us have them, *they can be got*. If we have a Government prepared to argue for them, not as supplicants needing aid, not as a nation negotiating from economic weakness, but as a strong and powerful nation with something to bring, *they can be got*.

The five conditions, therefore, were not a piece of anti-Common Market propaganda but a considered expression of the attitude to Europe adopted by the whole leadership of the Labor Party.

When we examine the conditions individually, we find that three of them—the safeguards for the Commonwealth, the guarantees for British agriculture and the pledge to Britain's partners in EFTA—were taken over from the Government. Only two—the demand for freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy and to plan the British economy—were formulated by the Labor Party. It has been suggested that these specifically Socialist demands were presented in such doctrinaire style that they were bound to repel the Six. A glance at Mr. Gaitskell's Brighton speech reveals the absurdity of this suggestion. True enough, he repudiated in the strongest language the idea that Britain should join an anti-American third force, and went on to denounce the "anti-American, anti-Russian, pro-Colonial" aspects of the European movement in words that caused deep offense at the time. But in the light of what has happened since last autumn, his remarks on this subject seem to reveal not an insular dislike of Europe but remarkable prescience about de Gaulle's designs.

As for the fourth condition—the right to plan the British economy—he put less emphasis on this than on any of the others. Indeed, he said, "I will not spend much time on this. There are, I must frankly tell you, many unsound arguments used in this matter. There is far more public ownership in Italy and in France today than there is in Britain, and more central planning, at any rate in France. And it is true I believe—I know socialists who do it—that they are anxious to introduce more central planning in Europe."

The idea, therefore, that unacceptable Socialist conditions of entry were deliberately spitchcocked into the policy statement can be dismissed as an invention; and we can now turn to consider the three conditions on which the most emphasis has been laid. As has been stated, each of these Labor Party conditions first made its appearance as a solemn pledge made by the British Government when the first request for entry was made in the summer of 1961. Maybe a British Government intent on achiev-

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ing reasonable terms of entry should not have made such firm promises to the Commonwealth, to EFTA and to the British farmers before starting negotiations with the Six. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how any impartial observer could regard it as unreasonable that, once the pledges had been made, the Labor Party should insist on their being honored.

In the case of the Commonwealth, the Labor position is still the same today as it was when Mr. Gaitskell observed last autumn that "the vague promises made by the Six should be turned into precise agreements," and added the very important rider that this should be done "before we go in, before we start dismantling the preference system." The Labor Party's position on EFTA remains equally clear and reasonable. British entry must be conditional on the fulfilment of the pledge that other members of EFTA who want to come in as full members should be allowed to do so, while those who for special reasons want associate membership should also achieve their desire. As for the American objection that the admission of neutral Sweden would weaken the Western Alliance, Mr. Gaitskell's Brighton comment still holds good: "This is a profoundly dangerous argument. It is dangerous to treat people like this because they have decided on a neutral policy, a policy which maybe is far better for all of us than if they were to join NATO. You will not accuse me of being weak about my support to NATO, but I have never said that everybody should join it, all the same."

The Labor Party insists on safeguards for British agriculture not only because of its concern for a farming community which includes only 4 percent of the employed population, but also because it regards agriculture as an acid test of whether the Community is determined to remain inward-looking or whether it is prepared, as the price of British membership, to become outward-looking. This point was reëmphasized by Mr. Wilson in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington in April:

> The Labour Party was prepared to accept a solution which would have been genuinely outward-looking and be a stepping-stone to a wider free trade area embracing the Atlantic Community and the Commonwealth. There was nothing in the Treaty of Rome, as such, that would have precluded such an advance. What we were not prepared to join was an inward-looking, autarkic Europe which would sever Britain from our traditional channels of trade with the Commonwealth and the wide trading world. The adoption by the E.E.C. of an agricultural policy based on restrictionism, of high prices policed by a penal import levy on imports from the outside world, was a sign

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that perhaps Schacht rather than Adam Smith provided the inspiration for the agricultural planners of the New Europe. This policy involved a degree of interference with established market channels, a degree of rigging of prices and production, of internal self-sufficiency, far transcending the wildest dreams of any British or American Secretary of Agriculture, of any part, who ever existed, and in saying this I am speaking the language of superlatives.

Later in the same speech, Mr. Wilson made it clear that a Labor Government under his premiership would not exclude the possibility of entering into negotiations:

> We are prepared at the right time and given the right conditions to enter into fresh negotiations with the Six, provided this does not mean another 18 months with Britain sitting in the ante-chamber while the Six meet and wrangle about our fate, provided that no one regards the concessions made by Mr. Heath as an acceptable starting point. We have stated the five broad conditions which should govern Britain's entry, and we are prepared to negotiate on the basis of these conditions.

Nevertheless, it would not be fair to leave the impression that Labor policy today is based on the assumption that such a round of negotiations is likely to occur in the foreseeable future, or that, if it did, it would be easily crowned with success. On the contrary, the premise upon which Her Majesty's Opposition now operates is that after 10 years of comfy affluent decline, this country must, out of its own resources, find its own way of reviving its economy, rebuilding its strength and retrieving its role as an independent power outside Europe.

Of course, Mr. Wilson like Mr. Gaitskell before him is aware that when the negotiations started nearly two years ago, American public opinion shared Mr. Macmillan's view that our situation was really desperate, and that there was no future for Britain outside Europe. One of the puzzles which only a historian of our times can unravel is how this legend became accepted in Washington as well as in London as a serious economic judgment. Both Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Wilson are professional economists of some repute, and they have exposed it mercilessly in speech after speech, demonstrating quite clearly that, judged solely in terms of British interests, the economic arguments for and against entry are so evenly balanced that no responsible politician could permit his decision to be determined by them. Indeed it is clear in retrospect that what really repelled Mr. Gaitskell about the Macmillan initiative was the implication that nothing could arrest the decline which our country had suffered throughout the 1950s unless and until we joined Europe. To Her Majesty's Opposition, this

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diagnosis of the nation's health was bound to appear as a piece of political self-exculpation, an excuse for the disastrous consequences of the Government's own infirmities:

> The truth is that our faults lie not in our markets or the tariffs against us, but in ourselves; in the failure to invest enough; in the "stop, go, stop" four-year cycle to which we are all so accustomed; in the failure to spend enough on research; in the failure to solve the apprenticeship problem, even to do anything about it, and to build up the necessary reserves of skilled labour; in the continued existence of an antiquated and unfair tax system; in our failure to develop an incomes policy which can only succeed if it is based upon social justice and a fair distribution of wealth.

In these words, Mr. Gaitskell summed up the convictions and the implicit aspirations which inspire the Labor Party after ten years in the political wilderness. Even those Socialists who are themselves Common Marketeers have always recognized that Mr. Macmillan's application for entry was not a considered act of statesmanship based on a sober assessment of all the economic and political factors, but an extemporized device for propping up a failing government—an escape into Europe from domestic problems that had become insoluble. From the start, the Labor Party felt the gravest suspicion of a European community dominated by General de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer, and as the negotiations went on it expressed more and more emphatically the view that even if Mr. Heath were to surrender on the main economic issues that divided him from the Six, General de Gaulle was determined to keep Britain out, come what may. That this prediction was finally proved right in no way depressed an Opposition confident that it can win the next election and demonstrate that an independent Britain under a different leadership can be restored to health and vitality.

It is of course possible that this conviction is an illusion, and that the British economy will not revive until we are subjected to the forces of competition inside the Common Market. If so, it will not be very long before a Labor Government is forced to follow Mr. Macmillan's example and sue for terms. But this pessimistic conclusion about the United Kingdom's prospects, though it is as widespread in Whitehall as it is in the City and the Federation of British Industries, is completely foreign to the mood of the Labor Party. And surely it is a good thing that one of Britain's two great parties is still passionately convinced that this country has a future—outside the Common Market.

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PROSPECTS IN THE CARIBBEAN

By Philip Sherlock

DIVISION is the heritage of the Caribbean. The separateness of the islands in the archipelago that curves for a thousand miles from the tip of Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco is reflected in the fact that they have no common name. Each island shares with the others the same startling beauty of sun-drenched mountains and peacock seas; each has the same social configuration resulting from the same techniques of production, the intensive cultivation of one crop, and slavery. Yet the keynote is contrast, the dominant theme competition. One reason for this is that the archipelago extends over a great distance; if Port of Spain were to be placed where Savannah is, San Juan would fall on Indianapolis and Havana in northeastern Wyoming. But history, not geography, supplies the chief reason, for even those islands which lie within easy reach of each other turn their faces toward Europe and their backs on their neighbors. The rivalries of Western Europe broke the region into segments, each tightly integrated into the trading system of the metropolitan power, sealed off in an almost watertight compartment and stocked with people brought together from Europe, a score of West African kingdoms and the central provinces of India. Nowhere else in the New World is there so sharp a juxtaposition of different races, languages, religions—different legal, educational and political systems.

Yet the compelling need is to jettison the heritage of division. Will this be any easier now following the breakup of the Federation, when Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are independent countries and seven or eight smaller islands are on the point of independence? Will the breaking of the last imperial ties with Britain mean that West Indians will reject insularity and parochialism and move closer to Latin America? Does West Indian independence signify the achievement of unity within multi-racial island communities and does it foreshadow a search for a larger regional unity? Does it mean that islands which have been linked with Britain for more than three centuries will now move finally into the orbit and under the protection of the United States? What, in fact, does West Indian independence mean?

The West Indies is the name of an aspiration shared by three

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million English-speaking people scattered through the archipelago. These people have been slow in growing away from their Old World origins and in developing characteristic communities of their own, even though their earliest settlements belong to the Mayflower period. In the year when William Bradford was exclaiming at the wild desolation round about Plymouth, small bands of Englishmen were planting their first crops of tobacco in St. Kitts and fighting off fierce bands of Caribs. Roger Williams, in his "Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for the Causes of Conscience," was asserting that the basis of power lies in the people at the very period when Barbados was rejecting the laws of trade passed by Cromwell's parliament on the ground that there should be no legislation without representation. On the strength of sugar, the little islands forged ahead and became the centers of trade in the first British Empire, so much so that the powerful West Indian interests were contemptuous of the quarrelsome, struggling Yankees. They pointed with pride to the perfection with which the islands, their plantations, fitted into the imperial scheme, supplying Europe with tropical staples and furnishing a secure market for the goods of the mother country. Calculators and economists joined in the hymn of praise, "that the glory and grandeur of England has been advanced more by sugar than by any other commodity, wool not excepted." Yet the northern colonies became independent 160 years before their southern contemporaries in the Caribbean. When the floodgates of Europe opened and tens of thousands of Europeans—Irish, Scots, Dutch, Germans, Poles—poured into the United States, they entered a country that was independent, eagerly made it their home and gave it their loyalty. Over a longer period hundreds of thousands of West Africans from a score of nations and tongues—Iboes, Yorubas, Mandingoes, Coromantis, Efiks—were transported by force as "hands" into islands that were colonies, and tied to a plantation and an owner. Close behind them came tens of thousands of men and women, brought from the provinces of India to work on sugar estates as contract laborers. All these, Africans and Indians, were men who had lost a country.

So the independence of Jamaica and of Trinidad has a special meaning. It is a Declaration of Unity by people for whom the road to unity has been long and hard. Cradled in division, they have established two of the most remarkable multi-racial communities in the world. They are not based merely on tolerance, for that

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assumes something to be tolerated, or on acceptance, as if there were some problem to be overcome, some difficulty to be accepted; but rather on people truly learning to be part of each other without consideration of anything except natural human feeling, affection, respect. Undeniably tensions exist, but where do they not?

West Indian independence is also a declaration of identity by uprooted people who yesterday lost a homeland and who today have found a country that commands their loyalty. It is a declaration of responsibility by people living in lands which were once regarded as places of exile. For most of their history the islands were valued as the outer defense works of a gate, to Cathay perhaps and to the South Seas. Even when sugar brought golden days the wealth produced in the islands served only to make it easier for the planter to return to his own home, so much so that a traveler in Jamaica in 1763 said that "the generality of its inhabitants look upon themselves as passengers only." Every war revealed the complete dependence of the islands on external markets for food and for cash. Two social revolutions, first the introduction and later the abolition of slavery, changed West Indian society radically and each originated outside of the region. Responsibility always lay elsewhere. With the assumption by the West Indians of complete responsibility for their own future, a new period in West Indian history has begun.

II

Even in the act of making this declaration, the Jamaican and Trinidadian regretted the recent failure to find a larger unity through the Federation of the West Indies. After 12 years of planning and persuasion, the Federation of the West Indies was established in 1958, only to be dissolved four years later. Jamaica, far removed from her sister islands in the eastern Caribbean, was large enough to feel self-sufficient, having more than one-half of the population of the Federation. Many Jamaicans feared that they would have to carry the burden of supporting the smaller and poorer islands, and, proud of the fact that they were already self-governing in internal matters, they did not wish their progress toward full independence to be slowed down by association with other islands whose constitutions were less advanced. Also, since a large part of the island's revenue came from customs duties, Jamaica was reluctant to enter into a customs union with the other islands. In admittedly difficult circumstances the weak Federal

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Government proved incapable of furnishing the imaginative and farsighted leadership that was required.

The end came in September 1961 when the people of Jamaica voted in a referendum against continuing in the Federation. Only 60 percent of the electorate voted, with 251,935 in favor of withdrawal and 216,400 against. The result was disastrous not only for the Federation but also for Norman Manley's People's National Party which was in power at the time. It had defeated Sir Alexander Bustamante's Labor Party in 1955 and again in 1960, when it won 29 out of the 45 seats. During its term of power the People's National Party generated a new dynamism in government, established many of the financial institutions that a developing country needs, carried out extensive educational reforms that opened secondary education to every child with ability, negotiated a new and far more profitable agreement with the bauxite companies, attracted capital by incentive legislation and set the economy on the road to self-sustaining growth. This intense drive produced social dislocations. As in every developing country, the gap widened between the skilled and the unskilled, and between the country and the town. The leaders of government began to lose touch with the country folk. So, on a wave of popular enthusiasm whipped up by Sir Alexander's anti-federation campaign and his victory in the referendum, and aided by the local dislocation that had accompanied Mr. Manley's remarkably successful program of industrialization, Sir Alexander won the 1962 election in Jamaica with 26 seats as against Mr. Manley's 19.

On hearing the result of the Jamaica referendum, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams, pointed out that if there was a Federation of 10, and the figure 1 was removed, nothing was left. A few months later the Government of Trinidad and Tobago decided to seek independence on its own, and announced that it would welcome any island that chose to be associated with it in a unitary state. Only Grenada showed any interest in this proposal. The other seven islands which contain about 20 percent of the population and 15 percent of the area of the former Federation are in the process of setting up a new federation based on Barbados, and including Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis and Anguilla, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.

Hand in hand with regret went concern about the future. The new states of Jamaica and Trinidad are grappling with problems

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similar to those which afflict the smaller islands, though not in so acute a form; and they find neither comfort nor encouragement in the happenings in those islands which gained their independence at an earlier date. To the north they see the Dominican Republic still sorely stricken after 20 years of Trujillo's oppression and the destruction of its democratic institutions. In Haiti, which led the way in Caribbean independence, the shabby dictator Duvalier rules with the support of a gang of thugs, his secret police. The effort of the Cuban people to free themselves from the brutal dictatorship of Batista has resulted in subjection to an even more ruthless tyranny. Jamaicans and Trinidadians, therefore, have seen at close quarters the swift destruction of civil liberties. The sudden arrival of refugees and exiles at their airports and in their harbors has underlined the fact that independence in itself offers no safeguard against exploitation or tyranny.

Perhaps as a result of this awareness the Jamaica constitution contains special provisions for protecting civil liberties and the parliamentary and ministerial system of government. The constitution is monarchical and is based largely on that of Britain. The Queen of England is the Queen of Jamaica and, as such, the nominal head of the Executive and an integral part of a Parliament that has legal supremacy within the framework of the constitution. Parliament consists of the Queen, a nominated Senate and a House of Representatives elected by adult suffrage. The constitution recognizes a Leader of the Opposition, but it goes further and is probably unique in giving him certain definite functions. Thus he has the right to be consulted when the Prime Minister is making specified appointments such as the Chief Justice, President of the Court of Appeal, and some members of commissions responsible for the police, the civil service and the subordinate courts; and he is entitled to express his views on these appointments to the Governor-General. Besides this, the Governor-General appoints one-third of the Senate on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, two-thirds on the advice of the Prime Minister. Responsible government and the two-party system are new in both Jamaica and Trinidad. They have developed within the last 20 years, yet are already deep-rooted. The debates on the constitution showed that Jamaicans and Trinidadians were insistent on taking every possible step to prevent their countries ever passing under a dictatorship. They were troubled both by events in neighboring lands and also by the fate which has

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overtaken opposition parties in other newly independent states.

The constitutions of Jamaica and of Trinidad recognize the fundamental rights in respect of life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property, the protection of law, freedom of conscience, the right of free speech and of free assembly. These provisions cannot be altered easily. Under the Jamaica constitution entrenched provisions, such as those which deal with personal security and with the protection of the law, can be changed only by a majority vote of two-thirds of the members of each house, and at least three months must elapse between the conclusion of the debate and the final vote. It is even more difficult to change the specially entrenched provisions that deal with the monarchical system of government, the composition and summoning of Parliament and the holding of free elections at specified times.

One of the most revealing features of the independence celebrations of Jamaica and Trinidad was the emphasis repeatedly put on the need for preserving harmonious relationships among the various racial groups in the community. Eric Williams gave his new nation the watchwords "Discipline, Production, Tolerance," while Jamaica chose as its motto "Out of Many, One People"—a noble aspiration but not a completely accurate description of the population of the island which is predominantly African. This insistence indicated that race and color remain explosive elements throughout Caribbean society, inspiring the Afro-Cubanism of Pales Matos, who pictures the powerful vitalizing role played in Caribbean culture by the Negro, who "lives physically and spiritually within us all"; moving Aimé Césaire and others to reject European culture and the "white world horribly weary from its immense effort"; leading Brouard of Haiti to express the power of Africa as both symbol and home: "Your lost sons send you greetings, Mother Africa. From the West Indies to Bermuda and Bermuda to the United States they sigh after you." In the 1920s the sighing after Africa became a political movement with the Jamaican Marcus Garvey, and in the 1940s it became a messianic movement with the Ras Tafari whose banner, floating above a hut on the Kingston foreshore, reads: "Headquarters of the Ras Tafari and Africa Recruitment Centre."

In Jamaica the areas of possible tension lie in relationships between black-white or black-brown, but friction is modified by a long tradition of understanding, tolerance, public service and common endeavor. Universal adult suffrage has made the masses

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the politically powerful class, and the common school and a generous provision of state scholarships have made education a unifying rather than a divisive force. Also, there is a high degree of homogeneity in the population; 75 out of every 100 people are of African descent, 20 are of mixed blood, and only 5 are from other groups such as the East Indians, Europeans and Chinese.

The position is different in Trinidad, which for three centuries after its discovery by Columbus in 1498 was almost completely neglected by Spain. Up to the period of the Napoleonic wars it was a struggling, backward island; but even then its small population was more diverse in its origin than that of Jamaica, for it included Spanish and French as well as British, African and people of color. The abolition of the slave trade in 1834 left the island critically short of labor. Frantic efforts were made to attract disbanded soldiers from Wellington's regiments, free Africans, Portuguese from the famine-stricken island of Madeira, and Chinese, but in the end the East Indian immigrant proved to be the answer to the desperate need of Trinidad—as to that of British Guiana. The first arrivals were in Guiana in 1838 but large-scale immigration did not get under way until after 1850. Over a period of 70 years from that date a total of 238,900 East Indians were introduced into Guiana, 143,900 into Trinidad. As a result East Indian immigration dominated the pattern of population growth in both countries. For this reason Trinidad differs from the other islands where, as a result of slavery, the Negro stock is dominant. In Guiana about half the population is East Indian, while in Trinidad the proportion is approximately one-third. The East Indian population has an extremely high fertility rate, about 45 per thousand as compared to around 30 per thousand for other groups. Since the death rate has fallen sharply because of advances in public health and medical care, the rate of natural increase is about twice that for other racial groups. In both Trinidad and Guiana the East Indians are rapidly becoming numerically equal to all other groups combined.

A recent study of an East Indian village in Trinidad's sugar belt reveals the strength and extent of cultural persistence even among second and third generation East Indians; but much more remarkable is the rapidity with which European, East Indian and Negro have settled down together to form a community. No other island in the Caribbean has a population so recently established and at the same time so heterogeneous in character;

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yet the people of Trinidad, regardless of cultural or ethnic background, have common goals of mobility, seek the same opportunities and share a common loyalty to their new nation.

What does threaten stability in Trinidad is the swift rate of population increase. This is true in every Caribbean country with the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, where there is still land-room. In all other countries the population presses remorselessly against narrow limits of space and resources. At their present rate of increase the populations of Jamaica and of Barbados will double themselves in 25 and 33 years respectively; and already the population density in Barbados is of the order of 1,200 to the square mile, a figure that can be matched only in the suburban areas of most countries. Trinidad is better placed at present but her rate of increase is substantially higher than Jamaica's, and her 800,000 will become 1,600,000 in 25 years. With the exception of Puerto Rico, and to a lesser extent Trinidad, the economies of the islands are mainly agricultural. In general they are underdeveloped, with low capital intensity, relatively few skilled people, a relatively large number of unskilled laborers. The *jibaro* with his machete, the *paysan* scratching at his plot of land with a hoe, the sugar worker with his cutlass, are the characteristic figures on the Caribbean landscape. Shacks, cottages, estate houses hug the shoulders of the road that runs along the coast or into mountain valleys, and each year the number of people in them grows larger and the fertility of the land falls. In the islands agriculture can flourish only if some of the people now on the land are taken off it.

This is why political leaders in the Caribbean are preoccupied with economic development. Spurred by economic necessity, every territory (except Haiti) has achieved high rates of economic growth, but the population has grown faster. Puerto Rico led in both fields. Through its Fomento program Puerto Rico promoted and facilitated foreign investment and, with the advantage of being a part of the internal market of the United States, raised its national income above that of most Latin American countries. Also, New York and other cities of the industrial north provide a wide hatchway of escape and opportunity for its people. A Puerto Rican is born every seven minutes, but if need arises he can fly to the United States even before he learns to walk. Encouraged by Puerto Rico's success, Jamaica, under the leadership of Norman Manley, embarked on an ambitious program of development in

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the 1950s with the result that the annual rate of increase in per capita national income exceeded 10 percent. However, it was discouraging to find that very little employment was provided by industries developed through the Industrial Development Corporation. Between 1955 and 1960 not more than 5,000 jobs were created in factories, whereas the population increased by 30,000 a year. The pressure was reduced by the fact that during the same period Jamaica exported 70,000 people to the United Kingdom—an escape valve that has now been much tightened by recent British legislation.

III

West Indian leaders are not wasting too much time on beating white men about the head for their misdeeds and "colonialism." There is bitterness enough in their history but they find in their past better stuff from which to fashion their future: endurance, courage, the sustained capacity for common effort. But no island is a world, and already it is possible to discern new efforts at joint action within the group of islands that were members of the Federation of the West Indies. In the summer of 1962 a Common Services Conference was held in Port of Spain under the chairmanship of an Interim Commissioner appointed by the United Kingdom to perform the melancholy task of disposing of the assets of the dissolved Federation and of determining which of the common services should be continued. Very few of these common services were retained, but it was significant that all the governments, with the exception of British Guiana, agreed to continue supporting the University of the West Indies as a regional institution, and this decision received widespread public support. This conference was held at a period of disenchantment and frustration. Since then relations between Jamaica and Trinidad have been improved. The two countries have established diplomatic relations with each other, their diplomatic representatives overseas work closely together and steps are being taken to improve trade between the two islands.

Trinidad is more active than Jamaica in promoting contacts abroad because she has a market for her goods in many of the eastern islands as well as in Guiana and Surinam. Ships and schooners link the islands together, from distant Tortola and Anguilla to Trinidad; but the schooners keep to the north-south route and Jamaica remains a remote island, one indeed that is brought into the eastern group only by airplanes and air waves.

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The Governor-General of Jamaica, opening a new session of Parliament on April 8, referred to his Government's intention to foster good relations with the other islands, but the point was not developed. The fact is that as yet there is in Jamaica no more than a general interest in the rest of the Caribbean; but it would be surprising if some effort were not made toward closer relationships with British Honduras, which lies 600 miles or so to the west, is twice the size of Jamaica, has a population of under 100,000, and whose citrus and sugar industries have been developed with the help of Jamaican capital. Both countries could gain from carefully developed programs of technical assistance and trade.

Latin America has become of much more importance to Jamaica and Trinidad now that they are independent countries. One of their first acts was to seek membership in the Organization of American States. It is doubtful, however, whether the more restricted Caribbean Organization will win the support of either Trinidad or Jamaica. This body grew out of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission which was formed in 1942 to encourage and strengthen "social and economic coöperation between the United States of America and its possessions and bases in the area . . . and the United Kingdom and the British Colonies in the same area." Later the Dutch and French joined the organization which in 1946 became the Caribbean Commission. Recently it became the Caribbean Organization, with its headquarters in Puerto Rico. It has done much to further common understanding and develop programs requiring joint action, but its effectiveness is likely to be limited by the fact that it was founded by the wrong people, in the sense that it originated with the metropolitan powers and for a time was dominated by them.

A deeper feeling for the region and its people will come only when the writers, educators and intellectuals of the Caribbean play the part of pioneers, even of prophets, creating symbols of unity, discovering and giving expression to spiritual and cultural identity. The task has been outlined by Dr. Eric Williams:

> Let us suppose that with the stroke of a wand we could blot out the four and a half centuries of international rivalry for Caribbean Hegemony, and start with a clean slate. Let us suppose, finally, that the Caribbean were suddenly transformed into an area of fraternity. . . . Let us imagine, I say, all these miracles, and Caribbean coöperation would probably be no nearer realisation that it is today. For the two fundamental obstacles to its achievement would remain: the absence of a common body of knowledge, and the language barrier. . . . The development and organisation of this common body

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of knowledge of the Caribbean, based on the deliberate cultivation of the multilingual facility, is the great political desideratum and intellectual truth of the age and of the area.

These are challenging words. They open up a splendid opportunity for collaboration between the vigorous University of Puerto Rico and the rapidly expanding University of the West Indies. These two institutions have it in their power to develop joint programs of teaching and research. A start has been made in one or two branches of medical research but these small and tentative beginnings are as nothing in comparison with what might be undertaken through boldly conceived programs in Caribbean studies, the creative arts, and in some of the technological fields. At no time in Caribbean history has a greater opportunity been offered for these universities to become the burning glass of the region, focusing to intensity the aspirations and creative gifts of the scattered Caribbean people.

The seed bed is already there, in the haunting folk songs of Jamaica, the glittering calypsos and steel-band music of Trinidad, the Big Drum dance, the Calenda, the folk tales found in every island, the sparkling creole proverbs. These are common to the Caribbean, an immediate language understood by all, the natural expression of common experiences that underlie dissimilarities of Caribbean life. There is proof of this basic unity also at the level of self-conscious and deliberate art. In his illuminating study of "Race and Colour in Caribbean Literature," George R. Coulthard has pointed out that Caribbean culture as a whole has had a development very similar to that of continental Latin America: "We find for example that Haiti, which achieved independence before the Spanish-American colonies and was born into a different European cultural tradition, has an almost exactly parallel line of development." As for the West Indies, whose independence comes more than a century after that of Latin America, "their cultural process seems more and more to be assuming features typical of Latin America culture-localism. . . "

IV

The larger unity is to come. Its development will be influenced by the United States. One of the most striking features of Caribbean history in this century has been the growth of North American influence in the territories associated with European powers. These originated in the great movement of the Old World to dom-

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inate the New World and were left behind as isolated remnants when that movement receded. Power has shifted from those European nations, which embarked on the enterprise of the Indies, to the United States, which is now concerned with the enterprise of Europe.

In recent years the British Government has been most generous in its assistance to higher education, providing buildings and equipment for the University of the West Indies to the amount of some £7,000,000, and contributing millions of pounds through its Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for a wide range of programs in agriculture, education, public health and social services. United Kingdom universities, notably the University of London, have united to assist the University of the West Indies. Canada and the United States have provided aid in many ways. After long and sometimes difficult negotiations the Government of the United States has agreed with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to contribute $31,000,000 for certain development projects, over a period of four or five years, in return for the use of the naval base at Chaguaramas. The United Nations Special Fund and philanthropic foundations have assisted social and economic development with generous grants.

The first organized effort at social and economic development in the West Indies was made after poverty and discontent exploded in a series of riots in St. Kitts, Barbados, Trinidad and Jamaica in 1937–38. The United Kingdom established a Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, and appointed a comptroller and a group of advisers to assist the West Indian governments in establishing priorities and formulating long-term programs in agriculture, education, health, social work and labor education. The flow of ready money put new vigor into the economy, the careful study of local problems was a welcome change from earlier haphazard attempts to cure all troubles by the building of a road, and consultation on a regional basis led each community to discover that there were other islands in the Caribbean.

Local participation in planning and in making decisions became more essential after 1944, the point of no return in West Indian development. In that year Jamaica was given a new constitution which provided for adult suffrage and a fair measure of responsible government. The process was carried to its conclusion in 1962 when Jamaica and Trinidad became independent. As sovereign states they are no longer eligible for Colonial Development

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grants and the United Kingdom has emphasized in a rather heavy-handed way that economic independence is an essential concomitant of political independence. The thesis is open to question if the perspectives of history are substituted for the near-sighted view of present necessities.

The fact is that small independent nations such as Trinidad or Jamaica need help for a period of time in order that their economies may become self-sustaining. As independent countries they are seeking aid for economic and social development, and they turn in particular to the United States. They have based their claim not on poverty but on their record in development. One aspect of that record illustrates the complexity of international assistance. On the one hand the United States and Canada generally require that every possible use be made of their own trained people and of their own manufactured goods in every program for which they provide money. This is understandable; but it is also easy to understand why local architects, contractors or other professional men resent this condition.

In these circumstances it is not enough to dismiss the problem by saying that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Development begins in the mind, with a decision. This is the first essential step; the country which needs development must first seek it. That it why technical aid should not be exported; it should always be imported—brought in as a result of a decision already taken within the community. Trinidad and Jamaica have made their decision in favor of development. They have public servants of ability and honesty who can see that public funds are spent honestly for the public benefit. They seek a partnership in the development of their resources by which they will keep their independence while obtaining the aid they need.

Having achieved unity and independence, having demonstrated in the field of human relationships how differences of race and color can be used creatively, having mobilized their resources under their own leadership, three million people in what used to be called the British Caribbean have embarked upon their own Enterprise of the Indies, with no doubt in their minds about their own capacity, but with some questioning as to whether their efforts will win the support of nations whose help is essential to their development.

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THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By Ernest R. May

MUCH of what is said about the Alliance for Progress assumes that up to now Americans have been indifferent to Latin America; that, in so far as they have not, the results have been bad—that the record in Latin America is one in which neither our Government nor private interests can take pride; and that the Alliance therefore represents an entirely new departure. One of the most learned men of the New Frontier, former Harvard law professor Abram Chayes, now the State Department Legal Adviser, has said, for example, that the condition of Latin America today "is in some measure a consequence of our own neglect. For most of the 180 years of our history, we looked inward, or eastward across the ocean to Europe, or, latterly, around the world. Only rarely have we looked south and then not always with a benevolent eye."[1] While these generalizations are not baseless, neither are they unquestionably true, and they play enough part in current thinking to be worth some review.

To say that Americans have been indifferent to Latin America is accurate only in a foreshortened or unduly lengthened time perspective. If one takes the whole of American history, from Jamestown forward, one could make such a case. From the seventeenth century until the early nineteenth, North Americans paid little attention to Latin America. Ship captains sailed there, leaving Bibles, Protestant tracts, and, later, copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. A few founding fathers, such as Alexander Hamilton, thought of some day building a rival empire; a few other Americans played host to visitors like Francisco de Miranda who talked of setting Spanish colonies free; and when revolutions for independence actually came, some hailed them and proposed giving aid. Henry Clay, for example, spoke of spiritual links and the great destiny the two Americas could share by building together. But the Monroe Administration was distinctly cool. Engaged in negotiations with Spain about Spanish Florida and western boundaries, it did not even recognize the new régimes until there was danger that the British might do so first.

While the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was in part a restatement

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1962, p. 192.

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of the centuries-old "doctrine of two spheres," proclaiming the political system of the Americas "essentially different" from that of Europe, its emphasis was not on hemispheric solidarity but on United States interests. And the Government, when invited in 1824 to send delegates to an inter-American conference, responded cautiously. Though two men were sent, neither ever arrived: one died; the other stopped in Mexico. To Latin American proposals for mutual defense alliances, the State Department returned abrupt refusals. The policy of non-entanglement was applied to the Western Hemisphere as well as Europe.

The Mexican War, filibustering expeditions such as William Walker's in Nicaragua, and the Southerners' Ostend Manifesto, saying the United States should buy Cuba, were indications that some Americans took a lively interest in some parts of Latin America. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1870s that businessmen began seriously investigating trade and investment opportunities, nor until the late 1880s that the Government got behind them, with Secretary of State James G. Blaine calling a Pan American conference to discuss, among other things, steps for improving commerce.

From that time on, however, public documents and the press contained more and more about Latin America, and, after the middle of the 1890s, no one could any longer speak with accuracy of American indifference to the region.

Restating and reinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine, President Cleveland in 1895 stepped into a boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela, threatening war unless the British Government accepted arbitration. Within less than three years, the McKinley Administration intervened in a civil war in Cuba and fought Spain in order to make the island independent. The United States occupied Cuba until 1903, then withdrew, retaining a naval base at Guantanamo Bay and, by the Platt Amendment, a right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence [and] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."

Theodore Roosevelt acquired the strip through Panama where $400,000,000 was spent in cutting an inter-oceanic canal. In 1904 he proclaimed it a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine that, by denying European states the right to act against American republics, the United States necessarily took upon itself the responsibility and duty of ensuring that those republics lived up to international

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obligations—of serving, in other words, as policeman for the Hemisphere. Although the decade 1895–1905 was also the period of the Boxer uprising and the Open Door notes, Latin America held and kept the center stage.

And this remained true. Headlines went to such events as Roosevelt's mediation between Russia and Japan, the Algeciras conference, and the round-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet, but the Government and public gave more attention, cumulatively, to the Pan American conference of 1906, Secretary of State Elihu Root's hemispherical good-will tour, the State Department's efforts to promote a Central American federation, and a three-year reoccupation of Cuba, carried out under the Platt Amendment. During the Taft Administration, Nicaraguan, Honduran and Mexican affairs overshadowed all else, and during the Wilson Administration the problems of Haiti and Santo Domingo, where temporary protectorates were established, and Mexico, where tensions persisted for nearly four years, took second place only to the gravest crises rising out of World War I.

After the war and the rejection of the League by the Senate, Latin America regained its previous prominence. In the twenties nothing in American diplomacy took more time and effort than ending occupation régimes in the Caribbean and straightening out the Mexican tangle. In these years, when, as Coolidge said, the chief business of America was business, the relative importance of Latin America was reflected in the fact that it accounted for more direct dollar investment than any other area—$3.5 billion as compared with $1.35 billion in Western Europe.

The thirties saw even more intensified concentration on the Western Hemisphere. The Good Neighbor Policy came at a time when the Government was otherwise conspicuously inactive in world affairs. In this heyday of isolationism, everyone from the President down talked of isolating not just the United States but the whole Hemisphere. Roosevelt said at the beginning of his administration, "among the foreign relations of the United States as they fall into categories, the Pan American policy takes first place. . . .," and this remained true until after World War II began.

The position held by Latin America is perhaps best illustrated by the history of the Standing Liaison Committee. There being then no organization comparable to the National Security Council, diplomacy and military planning were coördinated only by the

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President. The Liaison Committee was set up in April 1938, so that high State, War and Navy representatives could exchange information and opinions. It held approximately a hundred sessions, mostly in 1939 and 1940, and, at all but half a dozen, questions concerning Latin America received top priority. The existence of German communities in Latin America, the operation of German-owned airlines, activities by German agents and the Nazi and Fascist sympathies of Latin political leaders appeared to worry men concerned with United States security more than anything happening in Europe or Asia, prior to the fall of France. Until some time after that event the principal war plans of the armed services remained Rainbow One and Rainbow Four, looking to defensive fighting in the Western Hemisphere; Rainbow Five, assuming the dispatch of forces to Europe if the United States were drawn into the war, was not accepted by the Chiefs of Staff until the late summer of 1940.

The Second World War, like the first, again pulled American attention to other parts of the globe. Although all but one of the Latin American states became allies, their efforts went almost unnoticed. Hardly anyone in the United States was aware, for example, that a Brazilian division fought in Italy or that Mexican air units helped in the recapture of the Philippines. In 1945 and 1946 Latin America made a momentary comeback, but its affairs were soon eclipsed by the growing tensions in Europe and the Far East, and from 1947 on they won relatively little attention. The only events drawing much notice were those that could be seen in the context of the extra-hemispheric struggle with the Sino-Soviet bloc—the *Bogotazo* of 1948, the Guatemalan coup of 1954, the stoning of such American dignitaries as Vice President Nixon, and the Communist take-over in Cuba.

Between 1947 and 1960 neither the Government nor the press paid as much regard to Latin America as in the past. Indeed, for a time just before 1960 a reader of the State Department *Bulletin* or *The New York Times* might well have felt it the last region of American concern, trailing not only Europe and East Asia but Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Central Africa. Other indices might have modified this impression. Between 1947 and 1960 U.S. trade with Latin America rose 20 percent and direct investment doubled. Even though not on the front line of the cold war, Latin America received military and technical assistance amounting to something like $100,000,000 a year; legislation for

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aid to other areas sometimes specified that products be bought in Latin America; and, as Francis Wilcox, former staff chief for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said, "the Latin American segment of our foreign aid programs was far more popular than any other part.... Often Senators and Congressmen actively interested in reducing the amount of aid going to Europe, Asia, and Africa would take the lead in supporting amendments designed to increase our assistance to the other Americas."[2] Latin America was not forgotten.

Whether one judges Americans to have been indifferent depends on perspective. Looking at the last three quarters of a century, one has to say that the Government and people of the United States have shown more concern about Latin America than any other part of the world. Only of earlier times or of the last two decades or so can one speak accurately of neglect and then only of comparative neglect.

II

Actually, the question of past indifference is hard to separate from the question of how good or how bad has been the American record in Latin America. To recapitulate the signs of past interest is to call to mind what writings on the "Yankee peril" invariably cite—the Mexican and Spanish wars, the Platt Amendment, Panama, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua and Guatemala. It is also to be remembered that American companies have been charged with dominating Latin American countries and influencing the American Government to support dictators. Both Latin and North Americans are prone to say of the United States, as Gladstone said of Austria-Hungary, that one can point to no place on the map and declare, There the nation did good.

But blanket criticism takes too little account of the intentions of statesmen and the accomplishments of business. The intervention in Cuba in 1898 clearly sprang from humanitarianism. Perhaps the yellow press exaggerated the suffering caused by the prolonged struggle between Spain and the rebels; perhaps people needed some such excitement because of their own inner anxieties; nevertheless, their impulse was to aid the afflicted. The President and his principal advisers did not think that intervention was in the national interest; the large majority of businessmen believed

[2] Foreword to John C. Dreier (ed.), "The Alliance for Progress: Problems and Perspectives." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, p. v.

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war with Spain would hurt the economy. It was a rampant public opinion that forced intervention.

With intervention came responsibility for seeing to it that Cuba was left with orderly government, with transportation lines, industries and schools restored, with disease controlled and the risks of famine reduced. The passage of the Platt Amendment was not, of course, a pure act of altruism. The Navy wanted a harbor; American property-owners and investors wanted some security; the Government wanted to be sure that Cuba would never become a base for a foreign power. But there were altruistic elements in it. Under General Leonard Wood, the three-year occupation accomplished wonders. Elihu Root, who was the amendment's principal author, felt that Americans owed it to Cubans as well as to themselves to see that what had been accomplished in the island was not wasted. "It would have been a poor boon to Cuba," he wrote, "to drive the Spaniards out and leave her to care for herself, with two-thirds of her people unable to read and write, and wholly ignorant of the art of self-government. . . . Instead of that, we are trying to give the Cuban people just as fair and favorable a start in governing themselves as possible. . . ."[8]

Roosevelt's taking of Panama had behind it concern for American security and trade, and his method indicated little respect for Latin American sensibilities. Colombia, which then held sovereignty over the isthmus, refused to ratify a treaty ceding a canal zone to the United States. When Panamanian separatists revolted, Roosevelt interposed U.S. forces to prevent Colombia from acting, recognized Panama's independence after a delay of only 76 minutes, and obtained from it the canal rights that he wanted. While his moves had some color of legality, they were morally indefensible, and a subsequent administration, even though of Roosevelt's own party, admitted as much by paying $25,000,000 in conscience-money to Colombia.

Yet even the taking of Panama had more than one motive, and not all were selfish. Roosevelt's anger against the Colombian Government was partly due to a feeling that it was angling for more money and, in doing so, holding up a work important to itself and to the world as well as to the United States. In a private and presumably candid letter to his friend, Cecil Spring-Rice, Roosevelt expressed incomprehension of Colombia's shortsightedness. The treaty they rejected would, he said, "have given them a sta-

[8] Philip C. Jessup, "Elihu Root." New York: Dodd, 1938, v. 1, p. 288.

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bility and power such as no other Spanish-American republic possessed between Mexico and Chile," and his own estimate of his actions was that they had been "both wise and right."[4]

While Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine grew from concern over United States security, behind it also was the idea that the nation had certain obligations to Latin America. The occasion was the signing of a convention by which the United States was to administer the finances of the Dominican Republic. Roosevelt explained to Congress: "Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful and friendly nation. This aid we are able . . . to bestow. She has asked for this aid, and the expressions of friendship repeatedly sanctioned by the people and government of the United States warrant her in believing that it will not be withheld. . . ." Elsewhere he spoke of an "international duty" being "necessarily involved in the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine."

When in 1906 he invoked the Platt Amendment and sent in troops to re-occupy Cuba, he did so reluctantly, and when he arranged for their withdrawal he wrote Root: "We must try to make [the Cubans] understand that our purpose is not to interfere with the design of limiting their independence, but to interfere so as to enable them to retain their independence . . . to help them so manage their affairs that there won't be the slightest need of further interference on our part."[5] While he never lost sight of strategic interests and did not, for example, invoke his corollary outside the Caribbean region, he clearly felt that what he did benefited Latin America and answered to some moral obligation that lay upon his country.

In his successors this concept of moral obligation acquired even more importance. While the "dollar diplomacy" of the Taft Administration was long interpreted as diplomacy backing up American investors, historians now generally agree that it was not that at all. On the contrary, Taft and his Secretary of State sought to induce investors to put money abroad in places where, in their opinion, such investment would serve the broader interests of the nation. They urged New York bankers to go into Nicaragua and Honduras in order to prevent British lenders from doing so. In Nicaragua they eventually used warships and Marines, not to protect American investments, but to ensure a degree of political stability that would encourage them. In the long run, of course,

[4] Elting E. Morison *et al.* (eds.), "The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951–54, v. 3, p. 651.

[5] *Ibid.*, v. 6, p. 1138.

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they expected to build up markets for American goods, and the source of their concern about Nicaragua and Honduras was the Panama Canal. Nevertheless, one cannot read their public statements without being impressed by the stress they put on other objectives. "If the American dollar can aid suffering humanity and lift the burden of financial difficulty from states with which we live on terms of intimate intercourse and earnest friendship. . . ," wrote Secretary of State Philander Knox, "all I can say is that it would be hard to find better employment." The Monroe Doctrine, Knox said, obliged the United States to "respond to the needs still felt by some few of our Latin American neighbors in their progress toward good government, by assisting them to meet their just obligations and to keep out of trouble."[6] He and Taft plainly thought "dollar diplomacy" a means of contributing to the political and economic uplift of nations to which the United States had peculiar obligations.

In Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy the moral component was still greater. He withheld recognition from Victoriano Huerta's government in Mexico. On a trifling pretext—the refusal of a Mexican colonel to render a 21-gun salute to the American flag—he seized the port of Vera Cruz. From 1913 until well into 1917 his intervention in Mexican politics was assiduous and continuous. Yet there is no doubt whatever that his primary object was, according to his lights, to help Mexico. Huerta had come to power by violence, aided, probably, by foreign interests, and Wilson wished to unseat him. To a friend with whom he had no reason to be anything but frank, he said in 1916 that "his Mexican policy was based . . . upon his belief in the principle laid down in the Virginia Bill of Rights, that a people has the right 'to do as they damn please about their own affairs'. . . . He wanted to give the Mexicans a chance to try." Walter Hines Page, his Ambassador in London, put the policy even more simply when talking with Sir Edward Grey:

"Suppose you have to intervene, what then?" Grey asked.
"Make 'em vote and live by their decisions."
"But suppose they will not so live?"
"We'll go in again and make 'em vote again."
"And keep this up 200 years?"
"Yes. . . . The United States will be here 200 years and it can

[6] Henry F. Pringle, "The Life and Times of William Howard Taft." New York: Farrar, 1939, v. 2, p. 678–79.

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continue to shoot men for that little space till they learn to vote and to rule themselves."[7]

Wilson's motives for taking over Haiti and Santo Domingo were less clear. In both cases some influence was exerted by financiers who stood to lose substantially from the near anarchy that had developed. In both cases, however, conditions did so nearly approximate anarchy that, as Wilson said to Congress about Santo Domingo, intervention seemed "the least of the evils in sight." His declared objective was "the establishment of a government that will provide peace, individual guarantees, and opportunity for development, without which no true prosperity can come."

The 1920s saw a gradual shift away from the Roosevelt corollary. The reasons were realistic ones. Interventions were expensive and onerous; they did not make the United States popular in Latin America and, indeed, might be harming trade; and they aroused criticism at home. But once a new policy had been formed it was defended to Congress by President Hoover as a "true expression of the moral rectitude of the United States."

President Franklin Roosevelt characterized his Good Neighbor Policy as "based on an honest and sincere desire, first, to remove from [Latin American] minds all fear of American aggression—territorial or financial—and, second, to take them into a kind of hemispheric partnership in which no Republic would obtain undue advantage."[8] These same ideals were not only reaffirmed by Truman and, under the label, "Good Partner Policy," by Eisenhower, but were even invoked to explain deviation from strict non-interventionism (reminding one of Talleyrand's remark that non-intervention is intervention under another name). The Blue Book of 1946 was justified as disclosing to the other American republics the conditions which had caused the United States "embarrassment and concern so that it would be clear that the United States was acting in defense and not in derogation of the principles of the inter-American system." Secretary Dulles represented the Arbenz régime of Guatemala as "a danger to all the American states . . . not just a question between Guatemala and the United States." Similarly, with regard to Cuba, both the Ei-

[7] Ray Stannard Baker, "Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters." New York: Doubleday, 1927–1939, v. 6, p. 74; Burton J. Hendrick, "The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page." New York: Doubleday, 1922–26, v. 1, p. 188.

[8] Bryce Wood, "The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy." New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 130–31.

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senhower and Kennedy Administrations took the position that they were not intervening but upholding the principle of non-intervention.

A good deal of what American statesmen have said, even in private, may have been cant. Policy decisions are seldom prompted by purely altruistic considerations, and, in any given case, historians can always locate evidence that concern for security or economic advantage played a part. Even Wilson's nonrecognition of Huerta was so influenced, for Huerta was linked with one group of oil men, mainly English, and opposed by another group, mainly American. While the closest students of Wilson's diplomacy feel that this business rivalry had only minor influence on him, he was at least aware of it.

What is important, however, is not the number of considerations that entered into American policy but the fact that, for at least the last 70 years, one among them has been concern for the welfare of Latin Americans. Since the Mexican War, the United States has not deliberately, for its own benefit, done harm to any American nation. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, it has not in the last century treated any part of the Hemisphere as an area simply for exploitation. In Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua, American occupation authorities were under orders not to allow long-term concessions to Americans. Financial conventions and petroleum agreements contained safeguards for the Latin American signatories, inserted, more often than not, at the insistence of the American negotiators. There have, of course, been diplomats concerned about nothing but the profits of American companies, and there have been times when the State Department paid little or no heed to the interests of Latin Americans. On the whole, however, the American Government has been mindful of these interests and has acted in what it thought to be a spirit of benevolence and even, on occasion, of self-sacrifice.

The reason why this is so easily forgotten is, in the first place, that the underlying attitudes are now out of date and, in the second place, that this benevolence was largely ineffectual, at least over the long term. American statesmen, from Blaine to Hoover and perhaps beyond, looked upon Latin Americans with contempt or at least condescension. Conceiving themselves bearers of "the white man's burden," they assumed that they were able to decide what was best. Such an assumption provoked resentment even in the Philippines where outright colonial rule brought significant

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economic, social and political progress. In the Western Hemisphere it provoked even more outrage, for there the results of American efforts to promote prosperity and democracy were the Cuba of Machado, Batista and Castro; the Dominican Republic of Trujillo; the Nicaragua of the Somozas; and Haiti. With some justice, it can be said of the United States Government that there is no place on the map of the Hemisphere where one can point and say, There it did good. On the other hand, one can point to a number of places and say, There it *meant* to do good, but failed.

This applies, of course, only to the Government. American business activity in Latin America has not characteristically been benevolent in motive. The great oil, mining, fruit and shipping companies have been out to make money, and, just as in the United States before the advent of government regulation, they have crushed competition, corrupted politicians and committed such crimes as legal persons can. Paying more attention in recent years to public relations, they have begun to advertise the fact that many pay wages above the average, have worker welfare programs better than those even in most state-owned enterprises and offer education and training to recruit local nationals into both technical and managerial posts. United Fruit is disposing of its plantations, making generous loans so that its workmen can buy land and contracting to buy their produce. Creole Petroleum pioneered in arranging to split its profits with the Venezuelan Government. Originally to be a 50–50 division, it has since become more nearly 30–70, with Venezuela getting the larger share. But such measures have been calculated either to up production or forestall nationalization and have been justified to stockholders in those terms.

When we look at what corporations have done, we see nevertheless that they have put up docks and warehouses, railroads, airfields, telephone and telegraph lines, power stations, oil wells, mines, mills, factories, automobile and machine-tool dealerships and even Sears Roebuck department stores. They have cleared jungles, put in roads, broken up pastoral societies, and generated envy of and desire for the products of industry. In some instances, just by being rich and powerful and foreign, they have aroused the sense of "they" and "we" fundamental to national self-consciousness and lacking in so much of the artificial nationalism of Latin America. Whatever the undesirable by-products, it is probably fair to say that without these companies Latin America

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would not be what it is today and, economically if not politically, might be much more nearly in the condition of Africa—undeveloped rather than underdeveloped. In appraising the American record in Latin America, one ought to judge by either intentions or results. If by the one, the Government comes off well; if by the other, business does.

The general impression that the whole record is bad may grow from belief that good works depend on good intentions and vice versa. It may also rise, however, from the fact that we lack any frame of reference for judgment. The greater approval commanded by our performance in the Philippines is due not only to statistical evidence but to the fact that it shines by comparison with the performances of other colonial powers. The relation of the United States to Latin America, on the other hand, has not been that of ruler to ruled. Not only have all the republics of the Hemisphere remained technically sovereign, but, except for brief periods of military occupation, all have retained full control of the administration of justice, taxation, education, defense—in short, of all functions that, in colonies, are seldom entrusted to natives. Yet some of these republics have been in actuality a good deal less independent than a nation in the French Community or, certainly, a Dominion in the British Commonwealth, for in the Caribbean area the United States long stood ready to use Marines; there and elsewhere its economic position has been substantially that of a colonial mother country; and even now, as Guatemala and Cuba have shown, it claims certain tutelary rights. The only comparable system is the Soviet bloc, but, even there, points of similarity are fewer than points of contrast, and in any case little satisfaction can be derived from a conclusion that our record in Latin America is better than the Soviet Union's in Eastern Europe. Lacking comparative examples, we judge interrelationships among American states against some set of ideals, to which, of course, they will not measure up.

While we are able to answer such reproaches as we hear from Filipinos, we have no intellectual defense against Latin American criticism and therefore accept most of it as justifiable. In actuality, a great deal of this criticism has its roots in emotions rather than in the realities of inter-American relations. Much of it was uttered well before most of the episodes usually cited to explain Yankeephobia. A great outburst came around the turn of the century, before Panama and the Roosevelt corollary, and the

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leaders in the attack were mostly from countries then outside the U.S. orbit. José Enrique Rodó, whose *Ariel* is the most often quoted of such works, was an Uruguayan; Manuel Ugarte, whose writings are almost equally well known, was an Argentinian. By the end of Theodore Roosevelt's Administration, indictments were issuing from Mexicans such as José Vasconcelos and Carlos Pereyra, and from the Nicaraguan, Rubén Darío, and the Venezuelan, Rufino Blanco Fombona. An equal number, however, were coming from writers in lands still beyond the American touch. One thinks of the younger Argentinian, José Ingenieros, and the Peruvians, Francisco García Calderón and José Carlos Mariátegui. Actions by American officials and businessmen undoubtedly helped to keep anti-American feeling alive and give it vigor, but they did not necessarily cause it.

Although some severe criticism of the United States came as a result of the Mexican War, it did not last long. Indeed, in 1848, the year when the war ended and the United States annexed the territories that became New Mexico, Arizona and California, the foreign minister of Colombia (then New Granada) proposed to the other Latin American republics a concerted effort "to establish and maintain very meaningful relations with . . . Washington," the object being to benefit from "the inestimable treasures of experience and completely democratic civilization which the Anglo-American Union has within it."[9] The conception of the United States as Caliban, menacing the political, moral and intellectual integrity of Latin America, came later, at about the time when the United States began to be recognized in Europe as a great power, and what was said by Rodó and others bore striking resemblance to what had been said earlier about Britain, when she had been the mistress of the trade lanes and the symbol among nations of strength, wealth and arrogance.

Thereafter, criticism abated only during the 1930s. While this may have been due to the Good Neighbor Policy, it may equally have been due to the Great Depression and the fact that the United States seemed temporarily an object for pity. Events have undeniably promoted ill feeling. Nevertheless, it is probably true, at least to some extent, that Latin American criticism of the United States is independent of what happens or has happened and arises simply from discrepancies in wealth and power

[9] Robert N. Burr and Roland D. Hussey (eds.), "Documents on Inter-American Cooperation." Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955, v. 1, p. 99.

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and from cultural conflicts that are inevitable between peoples who speak different languages and have different historical traditions. While it cannot be ignored or wholly discounted, neither ought it to be taken at face value. The fact is that, since there are really no standards for objective judgment, the American record in Latin America cannot be pronounced good or bad. As much can be said on the one side as on the other. There is simply no hard basis for the common assumption that it has been shameful.

III

This brings us to the question of whether the Alliance for Progress is something new and different. Looked at only in the context of the years after World War II, it certainly seems so. Both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations were cool toward suggestions of a Marshall Plan for the Hemisphere and insisted that nearly all of Latin America's needs could be met by private capital or loans from existing agencies. Not until 1959 did the United States agree to the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. Not until 1960 did President Eisenhower propose a $500,000,000 appropriation for a special social development fund. From these meager beginnings it seems a long step to President Kennedy's call for "a vast coöperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy . . . basic needs . . . for homes, work and land, health and schools," the ten-year program outlined in the Charter of Punta del Este, and Secretary Dillon's pledge of a U.S. contribution on the order of $1 billion a year. This seems a reversal, a new start, a change, as Ambassador John Dreier has written, "of tidal character."

But if one sets the Alliance in the context not just of the last decade and a half but of the 140 years of inter-American relations, it seems less startlingly new. From Blaine's time on, American statesmen were interested in Latin America's economic progress. When attending the Rio Conference in 1906, Secretary Root declared: "We wish to increase our prosperity, to extend our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, [and] . . . our conception of the true way to accomplish this is . . . to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together." Speaking at a Pan American financial conference in 1915, Wilson said that to promote one another's prosperity, the two halves of the Hemi-

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sphere needed more ships in which to exchange their goods, more vehicles and better routes of trade, and, he added, "I am perfectly clear in my judgment that if private capital cannot soon enter upon the adventure of establishing these physical means of communication, the government must undertake to do so." In 1931, after speaking similarly of economic interdependence, President Hoover remarked almost apologetically that Americans "hold to the theory that commercial enterprise, except as a rare emergency action, is essentially a private undertaking, and that the sole function of government is to bring about a condition of affairs favorable to the beneficial development of private enterprise. It is the failure to comprehend this conception. . . ," he went on, "that sometimes leads the thoughtless to assume the existence of an international indifference which does not in fact exist."[10] When talking of future developments under the Good Neighbor Policy, President Roosevelt came even closer to saying what the Kennedy Administration has said about economic aspects of the Alliance for Progress.

What is different about the Alliance in these respects is simply its magnitude and the assumption, founded on recent experience, that the United States Government can make funds available for a variety of purposes—not just for the improvement of ports, highways and air facilities or for hemispheric defense.

The emphasis in the Alliance, of course, is less on economic than on social progress. But even here there are at least echoes from earlier decades, for one professed aim of Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and the Presidents of the 1920s was that Latin America should become more democratic, and even Coolidge acknowledged that this involved raising the "economic power of the masses of the people." Henry L. Stimson, after supervising the Coolidge Administration's intervention in Nicaragua, came back and wrote a book about his experiences. In it he summarized Nicaragua's problems:

> Her industries and manufacturies are undeveloped; her artisan population is scanty; there is almost no middle class between the cultivated leaders of politics and the ignorant peons or peasants; though she is preëminently an agricultural country, even her agricultural methods are primitive and obsolete. . . .
>
> . . . Nicaragua to-day lacks one of the principal foundations for a democratic government in that she has no well-developed middle class of artisans

[10] William S. Myers (ed.), "The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover." New York: Doubleday, 1934, v. 2. p. 8–9.

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and workers from whose influence and out of whose problems come the usual activities of democracy.

Such a middle class cannot come into existence until the industries of the country are developed. These industries cannot be developed without capital, and capital can be obtained only by foreign loans coupled with a reform of their fiscal system, including particularly their system of taxation.[11]

While Stimson did not mention land reform or speak of taxation as a means of redistributing income, he clearly had in mind social change such as that called for in the Alliance for Progress, and his contention was that the United States should help to bring it about.

There is a continuity in American policy. In one form or another, one can trace back at least 80 years the idea that the United States owes it to itself and to Latin America, as the Punta del Este Charter puts it, to "accelerate economic and social development, thus rapidly bringing about a substantial and steady increase in the average income in order to narrow the gap between the standard of living in Latin American countries and that enjoyed in the industrialized countries." One can also trace back at least to the first Roosevelt what Secretary Rusk described in his Johns Hopkins lecture of 1962 as the second part of the Kennedy Administration's "grand design" for the Hemisphere—"the building of free, politically stable, and independent nations."[12]

Even the dilemmas go back into the distant past. When trying to promote prosperity and political stability in the Hemisphere, the United States Government did arouse Latin American fears. Yet when the United States renounced intervention in the Good Neighbor Policy, it also renounced the use of influence for goals it thought desirable. The new policy precluded pressure on such régimes as those of Batista, Trujillo, Somoza, Pérez Jiménez, Rojas Pinilla and Odría, and by the end of the 1950s Latin Americans were condemning the United States for its failure to combat feudalism and dictatorship.

In the Alliance for Progress, the American Government faces the choice on the one hand of stirring nationalist resentment and, on the other, of tolerating or ignoring conditions which it is the object of the Alliance to change. By making the utmost use of the O.A.S., the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, and the council of "wise men" created by the Punta del Este Charter, the Admini-

[11] Henry L. Stimson, "American Policy in Nicaragua." New York: Scribner, 1927, p. 121–3.
[12] Department of State *Bulletin*, May 14, 1962, p. 788.

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stration seeks to evade this choice. But political parties in Latin countries have already begun to make issues either of the fact that conditions attach to U.S. aid or the fact that aid has been given without fulfillment of the reforms listed in the Charter.

The aims of the United States in the Alliance for Progress are traditional, and so are the dilemmas. Yet the Alliance is not just an upswing in a recurring cycle. Even if one looks at it with a long perspective, there are respects in which it may actually mark "a change of tidal character." The change, if it comes, will not, however, be America's but Latin America's.

In the Charter of Punta del Este, what is striking is not that the United States promises coöperation. This promise has been made before. Nor is it, to a historian, the pledge of Latin American states to pursue economic and social reforms. Land reform, tax reform, expanded education, improved public health facilities, better utilization of resources, integration of Indian populations and all the rest have been the professed goals of many presidential candidates in Latin America. Though many of these have taken office, not much has been accomplished, and whether the Charter, abetted by the carrot-and-stick of U.S. aid, will change this or not remains to be seen.

What impresses a historian most about the Charter is that Latin American governments there speak of coöperating with one another. In the past, while each Latin American state has had its link with the United States, few have had links with one another. They have not even had many rivalries; despite the violence of their internal changes, they have seldom fought one another. Although both politicians and intellectuals make use of Bolivarean language about the spiritual unity of the Americas, they have not in the past talked of governments working together for positive ends. Raul Prebisch and his disciples in ECLA were almost the first to make such a suggestion. The Caracas meeting of 1954 was the first inter-American conference at which it was broached. By 1958, accords had been signed for a Central American free trade area, and President Kubitschek of Brazil proposed "Operation Pan America," the forerunner of the Alliance for Progress. The Charter is, however, the first expression of the ideal of coöperation subscribed to by all Latin American governments.

Whether all these governments will actually work together is, of course, problematical. It is more realistic, however, to expect this than to expect far-reaching internal reforms, for the imme-

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diate advantages to the people who wield power in Latin America lie in increased trade rather than land redistribution or higher income taxes. In the Charter itself, Title III and Title IV, "Economic Integration of Latin America" and "Basic Export Commodities," have less pie-in-the-sky eloquence in them than any other sections except Chaper IV of Title II, which, in precise words and not in the subjunctive mood, sets forth what the United States is to contribute. In presenting the Charter to President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk spoke of "the overriding importance of economic integration," and he and Secretary Dillon and some of the wise men have on other occasions emphasized this priority.

Even for this goal, the role of U.S. assistance is not, of course, a negligible one. The difficulties of economic coöperation, even among highly developed states, are evident in the recent history of Europe. In Latin America they are magnified many times by backwardness, lopsided development, rapid population growth and other factors. Outside sums much larger than those thus far discussed may well prove necessary to permit even modest steps forward. And if the United States turns out this time to be thoroughly in earnest in its benevolent aims, major sacrifices may be called for, particularly in the subsidization of imports and the opening of the domestic market to competing Latin American products. To achieve economic integration in Latin America, let alone the peaceful social revolution of which the rest of the Charter speaks, will be an immense undertaking.

And, though economic integration may seem a less glamorous goal than social revolution, it is in itself almost a grandiose concept. If the Charter of Punta del Este proves to be more than splendid rhetoric, it augurs a time when all Latin American nations will have given up to one another some of that sovereignty they have so far jealously treasured, when they will play coöperative and competitive roles in a common market, when there will be inter-American institutions insuring and protecting the flow of capital and credit, when, in short, their economies will be joined to one another at least as closely as will be those of nations in the new Europe and perhaps as closely as are the states of the North American Union. Ortega y Gasset commented in "Invertebrate Spain" that the Hispanic nations have shared a past but not a future. The Alliance offers Spanish and Portuguese America, and perhaps also English-speaking America, a dazzling future.

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One of the most penetrating and original thinkers of our time here deals with the phenomenon of revolution—its meaning, and the vicissitudes of the revolutionary tradition. An important contribution.

TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By MARGRET BOVERI. New York: Putnam, 1963, 370 p. $5.95.

A translation of an important study of twentieth-century treason, collaboration, underground resistance and espionage (the German original, "Die Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert," noted here January 1961).

CROWDS AND POWER. By ELIAS CANETTI. New York: Viking, 1962, 495 p. $7.50.

This is an erratic and oddly organized book, displaying a great range of interests and reading, and much coffee house speculation, but none the less containing some quite stimulating insights into the nature of crowds, their behavior and symbols.

MAN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. By CHARLES MALIK. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 242 p. $5.00.

In a mixture of philosophical reflection and political reminiscence the former Foreign Minister of Lebanon and former President of the U.N. General Assembly discusses some of the major themes of our time: the problem of peace, the role of the U.N., the Cold War and the challenge of Communism.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1962. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 429 p. $6.95.

This well-proportioned volume offers a concise, analytical record of American for-

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eign policy developments in the critical year of the Cuban missile crisis and the Trade Expansion Act. Its comprehensive coverage and full documentation rank it with the best in this series.

THE TWISTED IMAGE. By Arthur Goodfriend. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 264 p. $5.95.

As the title vaguely suggests, this book deals with what Vice President Johnson has called "America's failure to put across to millions of people overseas its desires and real objectives." It is based chiefly on the author's experiences as Public Affairs Officer with U.S.I.A. in India.

THE PERMANENT CRISIS. By Kurt London. New York: Walker, 1962, 328 p. $6.00.

It is the author's thesis that the far-reaching political and technological changes of recent decades have not been matched by corresponding changes in diplomatic habits and practices: "Old-fashioned nationalism and power politics are no longer the nub of political reasoning." He is particularly concerned, in this context, with the goals and methods of Communism.

PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE. By Fatma Mansur. New York: Humanities Press, 1962, 192 p. $5.00.

A Turkish sociologist makes a comparative study of the stages by which independence is achieved and of the groups which lead the movement at each stage. The countries selected for investigation are India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ghana and Nigeria.

PEACE THEORY: PRECONDITIONS OF DISARMAMENT. By John W. Burton. New York: Knopf, 1962, 200 p. $5.50.

The author's purpose is to provide a theory of international relations, and more particularly a "pattern of a stable condition of peace" which might facilitate a feasible approach to disarmament.

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. By C. A. W. Manning. New York: Wiley, 1962, 220 p. $5.00.

In what he calls an essay in meta-diplomatics for beginners, the author, professor of international relations in the University of London, grapples, in an original and sprightly fashion, with a number of troublesome and ambiguous concepts of international relations and diplomacy.

LAW AND ORGANIZATION IN WORLD SOCIETY. By Kenneth S. Carlston. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962, 356 p. $6.50.

Taking off from the particular question of the impact of nationalization on concession agreements, the author extends his inquiry to a more general consideration of the premises of international order and organization.

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Joseph Frankel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 231 p. $5.60.

This addition to the studies of "decision-making" lies somewhere between traditional approaches and the efforts to provide a theoretical scheme. In the author's words, "It is an attempt to interpret international politics in terms of decision-making but in a non-technical manner and with a minimum of special terminology."

THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS. By William H. Riker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 300 p. $6.00.

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Feeling that the traditional methods of political science have wound up in a cul-de-sac, the author, leaving the angels behind, undertakes "to construct, with the help of an existing general theory of coalitions (the theory of *n*-person games), a theory of coalitions that will be useful in studying politics."

SUBVERSION OF THE INNOCENTS: PATTERNS OF COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ASIA. By Dan Kurzman. New York: Random House, 1963, 570 p. $6.95.

A combination of good journalism and assiduous pursuit of facts and figures, this panorama of many countries gives a broad and generally accurate picture of the scope of Soviet and Chinese efforts and of the local factors which facilitate or hinder their success.

THE THIRD WORLD: THE UNALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD REVOLUTION. By Mario Rossi. New York: Funk, 1963, 209 p. $4.00.

A study, based largely on interviews, of the attitude of the leaders of the unaligned countries to the international situation, the Cold War and the U.N.

COMMUNITY AND CONTENTION: BRITAIN AND AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Bruce M. Russett. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 252 p. $7.00.

A rather theoretically oriented analysis of the factors determining the relations between Britain and the United States in the present century.

THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY, 1914–1945. By Lionel Kochan. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1963, 150 p. $3.95. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 21/.)

A brief but illuminating essay on the tug of war between Russia and the Western powers for the allegiance of Germany over the last half century. This contest in its various forms and outcomes is certainly a central strand of twentieth-century history.

IL PATTO D'ACCIAIO. By Vinicio Araldi. Rome: Vito Bianco, 1962, 340 p. L. 2000.

A brief study of Italian-German relations under Hitler and Mussolini.

DER VERTRAG VON VERSAILLES IN LICHT UND SCHATTEN DER KRITIK. By Erich Wüest. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1962, 277 p. Swiss Fr. 14.50.

A review of the controversy that raged about the Versailles Treaty and especially about its real or imagined economic consequences.

ALLIANCE AGAINST HITLER. By William Evans Scott. Durham: Duke University Press, 1962, 296 p. $7.50.

A good monograph on the background and origins of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance of May 2, 1935.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1956–1958. By G. Barraclough. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 618 p. $14.40.

This volume in the important Chatham House series covers the climactic years of the Suez and Hungarian crises and the advent of sputnik.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.

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BY MERTON J. PECK AND FREDERIC M. SCHERER. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1962, 736 p. $10.00.

This quite important study deals with the peculiar nonmarket character of the weapons-acquisition process, the special dynamism of the weapons industry, and the complex execution of weapons programs. Subsequent volumes will treat administrative and policy questions.

CONFLICT IN SPACE. BY M. N. GOLOVINE. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962, 146 p. $4.50.

An effort, not always persuasive, to foresee the nature of warfare and strategy in outer space.

LES MUTATIONS DE LA GUERRE MODERNE, DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE À LA RÉVOLUTION NUCLÉAIRE. BY JEAN PERRÉ. Paris: Payot, 1962, 419 p. Fr. 25.

A historical survey of the changes in the art of war since the French Revolution.

MILITARY STRATEGY: SOVIET DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS. EDITED BY MARSHAL V. D. SOKOLOVSKY. New York: Praeger, 1963, 396 p. $6.50.
SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY. EDITED BY MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION V. D. SOKOLOVSKII. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1963, 544 p. $7.50.

Two translations of an authoritative work on contemporary Soviet military thought and doctrine, prepared by 15 Soviet specialists and theoreticians. The first has an introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff. The second, a RAND Corporation Research Study, has an analytical introduction, annotations and supplementary material by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré and Thomas W. Wolfe.

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE. BY COLONEL NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES T. R. BOHANNAN. New York: Praeger, 1962, 275 p. $5.95.

An analysis of guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations based on the quite extensive and varied Philippine experience over the last 65 years.

SUN TZU: THE ART OF WAR. TRANSLATED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 197 p. $5.60.

A new translation, with an extensive introduction, of a classic study on the fundamentals of warfare, written in the sixth century B.C.

WE SEVEN. BY THE ASTRONAUTS THEMSELVES. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 352 p. $6.50.

The seven American astronauts tell the story of the Project Mercury space flights. Good reading.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

SHAPING THE WORLD ECONOMY: SUGGESTIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY. BY JAN TINBERGEN. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, 330 p. $4.00. (Paper, $2.25.)

This study, headed by a prominent Dutch economist, seeks to provide suggestions for an international economic policy to meet current world needs. While put forward modestly, the proposals are quite far-reaching and imply more than merely economic measures.

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THE GENESIS OF THE COMMON MARKET. By W. O. Henderson. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962, 201 p. $5.50.

A review, by the historian of the *Zollverein*, of achievements and efforts in international economic coöperation and integration from the late eighteenth century.

WORLD WITHOUT WANT. By Paul G. Hoffman. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 144 p. $3.50.

Mr. Hoffman gives a concise but informed picture of the poverty prevailing throughout much of the world, and the steps that may be taken to increase the pace of development.

ATLANTIC TARIFFS AND TRADE. London: Political and Economic Planning, 1962, 426 p. (Allen and Unwin, distributor, 80/.)

This P.E.P. report provides a very valuable and comprehensive statistical picture of the tariff levels and patterns of industrial imports of the countries of the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development.

FACTORS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By A. K. Cairncross. New York: Praeger, 1962, 346 p. $6.60.

Some 20 admirable essays and articles dealing in the main with economic development and international trade, by a professor of economics at Glasgow who subsequently became Economic Adviser to the British Government.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRICE LEVEL. By Geoffrey Maynard. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962, 295 p. $7.50.

A study of the pressures bearing on the price level during the course of economic growth. The approach is both theoretical and by way of a number of case studies of national experiences.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM. By P. J. D. Wiles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 404 p. $7.50.

One of the liveliest and most original students of Communist economic theory and practice here offers a critical introduction to the subject, but one for the relatively advanced student. The book is not easy going but gains greatly from Mr. Wiles' brisk style and amiable iconoclasm.

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Alexander Gerschenkron. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 456 p. $8.75.

Fourteen essays, several of them small classics, written over the last decade or so by a distinguished economic historian. About half the pieces concern the Russian experience.

THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. Edited by Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1963, 326 p. $6.00. (Paper, $2.25.)

An anthology of ideological statements and pronouncements by political leaders in the fermenting areas of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Lucian W. Pye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 381 p. $6.50.

This is a symposium of theoretically oriented papers dealing with the relationship of social communication in its various forms to political articulation and development.

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LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT. Edited by Crawford Shaw. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications (for the World Community Association), 1962, 265 p. $12.50.

A symposium of papers dealing with trade, anti-trust, marketing and tax problems.

UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Percy W. Bidwell. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1962, 215 p. $5.00.

This book presents the results of an inquiry into the extent and nature of undergraduate education in the field of foreign affairs at American colleges.

The Second World War

STRATEGY AND COMMAND: THE FIRST TWO YEARS. By Louis Morton. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962, 761 p. $10.25.

This volume in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II is devoted to the central question of the development of a strategy for the Pacific theater down to December 1943. This is a particularly significant volume in this monumental series.

VICTORY IN THE WEST. VOLUME I: THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY. By Major L. F. Ellis and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1962, 595 p. 63/. (New York: British Information Services, $12.60.)

This important volume in the official United Kingdom History of the Second World War is the first of two to narrate the victorious campaign in northwest Europe.

SIXTY DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WEST: THE FALL OF FRANCE: 1940. By Jacques Benoist-Méchin. New York: Putnam, 1963, 559 p. $7.95.

A translation of a significant work, the French edition of which was noted here in July 1957.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, 1939–1946. By Lord Casey. New York: McKay, 1963, 256 p. $5.75.

The wartime experiences of an Australian statesman who served as Australian Minister in Washington, Minister of State in the Middle East and member of the War Cabinet, and as Governor of Bengal.

THE ALEXANDER MEMOIRS, 1940–1945. By Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, 209 p. $5.95.

While Field Marshal Alexander's memoirs of the Second World War are hardly a major contribution to the subject, they do afford enjoyable reading and contain excellent appraisals of some of the major figures in the conflict. The volume was edited by John North.

ALAMEIN. By C. E. Lucas Phillips. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1963, 434 p. $5.95.

A good history of the Battle of Alamein "from the point of view of the regimental soldier."

IM HAUPTQUARTIER DER DEUTSCHEN WEHRMACHT 1939–1945. By Walter Warlimont. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1962, 570 p. DM. 34.

A substantial contribution to the history of German military planning and directives during the war, by the deputy chief of the *Wehrmachtführungsstab* from the beginning of the war till 1944.

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BATAAN: THE MARCH OF DEATH. By Stanley L. Falk. New York: Norton, 1962, 256 p. $3.95.

An account of the evacuation of American and Filipino captives from Bataan in 1942. The author is a historian in the Department of the Army.

THE RECORD. By Lord Russell of Liverpool. New York: Knopf, 1963, 351 p. $5.95.

An account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel drawn from the voluminous official record. The author earlier served as legal adviser at the Nuremberg Trials.

The United States

THE ORDEAL OF POWER: A POLITICAL MEMOIR OF THE EISENHOWER YEARS. By Emmet John Hughes. New York: Atheneum, 1963, 372 p. $5.95.

Mr. Hughes, who for a time was a speech writer and adviser to President Eisenhower, here offers his memoirs of the latter's Administration. Mr. Hughes is both frank and indiscreet, sometimes embarrassingly so, and the book is naturally interesting as an "inside" story of politics and decisions at the top level. The author himself became quite disillusioned with the Administration as it refused to perform in accordance with his lights. The late John Foster Dulles is the central villain of the piece.

CROSS FIRE: THE EIGHT YEARS WITH EISENHOWER. By Ezra Taft Benson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 627 p. $6.95.

In these somewhat lengthy memoirs Mr. Benson reviews his eight years as Secretary of Agriculture in the Eisenhower Administration. Of more interest as a political document than as a discussion of agricultural matters.

THE WARFARE STATE. By Fred J. Cook. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 376 p. $4.95.

The author argues the thesis that the United States is in danger of succumbing to a military-industrial coalition that will drive the country to war.

THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Thomas Molnar. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962, 281 p. $5.00.

A critique of American thought and policy in foreign affairs. In the author's judgment neither the "pragmatic approach of the political scientist" nor the "ideological approach of the liberal intellectual," nor indeed the "Anglo-Saxon mentality," is equipped to handle the moves of totalitarian opponents.

THE SIXTH COLUMN. By Roger Burlingame. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962, 258 p. $4.95.

A tract against vigilantism and right-extremism in American life.

SENATOR GERALD P. NYE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Wayne S. Cole. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, 293 p. $5.75.

A study of a leading "noninterventionist" senator of the 1930s, a key figure in the investigation of the munitions industry and the enactment of the neutrality laws. A central theme is the relation of agrarianism to isolationism.

MY LIFE. The Memoirs of Claude Bowers. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 346 p. $6.50.

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These memoirs, written shortly before Mr. Bowers' death in 1957, cover his life as a journalist and Democratic politician, and his subsequent career as a diplomat in Spain and Chile.

THE AMERICAN IMAGE SERIES. New York: Braziller, 1963, 4 v.

This series, under the general editorship of Ernest R. May and comprising four volumes, was designed as an introduction for the general, and especially the foreign, reader. The titles are: "The American Society," edited by Kenneth S. Lynn (245 p. $5.00), "The American Foreign Policy," edited by Ernest R. May (248 p. $5.00), "The American Political Process," edited by Leonard W. Levy and John P. Roche (246 p. $5.00), and "The American Economy," edited by Jesse W. Markham (274 p. $5.00).

THE INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By H. Bradford Westerfield. New York: Crowell, 1963, 538 p. $10.00.

Designed as a text, the book seeks to show the ways by which the United States has exercised its influence overseas.

THE LITERATURE OF COMMUNISM IN AMERICA. By Robert Finley Delaney. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1962, 433 p. $6.50.

An extensive annotated bibliography chiefly on American Communism.

Western Europe

POSTWAR POPULATION TRANSFERS IN EUROPE 1945–1955. By Joseph B. Schechtman. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, 417 p. $8.50.

The author of a work, "European Population Transfers" (1946), dealing with wartime displacements, here carries on the story of the massive population shifts in the decade after the war in Central and Eastern Europe.

THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE. By Richard Mayne. New York: Norton, 1963, 192 p. $4.00.

An introduction to the European Economic Community by an Englishman who has been an active official in it.

DIE PREISDISKRIMINIERUNG IM RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FÜR KOHLE UND STAHL. By Erich Zimmermann. Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1962, 456 p. DM. 45.

A legal study of the problem of price discrimination and its prohibition in the European Coal and Steel Community.

EUROPA: PROBLEME, AUFGABEN, CHANCEN. By Gerhardt Preuschen. Wiesbaden: Krausskopf, 1962, 275 p. DM. 21.80.

Brief sketches of the various Western European nations with the aim of reinforcing the movement toward unity.

ALGERIA AND FRANCE: FROM COLONIALISM TO COOPERATION. By Dorothy Pickles. New York: Praeger, 1963, 215 p. $5.00.

A leading British student of France discusses the impact of the Algerian problem on the politics of postwar France. A helpful guide through this very complex question.

THE ORDEAL OF COEXISTENCE. By Willy Brandt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 112 p. $3.00.

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In these lectures, delivered at Harvard in October 1962, the mayor of Berlin deals with the problem and meanings of "coexistence" and their implications for Berlin, Germany and the West.

THE POLITICS OF POSTWAR GERMANY. Edited by Walter Stahl. New York: Praeger (for Atlantik-Bruecke), 1963, 480 p. $6.00.

A substantial though somewhat uneven collection of writings by German and foreign commentators dealing with various features of postwar Germany and its temper.

FEDERALISM, BUREAUCRACY, AND PARTY POLITICS IN WESTERN GERMANY. By Edward L. Pinney. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963, 268 p. $5.00.

This study is centrally concerned with the play of party politics and the role of federalism and bureaucracy in the functioning of the second chamber in the German Federal Republic, the *Bundesrat*.

DER HITLER-PUTSCH. Edited by Ernst Deuerlein. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962, 759 p. DM. 78.

A massive collection of documents relating to Hitler's unsuccessful *putsch* in Munich in November 1923. Well edited, with an extensive introduction.

GOERING. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 442 p. $6.50.

The authors of a very able study of Dr. Goebbels here collaborate on an equally good work on Hermann Goering. Making use both of the documentary record and of interviews, they have done an impressive job in analyzing the quite complex character of Hitler's monstrous lieutenant.

"VERSCHWÖRUNG GEGEN DEN FRIEDEN." By Annelies von Ribbentrop. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel, 1962, 540 p. DM. 28.

The widow of Joachim von Ribbentrop reviews the background and origins of the Second World War in an effort to exonerate her husband from the charges laid against him at the Nuremberg Trial.

MACHT UND VERBLENDUNG. By Karl-Heinz Janssen. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1963, 342 p. DM. 29.80.

A study of the role and influence of Bavaria, Saxony and other *Bundesstaaten* on German war aims in 1914–1918.

GESCHICHTE DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH. By Walter Goldinger. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1962, 311 p. DM. 19.80.

A concise but scholarly history of Austria since the formation of the republic in 1918.

L'ITALIA DALLA DITTATURA ALLA DEMOCRAZIA, 1919–1948. By Franco Catalano. Milan: Lerici, 1962, 869 p. L. 5000.

A solid political history of Italy from d'Annunzio's Fiume expedition to the establishment of the Italian republic after the war.

THE ITALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT. By Daniel L. Horowitz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 356 p. $7.50.

A valuable study of the history of Italian trade unionism in relation to the social, political and economic environment. A central concern of the author is the reason for Communist domination of the movement in much of the postwar period.

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Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

ALBANIA AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT. By William E. Griffith. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 423 p. $7.95. (Paper, $2.95.)

A first-rate study with voluminous documents of the background and significance of the Albanian break with the Soviet Union and the alliance with Communist China. The volume is the first in a series on international Communism under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T.

THE SICKLE UNDER THE HAMMER. By Oliver Henry Radkey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 525 p. $9.75.

In this work, the sequel to his "The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism," Professor Radkey traces, with an enormous fund of scholarship, the fate of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries between the Bolshevik seizure of power and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1914–1917. By Alexander Dallin and Others. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1963, 305 p. $5.50.

A collection of six essays on various facets of Russian policy in central and eastern Europe between the outbreak of the First World War and the coming of the Revolution.

THE NEW FACE OF SOVIET TOTALITARIANISM. By Adam B. Ulam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 233 p. $4.95.

Essays, by a professor of government at Harvard, on recent developments in Soviet politics.

KHRUSHCHEV SPEAKS. Edited by Thomas P. Whitney. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963, 466 p. $7.50.

An anthology, with commentary, of Khrushchev's speeches, articles, press conferences and comments between 1949 and the end of the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961.

THE U.S.S.R. AND THE FUTURE. Edited by Leonard Schapiro. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich), 1963, 324 p. $6.00. (Paper, $2.25.)

A substantial symposium of essays devoted to an analysis of the new 1961 program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Appendices include texts of the 1919 and 1961 programs.

ESSAYS IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY. Edited by John Shelton Curtiss. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 345 p. $10.00.

This symposium of 20 pieces on modern and contemporary Russian and Soviet history was organized as a *Festschrift* for a leading scholar in the field, Geroid Tanquary Robinson.

THREE GENERATIONS: THE EXTREME RIGHT WING IN FINNISH POLITICS. By Marvin Rintala. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, 281 p. $5.00.

This interesting contribution to our understanding of extreme rightist movements deals with this phenomenon in Finnish politics from the civil war in 1917–1918 through the inter-war period. As the title indicates the author gives considerable attention to the "generations problem."

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POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1932–1939. By Bohdan B. Budurowycz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963, 229 p. $6.00.

A judicious and scholarly monograph on the course of Polish-Soviet relations from the conclusion of the 1932 nonaggression pact to the partition of Poland in 1939.

HOCHSCHULWESEN UND WISSENSCHAFT IN POLEN. By Karl Hartmann. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1962, 606 p. DM. 54.

An elaborate description of the organization of science and education in Poland in the years since 1918.

CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT 1947–1948 AND 1955–1956. By Thad Paul Alton and Associates. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 255 p. $5.00.

This volume, one of a series on East Central Europe, is a careful study by a team of economists of the structure of the gross national product of Czechoslovakia for the years 1947–48 and 1955–56.

RUMANIA AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. By Sherman David Spector. New York: Bookman Associates, 1962, 368 p. $5.00.

A monograph on Rumania's role at Versailles centering on Ioan I. C. Bratianu's energetic struggle to reap the rewards of victory.

PROBLEMS OF GREEK REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Benjamin Ward. Athens: Center of Economic Research, 1962, 159 p.

A useful monograph on the regional distribution of economic activity and development in Greece.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE SUPREME CHOICE: BRITAIN AND EUROPE. By Drew Middleton. New York: Knopf, 1963, 292 p. $5.00.

The author, for many years chief of the London bureau of *The New York Times*, discusses the thorny problem of Britain's relation to the developing European community. It is a mature and serious work that touches on many of the major problems of international relations and affords a good picture of the present British climate of opinion.

THE COMMONWEALTH CHALLENGE. By Derek Ingram. London: Allen and Unwin, 1962, 291 p. 30/.

The author provides both an exposition of the contemporary operations of the Commonwealth and a spirited defense of its utility and viability in the face of a good deal of recent skepticism.

BRITAIN AND THE U.S.A. By Herbert Nicholas. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 191 p. $5.00.

This volume in the series "Britain in the World Today" treats of Britain's dealings with the United States since the beginning of World War II. The coverage is selective and topical, but handled with grace, lucidity and perception.

THE CONSERVATIVE ENEMY. By C. A. R. Crosland. New York: Schocken, 1963, 251 p. $4.95.

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In this extended tract a Labor M.P. outlines a program of "radical Left-wing reform for the middle 1960s." His battle is against a "national mood of stagnation, conformism and dislike of change" that he finds in both Britain and the United States. Not a great deal on foreign affairs.

BRITISH SHIPPING AND WORLD COMPETITION. By S. G. Sturmey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 436 p. $8.00. (London: Athlone Press, 1962, 50/.)

A book addressed to the question: "Why has the tonnage of ships registered in the United Kingdom declined from over 45 percent of the world total in 1900 to about 16 percent of that total in 1960?" The author finds the answer in internal constraints on growth.

THE STRANGLED CRY. By John Strachey. New York: Sloane, 1962, 256 p. $4.50.

This is a selection of Mr. Strachey's "unparliamentary" occasional writings, and deals with a variety of political and biographical topics.

1916—YEAR OF DECISION. By James Cameron. London: Oldbourne, 1962, 240 p. 18/.

A grim picture of England in the depths of the First World War. In four months of that year Britain lost more soldiers than in the entire six years of the Second World War.

NEW ZEALAND POLITICS IN ACTION. By R. M. Chapman and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 303 p. $5.60.

A detailed examination and analysis of the 1960 general election, including extensive sampling and interviewing.

LABOUR POLICY AND LABOUR ECONOMICS IN CANADA. By H. D. Woods and Sylvia Ostry. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 534 p. $8.50.

In this collaborative work by two Canadian economists, Professor Woods deals with labor policy and the general question of public interest in industrial relations, and Professor Ostry treats of labor supply, employment and wages.

The Middle East

THE ARABS AND THE WORLD: NASSER'S ARAB NATIONALIST POLICY. By Charles D. Cremeans. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 338 p. $6.50. (Paper, $2.50.)

The author, an American with long teaching and governmental experience in Egypt, discusses Arab nationalism and foreign policy as it has emerged in recent decades, and especially Nasser's approach to international politics. It is his well-considered view that there is "a foreign policy of Arab nationalism as consistent and as firmly based on doctrine and interests as Western foreign policies." A final chapter deals with policy implications for the United States.

ASPECTS OF NEAR EAST SOCIETY. By Moshe Zeltzer. New York: Bookman Associates, 1962, 276 p. $6.00.

Essays on a variety of Near Eastern topics and problems: minorities in Iraq and Syria, party politics, language revival, and land tenure and ownership.

AMERICANS AND OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Charles W. Hamilton. Houston: Gulf Publishing Co., 1962, 307 p. $5.95.

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An account by an executive of the Gulf Oil Corporation of the development of American oil interests in the Middle East.

BETWEEN ARAB AND ISRAELI. By Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns. New York: Obolensky, 1963, 336 p. $6.50.

An excellent account of General Burns' experiences as Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in 1954–1956, and his efforts to maintain peace in the endless and festering enmity between Arabs and Israelis.

THE OTHER SOCIETY. By H. Darin-Drabkin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 356 p. $5.95.

A quite comprehensive account of the Israeli *kibbutzim:* their structure, social role, economic efficiency and place in the Israeli scene.

WORLD WAR IN IRAN. By Sir Clarmont Skrine. London: Constable, 1962, 267 p. 42/.

An informal narrative, based largely on the personal experiences of the author as a British official, of events in Persia in the First and Second World Wars.

CONTEMPORARY IRAN. By Donald N. Wilber. New York: Praeger, 1963, 224 p. $6.00.

A brief presentation, by a leading American specialist, of the contemporary Iranian scene and the prospects for the future.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA AS A SECULAR STATE. By Donald Eugene Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 518 p. $10.00.

Unlike Pakistan and Burma, which have state religions, India has established itself as a secular state. This work discusses the implications of this decision in the Indian setting, the handling of religious issues, and the problems to be confronted. In the author's view, "the secular state is thus a fundamental aspect of India's democratic experiment."

THE NEHRUS: MOTILAL AND JAWAHARLAL. By B. R. Nanda. New York: Day, 1963, 357 p. $6.75.

A fine, dual biography of Prime Minister Nehru and of his father, Pandit Motilal Nehru, based in good part on family papers and covering an important segment of Indian history from 1861 to 1931.

PROSPECTS FOR INDIAN DEVELOPMENT. By Wilfred Malenbaum. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 325 p. $6.00.

An American economist, for many years a student of development in India, appraises India's economic progress under the first two five-year plans and then compares his projections for the 1960s with those of the Indian Government.

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An editor of *The Montreal Star* and author of a work on Communist China turns to another trouble spot and reports on a recent 50,000-mile trip through Latin America. While the United States is likely to be damned no matter what course it follows in the area, the author argues the need for active intervention, on the side of radical reform.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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